Opinion
G053675
01-29-2018
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JACKEE JAMAR JEFFRIES, Defendant and Appellant.
Randall Conner, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Barry Carlton and James H. Flaherty, III, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 15NF3033) OPINION Appeal from a judgment and postjudgment order of the Superior Court of Orange County, Lance Jensen, Judge. Affirmed. Randall Conner, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Barry Carlton and James H. Flaherty, III, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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INTRODUCTION
A jury convicted Jackee Jamar Jeffries of one count of domestic battery with infliction of corporal injury (count 2, Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a)) and one count of aggravated assault (count 4, Pen. Code, § 345, subd. (a)(1)) committed against W.D. As to count 2, the jury found true the allegation under Penal Code section 12022, subdivision (b)(1) that Jeffries used a deadly and dangerous weapon. The trial court sentenced Jeffries to the middle term of three years on count 2, a consecutive one-year term on the deadly and dangerous weapon enhancement, and a concurrent three-year term on count 4, execution of which was stayed pursuant to Penal Code section 654.
The trial court issued a protective order pursuant to Penal Code section 273.5, subdivision (j) (section 273.5(j)) that Jeffries have no contact with W.D. or her minor son, B.S., for a period of 10 years. The issue in this appeal is whether the trial court erred by extending the protective order to include B.S. We find no error and affirm.
FACTS
In November 2015, Jeffries lived in an apartment with W.D. and her children, one of whom was 15-year-old B.S. On November 6, as W.D. prepared to take a shower, Jeffries approached and started to engage in anal intercourse with her. W.D. tried to pull away and asked him not to have anal sex. Jeffries forced himself on W.D. and penetrated her three to four times before she managed to get away. When W.D. tried to call for help, Jeffries stepped on her cellphone, held a lit cigarette near her face, and told her things would get "ugly" if she did not comply with his sexual demands.
W.D. made a move toward the apartment door. Jeffries took an aluminum baseball bat and struck her with it several times. W.D. begged Jeffries to stop, but he continued to strike her with the bat. B.S., who had been in his bedroom, walked into the living room, said "[w]hat the hell?", and tried to push Jeffries off of W.D. Jeffries struck B.S. in the head with the baseball bat. B.S. fell to the ground, and Jeffries struck his hand with the bat.
B.S. ran to his bedroom, locked the door behind him, and called 911. He told the 911 dispatcher that Jeffries "was beating my mom with something and he just hit me in the head."
W.D., yelling for help, ran out of the apartment but stumbled on the stairs. Jeffries grabbed her and dragged her backwards toward the apartment. A neighbor heard sounds of a struggle and saw W.D. running from the apartment, her head bleeding. When the neighbor approached, Jeffries let W.D. go and went into the apartment.
W.D. was taken to a hospital. She had a laceration on her head and bruises on her left arm, the back of her right arm, her back, and left shoulder. She wore a hard cast on her left arm for about six weeks and a soft cast on her right arm for about four weeks. She returned to the hospital to relieve swelling on her forehead.
DISCUSSION
Jeffries was convicted of one count of infliction of corporal injury under Penal Code section 273.5, subdivision (a). A defendant commits a violation of section 273.5, subdivision (a), by willfully inflicting a corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition on a spouse or former spouse, cohabitant or former cohabitant, fiancée or fiancé, or the mother or father of the offender's child. (Id., subds. (a), (b).)
At sentencing, the trial court issued and signed a criminal protective order—domestic violence protective order pursuant to section 273.5(j). The protective order prohibits Jeffries from having any contact or coming within 100 yards of the protected persons, who were identified as W.D. and B.S., for a period of 10 years. The protective order was issued on Judicial Council Form CR-160 (revised July 1, 2014).
Section 273.5(j) states: "Upon conviction under subdivision (a), the sentencing court shall also consider issuing an order restraining the defendant from any contact with the victim, which may be valid for up to 10 years, as determined by the court. It is the intent of the Legislature that the length of any restraining order be based upon the seriousness of the facts before the court, the probability of future violations, and the safety of the victim and his or her immediate family. This protective order may be issued by the court whether the defendant is sentenced to state prison or county jail, or if imposition of sentence is suspended and the defendant is placed on probation."
Jeffries argues the protective order is unauthorized in scope because section 273.5(j) allows a protective order to restrain contact only with the victim, and B.S. was not the victim of the crime of infliction of corporal injury. We reject placing such a narrow scope on the protection afforded by section 273.5(j). In interpreting section 273.5(j), we follow this advice given in People v. Clayburg (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 86, 89 (Clayburg) to "use some common sense and [to] ask ourselves: what is the Legislature trying to accomplish?"
The trial could find, and correctly found, that naming B.S. as a protected person was necessary to protect him from Jeffries. The evidence at trial showed that Jeffries struck B.S. on the head and the hand with the baseball bat. It therefore would make no sense to exclude B.S. from the scope of the protective order and expose him to future harm. Jeffries's narrow definition of victim would, we believe, defeat rather than promote the Legislature's purpose of protecting victims of domestic battery and their families. "[W]e have no doubt that the Legislature intends to protect the immediate family of a [domestic battery] victim." (Clayburg, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 92.)
In reaching this conclusion, we are guided by Clayburg, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th 86. In that case, the defendant was convicted of stalking her ex-husband, who was the father of their daughter. The trial court issued a protective order under Penal Code section 646.9(k)(1) (section 646.9(k)(1)) to protect the ex-husband and daughter. (Clayburg, supra, at p. 88.) The majority opinion in Clayburg rejected the argument that the trial court was authorized only to issue an order protecting the "victim" (i.e., the ex-husband). The majority opinion construed the two sentences of section 646.9(k)(1) together and rejected the defendant's literal reading of the first sentence as only protecting the named stalking victim: "Were we to put horse blinders on and read the first sentence in isolation, [the defendant] would prevail." (Clayburg, supra, at p. 91.) But to do so would "'yield[] "a grotesque caricature of the Legislature's purpose."'" (Ibid.)
