Opinion
September 17, 1991
Appeal from the Supreme Court, New York County (Alfred Kleiman, J.).
Defendant was convicted of a chain snatching on a subway car. The victim pursued him, followed by a police officer, until defendant was apprehended by another police officer. A bystander on the train walked up to police and spontaneously identified defendant as the perpetrator. With respect to the bystander's identification, since this was not a police arranged identification procedure, the People were not required to provide notice pursuant to CPL 710.30 (1). (People v. Gissendanner, 48 N.Y.2d 543, 552; see, People v. Berkowitz, 50 N.Y.2d 333, 338, n 1; People v. Logan, 25 N.Y.2d 184, 193, cert denied 396 U.S. 1020.)
Defendant's contention that the trial court impermissibly interfered with examination of witnesses is meritless. The trial court, on a very limited basis, only clarified certain questions, a permissible exercise of the court's responsibility (cf., People v. Yut Wai Tom, 53 N.Y.2d 44).
The court erroneously instructed the jury that defendant's identity "must be shown with sufficient certainty to preclude a reasonable possibility of mistake". However, the identification charge as a whole conveyed the appropriate principles, and this single misstatement does not warrant reversal. Nor, in this direct evidence case, did the trial court's interjection of a moral certainty standard in its reasonable doubt instruction, warrant reversal. (See, e.g., People v. Jones, 156 A.D.2d 718, lv denied 75 N.Y.2d 920.)
We have considered the remaining arguments and find them to be without merit.
Concur — Sullivan, J.P., Milonas, Ross, Asch and Smith, JJ.