'Where property is snatched from the person of another . . . the crime amounts to robbery.' " (Id. at p. 491, quoting People v. Jefferson (1939) 31 Cal.App.2d 562, 567 ["Where property is snatched from the person of another or procured by threats of bodily harm or under circumstances reasonably creating grave apprehension on the part of the owner of receiving bodily injury at the hands of the thief, the crime amounts to robbery"].) None of the decisions on which the Jefferson court relies purport to hold that snatching property from the person of another is enough alone to constitute robbery.
( People v. Wright, supra, 52 Cal.App.4th at p. 210, italics omitted.) An accepted articulation of the rule is that "`[a]U the force that is required to make the offense a robbery is such force as is actually sufficient to overcome the victim's resistance. . . .'" ( People v. Clayton (1928) 89 Cal.App. 405, 411 [ 264 P. 1105], quoted with approval in People v. Lescallett (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 487, 491 [ 176 Cal.Rptr. 687], criticized on another point in People v. Allison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 879, 895 [ 258 Cal.Rptr. 208, 771 P.2d 1294]; see also People v. Jefferson (1939) 31 Cal.App.2d 562, 567 [ 88 P.2d 238]; People v. Roberts (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 782 [ 129 Cal.Rptr. 529], overruled on another ground in People v. Rollo (1977) 20 Cal.3d 109, 120, fn. 4 [ 141 Cal.Rptr. 177, 569 P.2d 771]; People v. Welch (1963) 218 Cal.App.2d 422, 423 [ 31 Cal.Rptr. 926].
( People v. Wright, supra, 52 Cal.App.4th at p. 210, italics omitted.) An accepted articulation of the rule is that "'[a]ll the force that is required to make the offense a robbery is such force as is actually sufficient to overcome the victim's resistance. . . .'" ( People v. Clayton (1928) 89 Cal.App. 405, 411 [ 264 P. 1105], quoted with approval in People v. Lescallett (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d. 487, 491 [ 176 Cal.Rptr. 687], overruled on another point in People v. Allison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 879, 895 [ 258 Cal.Rptr. 208, 771 P.2d 1294]; see also People v. Jefferson (1939) 31 Cal.App.2d 562, 567 [ 88 P.2d 238]; People v. Roberts (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 782 [ 129 Cal.Rptr. 529], overruled on another ground in People v. Rollo (1977) 20 Cal.3d 109, 120, fn. 4 [ 141 Cal.Rptr. 177, 569 P.2d 771]; People v. Welch (1963) 218 Cal.App.2d 422, 423 [ 31 Cal.Rptr. 926].
An accepted articulation of the rule is that "[a]ll the force that is required to make the offense a robbery is such force as is actually sufficient to overcome the victim's resistance. . . ." ( People v. Clayton (1928) 89 Cal.App. 405, 411 [ 264 P. 1105], quoted with approval in People v. Lescallett (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d. 487, 491 [ 176 Cal.Rptr. 687], overruled on another point in People v. Allison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 879, 895 [ 258 Cal.Rptr. 208, 771 P.2d 1294]; see also People v. Jefferson (1939) 31 Cal.App.2d 562, 567 [ 88 P.2d 238]; People v. Roberts (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 782 [ 129 Cal.Rptr. 529], overruled on another ground in People v. Rollo (1977) 20 Cal.3d 109, 120, fn. 4 [ 141 Cal.Rptr. 177, 569 P.2d 771], and People v. Welch (1963) 218 Cal.App.2d 422, 423 [ 31 Cal.Rptr. 926].
"Where property is snatched from the person of another . . . the crime amounts to robbery." ( People v. Jefferson (1939) 31 Cal.App.2d 562, 567 [ 88 P.2d 238]; and see People v. Roberts (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 782, 785, 787 [ 129 Cal.Rptr. 529]; People v. Welch (1963) 218 Cal.App.2d 422, 423 [ 31 Cal.Rptr. 926].) However, the issue whether sufficient force accompanied the snatching is best left to the jury which may ordinarily find the offense to be either a robbery, or grand theft from the person.
Here the taking of the watch "snatched" from Dodgson is sufficient evidence of force. (See e.g., People v. Jefferson, 31 Cal.App.2d 562 [ 88 P.2d 238]; People v. Reade, 197 Cal.App.2d 509 [ 17 Cal.Rptr. 328].) Judgment is affirmed.
Thus, if a struggle immediately ensues to keep possession of the property and the thief overcomes the resistance, or the article snatched is so attached to the owner's person as to afford resistance or injure the possessor in the taking, the violence is sufficient to constitute the act a robbery." See also, 77 C.J.S., ยง 17, p. 460; People v. Jefferson, 31 Cal.App.2d 562, 567 [ 88 P.2d 238]. Upon the foregoing evidence defendant (if believed by the jury) had established the basis for a justifiable homicide provided he did not indulge in more force than necessary to recapture his money.
(P. 302-303.) Thus it is clear that where there is evidence of force or fear in the taking of an object "snatched" from the person of the victim a conviction of robbery will be sustained ( People v. Jefferson, 31 Cal.App.2d 562 [ 88 P.2d 238]); and the record before us reveals that in shoving Miss Homma, defendant exerted sufficient force to cause her to fall to the floor and result in injury to her, and such as to incapacitate her to the extent that she could not readily recover the envelope from defendant or immediately pursue him, thus permitting his escape from the building. Relative to appellant's contention that the shove occurred after the envelope was taken, thus the "taking" could not be "accomplished by means of force," we refer to the recital in the evidence of several acts of defendant which occurred so "fast" in point of time as to constitute a single incident.
The credibility of the complaining witness and the reasonableness of his testimony were matters for the determination of the jury. ( People v. Jefferson, 31 Cal.App.2d 562 [ 88 P.2d 238].) Defendant's second contention is likewise without merit.
Those instances in which the appellate courts have overridden the conclusions of the jury and the trial courts are where the testimony of the complaining witness is uncorroborated and it is so obviously and so inherently false and unbelievable that reasonable minds may not differ with respect to its character. ( People v. Jefferson, 31 Cal.App.2d 562, 566 [ 88 P.2d 238].) For testimony which has effected a conviction by a jury with the approval of the trial court `to justify a reversal on that ground it should clearly appear that the verdict is the result of passion and prejudice.' ( Ibid.People v. Lewis, 18 Cal.App. 359 [ 123 P. 232].)" ( People v. Holquin, 48 Cal.App.2d 551, 555 [ 120 P.2d 71].