The mere fact that the jury knew they were in a hospital, in view of the court's safeguards, does not demonstrate any prejudice to the defendant. People v. Jenkins (1980), 88 Ill. App.3d 719. Under the circumstances of this case, we find that the trial court acted properly in granting the State's motion to hear the testimony of Mrs. Zeisler outside the courtroom.
Defendant argues that the trial judge failed to fashion a sentence which allowed for the possibility of defendant's rehabilitation and defendant requests that his sentence of 40 to 80 years for murder be reduced to 20 to 40 years and that his armed robbery sentence be reduced to 15 to 45 years. • 3 In response to this request, we agree with the statement of the court in People v. Jenkins (1980), 88 Ill. App.3d 719, 410 N.E.2d 1145, where the court stated: "With respect to defendant's request for a reduction in his sentence, we note that sentencing is a matter of the trial court's discretion and may not be altered absent an abuse of that discretion. [Citation.] Despite defendant's youth and the considerable length of the sentence, we cannot say there is any showing of substantial reasons for reducing the sentence [citation], or that it is manifestly excessive."
His lack of rehabilitative potential is shown by his commission of a felony, the basis for the probation revocation proceeding, within months after he was placed on probation. Despite his youth, 19 years old at the time of his sentence, and the lack of any prior serious criminal convictions, the defendant participated in a substantial number of burglaries which led to his original convictions and which support the trial court's sentence. (See People v. Jenkins (1980), 88 Ill. App.3d 719, 727, 410 N.E.2d 1145.) The trial judge is in the best position to fashion a suitable sentence and, absent an abuse of discretion, it is not our function to substitute our judgment for that of the trial court merely because we feel that we would have imposed a different sentence had that function been ours. ( People v. Perruquet (1977), 68 Ill.2d 149, 154-56, 368 N.E.2d 882.
Defendants also argue that the sentences were excessive considering their past history and character. A reviewing court will not reduce a sentence unless there is an abuse of discretion. ( People v. Almo (1985), 108 Ill.2d 54, 70, 483 N.E.2d 203.) Despite the youth of the defendants and their lack of prior convictions, there is ample evidence of their bad character and lack of rehabilitative potential, other than what is shown by this serious incident, which support the trial judge's sentence. See People v. Jenkins (1980), 88 Ill. App.3d 719, 727, 410 N.E.2d 1145. IV
We cannot overturn a guilty verdict unless the proof is so unsatisfactory and unconvincing that it raises a serious doubt of defendant's guilt. ( People v. Coulson (1958), 13 Ill.2d 290, 296, 149 N.E.2d 96, 99; People v. Jenkins (1980), 88 Ill. App.3d 719, 410 N.E.2d 1145.) Moreover, a rape victim's testimony, standing alone, is sufficient to sustain a conviction if her testimony is clear and convincing ( People v. Baseer (1980), 90 Ill. App.3d 866, 414 N.E.2d 5), and minor discrepancies in her testimony do not render it unconvincing.
No contention is made in the present case that the jury finally selected was not fair or impartial; no prejudicial error is inferable under such circumstances. People v. Jenkins (1980), 88 Ill. App.3d 719, 727, 410 N.E.2d 1145; People v. Carruthers (1974), 18 Ill. App.3d 255, 261, 309 N.E.2d 659. For the foregoing reasons we see no basis upon which to disturb the jury verdict or judgment in this case.
• 12, 13 Defendant finally contends that his three year sentence is manifestly excessive in view of his background and potential for rehabilitation. The proper standard for appellate review of sentencing is limited to whether the trial court abused its broad discretionary powers to fit the sanction to the crime. ( People v. Perruquet (1977), 68 Ill.2d 149, 156, 368 N.E.2d 882, 883; People v. Jenkins (1980), 88 Ill. App.3d 719, 410 N.E.2d 1145.) Under our statutory scheme, the offense of delivering a controlled substance is a Class 2 felony. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 56 1/2, par. 1401(b).)