Opinion
E050626 Super.Ct.No. FVI902698 Super.Ct.No. FVI901423
08-31-2011
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. TAIWAN DESHAWN JEFFERSON, Defendant and Appellant.
David McNeil Morse, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, and Gil Gonzalez and Jennifer A. Jadovitz, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
OPINION
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Eric M. Nakata, Judge. Affirmed.
David McNeil Morse, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, and Gil Gonzalez and Jennifer A. Jadovitz, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
I. INTRODUCTION
Defendant and appellant Taiwan Deshawn Jefferson was charged with three counts of robbery. (Pen. Code, § 211.) He confessed to one of the robberies. Before trial, defendant moved to suppress his confession, asserting that it was inadmissible because it resulted from police coercion. The trial court denied his motion and admitted his confession at trial. After the jury found defendant guilty of two counts, he was sentenced to 19 years 4 months in prison.
The court declared a mistrial as to the third count following the jury's inability to reach a unanimous verdict.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. He asserts his confession was involuntary and its admission into evidence violated his right to due process of law under the federal and California Constitutions. Specifically, he claims that during his interrogation the police implicitly promised to not press criminal charges against his wife if he confessed, thus rendering his resulting confession involuntary. We reject this argument and affirm.
II. FACTUAL SUMMARY
A. Background Facts
During the morning of June 24, 2009, Christina Linder and Diana Hyde, two workers at a Check Into Cash store, prepared to open the store for the day. Shortly after the store opened, a man, later identified as defendant, walked in and asked for an employment application. Linder and defendant briefly discussed the application process, and Hyde told defendant he would need three local references. "Three local references?," defendant asked, and, fiddling with something in his waistband, said, "I think I have that right here." At that point, defendant pulled a revolver out from under his shirt and pointed it at the workers' heads.
Defendant ordered the women to back up. He walked around the counter and placed the gun at Linder's temple, saying, "Give me the money." Linder complied with defendant's demand, after which defendant ordered the women to lay on the ground and count out loud. Defendant ran to the back of the store, searched some drawers, and returned moments later, asking if there was a safe. After he was told there was no safe, defendant grabbed Linder's keys from her desk, told the women to count to 10 out loud or he would blow their heads off, and left.
After hearing the store's front door close, Hyde got up and went to lock the front door, while Linder activated the silent alarm. Just as Hyde was about to lock the door, she saw defendant inside a red car. Hyde opened the door and yelled at Linder to write down the license plate number, "5TJL," that she observed on the back of the red car as it drove away. Hyde then locked the front door and called 911.
The robbery was captured on the store's video surveillance system, and a DVD of the incident was played for the jury at trial.
Minutes later, Deputy Sheriff Eric Getts arrived at the store and spoke with Hyde. Hyde told Deputy Getts about the robbery and described the suspect's vehicle as a maroon or burgundy-colored Ford Taurus; she gave him the partial license plate number "5TJL." Deputy Getts advised dispatch of this information, then took statements from Hyde and Linder.
The next morning, Detective Brandon Rio spotted a Ford Taurus resembling Hyde's description and followed it to an apartment complex. Detective Glen Mellor was dispatched to the apartment complex and assigned to wait outside the complex to make sure the car did not leave. Twenty minutes later, the suspect car drove away, and Detective Mellor followed. After Detective Mellor followed the car for about a mile, the car pulled over. Detective Mellor turned on his emergency lights and notified other units that the car was stopping. After other deputies arrived at the scene, Detective Mellor arrested defendant and drove him to the police station. B. Motion to Suppress
Prior to trial, defendant moved to suppress his confession on the ground that it was involuntary. Defendant essentially argued that the totality of circumstances surrounding his interrogation led him to believe that a confession would result in the exoneration of his wife, who was at the time suspected of being an accessory to the robbery.
Detective Mellor was the sole substantive witness at the hearing. He provided the following testimony. After arresting defendant, Detective Mellor quickly searched the glove box and front seat area of defendant's car, and found no gun. Detective Mellor then drove defendant to the police station and placed him in an interview room. Inside the interview room, Detective Mellor advised defendant of his Miranda rights, and defendant said he understood and was willing to talk.
Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.
Detective Mellor initially interviewed defendant for about 45 minutes to an hour in the interview room. At the outset, defendant repeatedly denied any knowledge of the robbery. During this initial interview, Detective Mellor was in and out of the interview room several times because the detectives who were at defendant's apartment were updating him as to their findings. After being informed that the gun had been found in the glove box of defendant's car, Detective Mellor suspected that defendant's wife had moved the gun from the apartment to the glove box to prevent the police from finding it. Suspecting she was an accessory to the robbery, Detective Mellor requested that defendant's wife come to the station to be interviewed.
