Opinion
H046782
12-23-2019
In re J.C., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. J.C., Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. 18JV43093A)
J.C. appeals after the juvenile court issued a three-year restraining order against him. J.C. argues that the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to issue the restraining order after it dismissed his wardship petition. In a supplemental opening brief, J.C. also contends that the juvenile court violated his due process right to notice and a hearing on the restraining order. As we explain, we find no merit in J.C.'s arguments and affirm the juvenile court's order.
BACKGROUND
On April 20, 2018, a juvenile wardship petition was filed under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, subdivision (a) alleging that J.C. violated Penal Code section 288, subdivision (b)(1) (lewd or lascivious act on a child by force, violence, duress, menace, or fear).
Unspecified statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
According to the probation officer's detention hearing report, the six-year-old victim reported to her aunt that J.C. " 'touched her where she goes pee-pee.' " Later, the victim told the police that J.C. locked his bedroom door, placed her on his bed, and proceeded to pull her pants down, run his hands up her legs, and insert his fingers inside her vagina. The victim said she cried, and J.C. stopped. When interviewed, J.C. admitted that he touched the victim inappropriately.
On April 23, 2018, defense counsel filed a motion requesting appointment of a doctor pursuant to Evidence Code section 1017. Finding that defense counsel needed psychiatric information, the juvenile court granted the motion and appointed a psychotherapist to examine J.C. At the detention hearing that same day, the juvenile court detained J.C. and issued a temporary restraining order prohibiting J.C. "from having any contact whatsoever with the victim or the victim's family."
The temporary restraining order was reissued and extended numerous times until the wardship petition was ultimately dismissed and the three-year restraining order was issued.
On May 14, 2018, the juvenile court admitted J.C.'s sealed psychological evaluation and referred him to the San Andreas Regional Center. Subsequently, on June 13, 2018, the juvenile court suspended the matter and ordered an evaluation under Penal Code section 1368 to determine J.C.'s mental competency. After receiving the Penal Code section 1368 evaluation and a probation report, the juvenile court again referred J.C. to the San Andreas Regional Center.
On September 5, 2018, the juvenile court ordered competency restoration services for J.C. The following month, the juvenile court downgraded J.C. from electronic monitoring to the community release program.
On March 27, 2019, the juvenile court found J.C. not competent to stand trial and not likely to be made competent. During the hearing, the juvenile court acknowledged that it was required to dismiss the wardship petition but indicated that it intended to issue a three-year restraining order. J.C.'s counsel objected, arguing: "I don't believe the Court has the power to impose a long-term restraining order in a case that is being dismissed and where the minor does not have the—is not competent and cannot be restored, and may not even have had capacity at the time the event was committed. So on those grounds, that is our record we would like to make."
Subsequently, the juvenile court issued a three-year restraining order and dismissed the wardship petition. J.C. appealed.
DISCUSSION
Initially, the Attorney General argued that the appellate record did not include a restraining order; therefore, J.C. failed to demonstrate error. On November 4, 2019, we granted J.C.'s motion to augment the record with a copy of the three-year restraining order issued on March 27, 2019.
On appeal, J.C. argues that the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to issue the three-year restraining order against him because it knew that it would have to dismiss his wardship petition due to his lack of competency. J.C. further argues that the restraining order must be reversed because he was not given adequate notice and a hearing on the matter.
1. Jurisdiction to Issue a Restraining Order
First, we reject J.C.'s claim that the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to issue the three-year restraining order under section 213.5 and California Rules of Court, rule 5.630(a). Here, the juvenile court issued the restraining order before it dismissed the wardship petition, while it still retained jurisdiction under section 213.5 and rule 5.630(a).
Unspecified rule references are to the California Rules of Court.
J.C.'s arguments present an issue of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo. (People v. Gonzalez (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1138, 1141.) When interpreting a statute, "[w]e begin by examining the words of the statute, affording them 'their ordinary and usual meaning and viewing them in their statutory context' [citation], for ' "if the statutory language is not ambiguous, then . . . the plain meaning of the language governs." ' " (People v. Colbert (2019) 6 Cal.5th 596, 603.)
Under section 213.5, subdivision (b), "[a]fter a petition has been filed pursuant to Section 601 or 602 to declare a child a ward of the juvenile court, and until the time that the petition is dismissed or wardship is terminated, . . . the juvenile court may issue ex parte orders . . . (3) enjoining the child from contacting, threatening, stalking, or disturbing the peace of any person the court finds to be at risk from the conduct of the child, or with whom association would be detrimental to the child." And under rule 5.630(a), the juvenile court has the authority to issue restraining orders under section 213.5 "[a]fter a petition has been filed under section 300, 601, or 602, and until the petition is dismissed or dependency or wardship is terminated, or the ward is no longer on probation."
The plain meaning of section 213.5 and rule 5.630(a) permits the issuance of the challenged restraining order. The juvenile court issued the restraining order shortly before it dismissed the petition, when it still retained jurisdiction. J.C., however, argues that because the juvenile court knew as early as November 14, 2018, that J.C.'s petition would likely be dismissed due to his inability to attain competency (see § 709, subd. (h)(4) [petition shall be dismissed by juvenile court if the court finds that the minor will not achieve competency within six months]), it lacked the jurisdiction to issue the restraining order under section 213.5 and rule 5.630(a).