Section 646.9(k)(1), which is substantially the same as section 273.5(j), reads: "The sentencing court also shall consider issuing an order restraining the defendant from any contact with the victim, that may be valid for up to 10 years, as determined by the court. It is the intent of the Legislature that the length of any restraining order be based upon the seriousness of the facts before the court, the probability of future violations, and the safety of the victim and his or her immediate family."
The Clayburg majority opinion applied rules of statutory construction and construed the two sentences of section 646.9(k)(1) together to conclude: "[I]t is apparent that the Legislature wants the judiciary to protect the child of a named stalking victim. The statute is 'remedial' and consistent with time-honored precedent, must be liberally construed to effectuate the object and purpose of the statute and to suppress the mischief at which it is directed. [Citation.] To strictly construe the statute and read the first sentence to the exclusion of the second would defeat Legislative intent and defeat justice. Such a construction would not suppress the mischief at which it is directed. For the same reasons, we cannot construe the second sentence so as to relate only to the length of the restraining order. The second sentence must be read, not in isolation, but in conjunction with the first sentence." (Clayburg, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 91.)
The Clayburg majority opinion also concluded its interpretation was supported by article I, section 28 of the California Constitution, the victims' bill of rights. (Clayburg, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 92.) Subdivision (e) of section 28, article I states, in relevant part: "As used in this section, a 'victim' is a person who suffers direct or threatened physical, psychological, or financial harm as a result of the commission or attempted commission of a crime or delinquent act. The term 'victim' also includes the person's spouse, parents, children, siblings, or guardian, and includes a lawful representation of a crime victim who is deceased, a minor, or physically or psychologically incapacitated." (Ibid.)
Jeffries argues that Clayburg was wrongly decided and urges us to follow People v. Delarosarauda (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 205 (Delarosarauda), in which the Court of Appeal disagreed with the Clayburg majority opinion's interpretation of section 646.9(k). In Delarosarauda, the defendant was convicted of assaulting his spouse. At sentencing, the trial court issued a criminal protective order under Penal Code former section 136.2, subdivision (i)(1) (former section 136.2(i)(1)) prohibiting the defendant from contact with his spouse, son, or stepdaughter for 10 years. (Delarosarauda, supra, at p. 209.) The Court of Appeal concluded that former section 136.2(i)(1) did not authorize the protective order as to defendant's son and stepdaughter because they were not "'victims,'" that is, "there was no reason to believe that any crime was being or had been perpetrated or attempted to be perpetrated against [them]." (Delarosarauda, supra, at p. 211.)
Former section 136.2(i)(1) stated in relevant part: "In all cases in which a criminal defendant has been convicted of a crime involving domestic violence as defined in Section 13700 or in Section 6211 of the Family Code, . . . the court, at the time of sentencing, shall consider issuing an order restraining the defendant from any contact with the victim. The order may be valid for up to 10 years, as determined by the court. . . . It is the intent of the Legislature in enacting this subdivision that the duration of any restraining order issued by the court be based upon the seriousness of the facts before the court, the probability of future violations, and the safety of the victim and his or her immediate family." Former section 136.2(i)(1) was amended by Statutes 2017, chapter 270, section 1. Among other things, the 2017 amendment modified section 136.2(i)(1) to read, "the court, at the time of sentencing, shall consider issuing an order restraining the defendant from any contact with a victim of the crime." (Ibid.)
In Delarosarauda, the Court of Appeal expressed disagreement with the Clayburg majority opinion's interpretation of section 646.9(k) and, in particular, the majority opinion's conclusion that the second sentence in section 646.9(k) modified the first sentence, thereby expanding the meaning of "'victim'" in the first sentence to include "'a member of the immediate family of a stalking victim . . . who suffers emotional harm.'" (Delarosarauda, supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 212.) The court concluded the language in former section 136.2(i)(1) providing that "the duration of any restraining order issued by the court be based upon . . . the safety of the victim and his or her immediate family" does not modify the term "'victim'" in the first sentence and "[t]hus, any restraining order issued under this provision must be limited to prohibiting contact with the victim." (Delarosarauda, supra, at p. 212.)
We disagree with Delarosarauda and agree with Clayburg. Delarosarauda's interpretation of former section 136.2(i)(1), if extended to section 273.5(j), would be contrary to the Legislature's intent to protect family members against whom credible threats have been made or acts of violence carried out. Delarosarauda also did not consider the Clayburg majority opinion's citation to the victims' bill of rights, which defines victim to include a person who suffers direct or threatened harm. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (e).)
In addition, the court in Delarosarauda distinguished Clayburg factually on the ground that in Clayburg there was evidence that the defendants caused the victim's child to suffer emotional harm while in Delarosarauda there was no evidence to suggest that the victim's children were harmed. (Delarosarauda, supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 212.) The court concluded, "absent evidence from which the trial court could reasonably conclude that [the defendant] had harmed or attempted to harm [the victim's children], the court lacked authority to issue the no-contact protective order as to the children under [former] section 136.2, subdivision (i)(1)." (Ibid.)
In this case, B.S. very much was a victim who suffered physical harm because Jeffries struck him in the head and hand with a baseball bat. We do not decide, however, whether the protective order could be upheld under former section 136.2(i)(1) because we uphold the order under section 273.5(j).
DISPOSITION
The judgment, including the postjudgment protective order, is affirmed.
FYBEL, J. WE CONCUR: MOORE, ACTING P. J. IKOLA, J.