Evidence adduced at trial was that while Detective Mellor and defendant were at the station, other deputies went to defendant's apartment. With permission from defendant's wife, the apartment was searched. During the search of the apartment, Deputy Mark Smith found a gun case and ammunition in a bedroom. Also with permission, Deputy Smith searched defendant's entire car, finding no gun. Deputy Smith returned to the police station and spoke with Detective Mellor. After speaking with Detective Mellor, Deputy Smith again went to defendant's apartment, and with the consent of defendant's wife, searched the entire car again. This time, in the glove box, Deputy Smith found the gun matching the gun case he had previously found in defendant's apartment.
Complying with Detective Mellor's request, defendant's wife went to the police station with her children. Because she had children with her, she was initially brought into the briefing room. Detective Mellor moved defendant from the interview room to another room and defendant's wife to the interview room, where he interviewed her for about 15 to 20 minutes.
After interviewing defendant's wife, Detective Mellor went back and forth between the two rooms two or three times, attempting to harmonize the two stories. At some point, defendant's wife asked Detective Mellor if she could talk to defendant. Detective Mellor asked why, and she replied that she wanted to tell defendant to tell the truth. Detective Mellor then allowed her to speak with defendant for "a few moments." Following this, Detective Mellor spoke to defendant out of the presence of defendant's wife, telling defendant that the evidence indicated he was lying about the robbery and the location of the gun. At this point, defendant told Detective Mellor that he would tell the truth. Defendant then confessed to the robbery.
Approximately four and one-half hours elapsed between the point at which Detective Mellor began interrogating defendant and the point at which defendant confessed. During this time period, Detective Mellor interrogated defendant "[o]n and off," taking several breaks.
Detective Mellor testified that he did not make any threats to defendant. He made no promises of leniency relative to defendant's wife, nor any promises contingent upon a confession. He did discuss the fact that defendant's wife could be charged with a crime, but did not threaten to charge her with a crime if defendant failed to confess.
Defendant's wife was at the station of her own volition. Detective Mellor told both defendant and his wife, separately, that defendant's wife could be charged with a crime. However, Detective Mellor never told defendant that if he confessed his wife would not be charged with a crime. After defendant confessed, defendant's wife left the station and was not charged with any crimes.
In denying the motion, the trial court explained that, "[b]ased on the statements made by [Detective Mellor] . . . even though there are some inconsistencies, I don't think that they amount to finding out that he is somehow hiding something or nefariously softening up [defendant] in order to get him to confess."
III. ANALYSIS
Defendant claims his confession was coerced and the trial court erred in finding his confession voluntary. Specifically, he contends the sequence of events surrounding his interrogation led him to reasonably believe that if he confessed, his wife would be allowed to leave the police station with his children instead of being taken into custody. In other words, defendant claims Detective Mellor implicitly promised leniency for defendant's wife, if defendant confessed. For the reasons that follow, we reject this argument. A. Applicable Law
The law governing voluntariness of confessions is settled. The prosecution bears the burden of proving the voluntariness of a confession by a preponderance of the evidence. (People v. Markham (1989) 49 Cal.3d 63, 65, 71.) Where, as in this case, we are dealing with uncontradicted facts, we examine the surrounding circumstances to determine independently if "the prosecution met its burden and proved that the statements were voluntarily given without previous inducement, intimidation or threat. [Citations.]" (People v. Hogan (1982) 31 Cal.3d 815, 835, overruled on another point in People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 836.) We look to the totality of the circumstances surrounding the confession, including the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation. (People v. McWhorter (2009) 47 Cal.4th 318, 346-347 (McWhorter).)
"A statement is involuntary if it is not the product of '"a rational intellect and free will."' [Citation.] The test for determining whether a confession is voluntary is whether the defendant's 'will was overborne at the time he confessed.' [Citation.] '"The question posed by the due process clause in cases of claimed psychological coercion is whether the influences brought to bear upon the accused were 'such as to overbear [the defendant's] will to resist and bring about confessions not freely self-determined.' [Citation.]" [Citation.]'" (People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 404.)
"'A finding of coercive police activity is a prerequisite to a finding that a confession was involuntary under the federal and state Constitutions. [Citations.]'" (McWhorter, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 347.) "'A confession may be found involuntary if extracted by threats or violence, obtained by direct or implied promises, or secured by the exertion of improper influence. [Citation.] Although coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to establish an involuntary confession, it "does not itself compel a finding that a resulting confession is involuntary." [Citation.]'" (Ibid.)