The November 14, 2018 minute order reflects that the juvenile court read and considered J.C.'s probation report and competency program status report and marked as "received" a letter from the San Andreas Regional Center. --------
We find this argument meritless. Since the statutory language of section 213.5 and rule 5.630(a) is clear and unambiguous, " ' " 'there is no need for construction and courts should not indulge it.' " ' " (People v. Vasquez (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 513, 519.) Essentially, J.C. asks us to insert statutory language that specifies that a juvenile court lacks jurisdiction once it knows that a petition may be dismissed. This would violate " ' "the cardinal rule of statutory construction that courts must not add provisions to statutes" ' because ' "a court must not 'insert what has been omitted' from a statute." ' " (Ibid.)
Thus, we reject J.C.'s arguments to the contrary and conclude that the juvenile court had the jurisdiction to issue the challenged restraining order.
2. Right to Notice and a Hearing
In a supplemental brief, J.C. argues that his statutory and due process rights were violated because he did not receive adequate notice that the juvenile court intended to issue a three-year restraining order. We conclude that J.C.'s failure to object on these grounds below forfeits his arguments on appeal.
Section 213.5 provides that the juvenile court may issue two different types of restraining orders: a temporary restraining order that may be issued without notice and a hearing that can remain in effect for up to 25 days (id., subd. (c)(1)), or restraining orders issued "upon notice and a hearing" that can remain in effect for up to three years (id., subd. (d)(1)).
In support of his argument, J.C. relies on In re Jonathan V. (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 236 (Jonathan V.). In Jonathan V., the minor was alleged to have committed multiple crimes, including second degree robbery. (Id. at p. 239.) At a trial setting hearing, the People requested a juvenile restraining order precluding the minor from contacting the victims. (Ibid.) Defense counsel objected, arguing that minor was entitled to an actual hearing on the order. (Id. at pp. 239-240.) On appeal, the appellate court reversed the restraining order after concluding that the minor did not receive adequate notice or an opportunity to be heard, which violated his statutory rights under section 213.5 and his due process rights. (Jonathan V., supra, at pp. 242, 246.) The appellate court observed that the People had not previously sought a protective order in the minor's case, and the minor was "entitled to some notice prior to the hearing so counsel and [minor] could prepare for the hearing." (Id. at p. 243.) Rejecting the People's argument that same-day oral notice was adequate, the Jonathan V. court noted that the minor "had no reason to believe the People would request a restraining order" at the trial setting hearing. (Id. at p. 244.) The appellate court further determined that "[w]hile the specific amount of time necessary to satisfy the 'notice' requirement is not delineated in section 213.5, more than courtroom notice is required." (Id. at p. 245.)
Jonathan V. is distinguishable. Unlike the minor in Jonathan V., J.C. did not object to the three-year restraining order below on the grounds that he lacked adequate notice and a hearing on the matter. J.C.'s counsel objected to the restraining order solely on the basis that she did not believe that the juvenile court had the authority to impose a long-term restraining order when J.C. was found not competent to stand trial.
In general, "a reviewing court ordinarily will not consider a challenge to a ruling if an objection could have been but was not made in the trial court. [Citation.] The purpose of this rule is to encourage parties to bring errors to the attention of the trial court, so that they may be corrected." (In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293, fn. omitted.) " ' " ' "[A] constitutional right," or right of any other sort, "may be forfeited in criminal as well as civil cases by the failure to make timely assertion of the right before a tribunal having jurisdiction to determine it." ' " ' " (People v. Trujillo (2015) 60 Cal.4th 850, 856; People v. Nguyen (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 260, 271 ["[i]t is well-established that a lack of notice can be forfeited by failure to object, even when it is claimed that it violated due process"].) The forfeiture doctrine has been applied in a variety of contexts (see, e.g., Jans en Associates, Inc. v. Codercard, Inc. (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1166, 1170 [failure to object to inadequate notice for sanctions award under Code Civ. Proc., § 128.5 forfeits issue on appeal]; Trujillo, supra, at pp. 858-859 [failure to object to imposition of booking fee for failing to comply with ability-to-pay hearing requirement under Pen. Code, § 1203.1b forfeits issue on appeal]; In re Wilford J. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 742, 754 (Wilford J.) [failure to object to defect in notice for setting a jurisdictional hearing forfeits appellate review in a dependency case]), and we see no reason why it should not apply here. J.C. had the opportunity to bring to the juvenile court's attention any defects in notice or lack of a required hearing, yet he did not do so. As a result, his failure to object below on these grounds forfeits his challenge on appeal.
Moreover, we observe that the situation described in Jonathan V. is factually dissimilar to J.C.'s case. In Jonathan V., the minor had no reason to believe that a restraining order would be issued against him. (Jonathan V., supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at p. 244.) In contrast, the juvenile court in this case issued multiple temporary restraining orders that were extended when continuances were granted. (See § 213.5, subd. (c)(4).)
Finally, J.C. argues that his limited intellectual capacity underscores the need for proper notice, which would have permitted his counsel to adequately prepare for a hearing. He argues that due to his lack of mental competency, he could "very well violate the restraining order without even realizing it." We acknowledge that "[a] defect in notice . . . is a most serious issue, potentially jeopardizing the integrity of the entire judicial process." (Wilford J., supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at p. 754.) J.C.'s claim, however, is purely speculative. By the time the three-year restraining order was issued, the temporary restraining order, originally issued on April 23, 2018, had already been in place for almost a year, and there is nothing in the record to indicate that J.C. had trouble complying with the restraining order or that he ever violated it. Moreover, despite the apparent lack of notice, it appears that J.C.'s attorney was prepared to make arguments about the propriety of the restraining order and did so during the hearing.
As a result, we conclude that J.C. has forfeited his argument that the restraining order must be reversed.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
/s/_________
Premo, Acting P.J. WE CONCUR: /s/_________
Bamattre-Manoukian, J. /s/_________
Mihara, J.