"It is well settled that a confession is involuntary . . . if it was elicited by any promise of benefit or leniency whether expressed or implied. . . . '[I]f . . . the defendant is given to understand that he might reasonably expect benefits in the nature of more lenient treatment at the hands of the police, prosecution or court in consideration of making a statement, even a truthful one, such motivation is deemed to render the statement involuntary and inadmissible. . . .'" (People v. Jimenez (1978) 21 Cal.3d 595, 611-612, overruled on another point in People v. Cahill (1993) 5 Cal.4th 478, 510, fn. 17.)
"[M]ere advice or exhortation by the police that it would be better for the accused to tell the truth when unaccompanied by either a threat or a promise does not render a subsequent confession involuntary." (People v Jimenez, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 611.) Further, false information relayed by the police to the defendant may bear upon the voluntariness of the confession. (In re Shawn D. (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 200, 209.)
And, "[a] threat by police to arrest or punish a close relative, or a promise to free the relative in exchange for a confession, may render an admission invalid. [Citations.] However, where no express or implied promise or threat is made by the police, a suspect's belief that his cooperation will benefit a relative will not invalidate an admission." (People v. Steger (1976) 16 Cal.3d 539, 550; see McWhorter, supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp. 355-356 [standing alone, a statement by the police that another person suspected of participating in the crime with the defendant would be let go if their investigation failed to reveal evidence of his or her guilt does not suffice for an implied promise of leniency].) B. Discussion
While conceding that Detective Mellor made no express promise of leniency, defendant argues that within Detective Mellor's comments there was an implied promise. He submits that given the sequence of events surrounding his interrogation, "anyone in [his] position would have reasonably concluded that a confession to the robbery would result in his wife's being allowed to leave the police station with their children instead of being put in jail . . . ."
Defendant's assertion does not survive scrutiny. The record before us is devoid of any facts suggesting that defendant was given to understand that he might reasonably expect that Detective Mellor's decision whether to charge defendant's wife was dependent on defendant confessing to the robbery.
We note initially that in viewing the "totality of the circumstances," there is little information as to the characteristics of defendant. From the facts that he was married and that he and/or his wife had children, we can infer that he was not of a youthful age. Additionally, in that the encounter between Detective Mellor and defendant lasted for over four hours, we can safely infer that he was not easily intimidated by the police.
As for the characteristics of the interrogation, Detective Mellor was the only person who testified. He testified that he felt defendant was being evasive as it related to the location of the gun used in the robbery. Because a gun was found in the glove box of defendant's car after it had been twice previously searched, he believed that defendant's wife was involved as an accessory after the fact. Detective Mellor further testified that because of this suspicion, he asked defendant's wife to come to the police station; she complied voluntarily. Detective Mellor told defendant he believed that defendant's wife was an accessory to the robbery. He questioned both defendant and his wife, and on occasions communicated to defendant what defendant's wife was saying. Eventually, defendant's wife asked to speak with defendant. After a short conversation between the two, defendant confessed to the robbery. Detective Mellor specifically testified that at no time did he ever make any promise of leniency to defendant as to charging defendant's wife with a crime.
To a preponderance of the evidence, there is nothing in these circumstances which indicate that defendant was "given to understand that he might reasonably expect" that Detective Mellor's decision whether to charge defendant's wife was dependent on him confessing to the robbery.
On the issue of voluntariness, totally missing from our record is the substance of any conversation between Detective Mellor and defendant's wife and the conversation between defendant's wife and defendant. Neither defendant nor his wife testified as to any direct or indirect grant of leniency towards defendant's wife. There is no testimony that defendant knew his wife was at the police station prior to her brief conversation with defendant. Nor is there anything to suggest that Detective Mellor made any misrepresentations as to the possible involvement of defendant's wife.
While defendant may have believed that his cooperation would benefit his wife, there is nothing in the circumstances of our record to support a conclusion that his belief arose from any implied promise of leniency by Detective Mellor
In coming to this conclusion, we find the discussion in McWhorter instructive. There, the court found no implied promise of leniency on facts far more indicative of such a promise. In McWhorter, the defendant was charged with the murders of a former next door neighbor and her son. (McWhorter, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 324.) The defendant committed the murders to steal $3,000 from the victims' apartment. Following the murders, the defendant and his wife took a bus from Bakersfield to Las Vegas. (Id. at pp. 325-326, 333-334.) After some investigation, detectives in Bakersfield believed that the defendant committed the murder and that his wife may have been involved. Following the defendant's arrest in Las Vegas, the officer advised the defendant's wife that he wished to speak with her relative to her knowledge of the murders. After agreeing to speak with the officer, the defendant's wife was transported to the Las Vegas police station. (Id. at pp. 342-343.)
The defendant, in speaking with the deputy, first brought up the subject of his wife. He told the interrogating detective: "'You know, my wife's in another room [at the police station] scared to death I imagine.'" (McWhorter, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 350.) The detective responded: "'No, she's she's fine. I, I talked to her. And she's fine. I mean, she's not happy about it but she's, she's fine.'" (Ibid.)Thereafter, the detective informed the defendant that he was not sure that the defendant's wife was not involved in the crime; that he suspected her of being an accessory after the fact and that he hadn't decided whether defendant's wife was "'going to go with [the defendant] too."" (Ibid., italics added.) The defendant, concerned for his wife, asked the officers to "please let her go." The officer explained why they suspected the defendant's wife as an accessory, and then told the defendant: "'The ball's in your court. You call the shots on, on what's gonna happen tonight . . . with [your wife].'" (Id. at p. 351, italics added.) The defendant accused the officer of using his wife as a means of inducing him to confess, and the officer retorted that it was the defendant who, by lying, was the one who was dragging his wife into the situation. "'[Y]ou may think I'm trying to pressure you by holding [your wife] over your head. I'm just being realistic,'" the officer asserted. (Ibid., italics added.)
The officer then told the defendant to consider that they already had enough evidence to get a warrant for his arrest. The defendant again accused the officer of using his wife to induce him to confess, saying: "'You stood there and told me if I don't tell you that I did this, that you're gonna hold her as an accessory.'" (McWhorter, supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp. 351-352.) The officer countered: "'I'm not looking for you just to say okay I did it, let her go. I won't accept that. I will not accept that. And again, do not shift the blame on other people for something that you've done. I'm not over here because I'm a bad guy. I'm not over here because of me. I'm over here because of you. [Your wife]'s down here because of you. . . . So don't try to reverse it.'" The defendant then confessed to the murder. (Id. at p. 352, italics added.)
In McWhorter, the officer later did promise the defendant leniency toward his wife if he would provide more details of the murder. That portion of the confession was ruled inadmissible by the trial court. (McWhorter, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 345.) The California Supreme Court did not disturb that ruling.
In holding that under those circumstances there was no implied promise of leniency, the court focused on evidence that the defendant's wife had not been brought to the station for purposes of encouraging the defendant to confess and that the presence of the defendant's wife at the police station was first brought up by the defendant. Clearly, any facts in the present case which could even be construed as a promise of implied leniency are far more benign. They simply to not rise to the level of an implied promise of leniency.
Defendant, in support of his position, relies primarily on People v. Trout (1960) 54 Cal.2d 576, overruled on another point in People v. Cahill, supra, 5 Cal.4th at page 510, footnote 17, and In re Shawn D. supra, 20 Cal.App.4th 200. In Trout, both the defendant and his wife testified. As set forth by the court, the defendant testified that "[t]he police gave him to understand that his wife would be retained in custody until he confessed, and the only reason he made the confession was to secure her release. While he was at home the police told him that his wife could remain there if he would give them a statement, and, when he answered that he could not confess because he did not know anything about the crimes, one of the officers, whose name he did not know, asked him what manner of man he was to allow her to go to jail when all he had to do was confess. Shortly after he arrived at the police station his wife was crying and tried to sit near him but was forbidden to do so. During his interrogation by Lieutenant Murray the officer told him that [his wife] should be at home with the children at 'that particular time of the year,' that she could go home immediately if he confessed, and that all he had to do was 'come clean and confess, clear this thing up, and she could go home with the children.' The first time Lieutenant Murray sent Mrs. Trout to talk to defendant, she was crying and told him she had been informed she could go home if he confessed. At the second visit she said that she had been taken home for a short while, that the baby cried for her when she left, and that she wanted to go home and 'just couldn't bear it.'" (People v. Trout, supra, at p. 580.) The essence of the testimony was corroborated by Mrs. Trout. (Id. at p. 581.) And while various police officers testified as to the surrounding circumstances, the court characterized the Trouts' testimony as being, for the most part, "uncontradicted." (Id. at p. 583.) Trout is clearly inapposite.
In In re Shawn D., during a three-hour interrogation of a 16-year-old relative to a burglary, the investigating officer told the defendant, among other things: that he was putting his girlfriend in a precarious situation and that the officer did not want to see her get in trouble; that the police report would reflect whether or not the defendant was cooperative; and, within the context of the defendant being tried as an adult, the officer indicated, "'Seriously, you help us get the stuff back and I will personally talk to the [district attorney] or persons who do the juvenile.'" (In re Shawn D., supra, 20 Cal.App.4th at pp. 204-207.) The differences between the present case and In re Shawn D. are patent.
IV. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
King
Acting P.J.
We concur: Miller
J.
Codrington
J.