Opinion
B228151
10-19-2011
In re J.B., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. J.B., Defendant and Appellant.
James M. Crawford, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, James William Bilderback II, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Eric E. Reynolds, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. MJ15204)
Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Benny C. Osorio, Judge. Affirmed.
James M. Crawford, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, James William Bilderback II, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Eric E. Reynolds, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Appellant J.B. claims the trial court erred in declining to suspend proceedings to determine if he was mentally competent to understand the nature of the pending juvenile court adjudication hearing and to assist counsel in a rational manner, after his counsel declared a doubt. J.B. also contends the court abused its discretion in committing him to the Division of Juvenile Justice. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment.
J.B. has been the subject of three petitions under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 (wardship petitions) alleging increasingly violent behavior over the course of three and a half years, beginning when J.B. was 13 years old. J.B. admitted the allegations of the first petition, that he committed burglary of a walk-in storage container and vandalism causing over $400 in damage by defacing the walls, doors and windows of a Lancaster middle school. He was placed home on probation. A second wardship petition for misdemeanor battery was sustained after J.B. had an argument with his mother and slammed a door on her shoulder. He was placed in short-term camp. While on probation, J.B. failed to appear in court, a warrant of arrest was issued, and he was arrested and placed in mid-term camp.
All further section references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless stated otherwise.
The third sustained petition, which is the subject of this appeal, was for second degree robbery. J.B. and an accomplice robbed the victim of his cell phone. The victim was at a bus stop when he saw J.B. and another male approach him. The other male sat next to the victim on the bus bench while J.B. stood in front of him and asked to borrow his cell phone. The victim allowed J.B. to borrow his cell phone, J.B. made a call and then walked away with the cell phone. The victim followed J.B. and asked for the return of his cell phone. J.B. turned toward the victim, his accomplice got off the bench and stood next to the victim, J.B. removed a kitchen knife from his right front pants pocket and then asked, "Do you really want it back?" J.B. and his accomplice then walked away with the victim's phone.
At the contested adjudication hearing, J.B. admitted he was a member of the "VNE" gang, that he joined the gang when he was about 14, and that his moniker was "Kid" or "Kiddo." Another witness, Rudy Escarcega, testified he committed the robbery with someone whom he refused to identify. Escarcega testified he knew J.B. and they were both members of the VNE gang, but J.B. was not with him at the time of the robbery. Escarcega served time in custody for the robbery. J.B. testified that he met Escarcega at camp in 2009 and they hung out a couple of times after J.B. was released from camp. J.B.'s mother lived about a block away from the bus stop where the robbery was committed. Escarcega admitted he saw J.B. at his mother's house on the morning of the robbery.
J.B. makes no challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the adjudication. He argues there should have been no adjudication hearing without a determination of his competence, because his counsel had declared a doubt that he was competent. A criminal trial of an incompetent defendant violates the due process clauses of the state and federal constitutions. In determining whether a defendant is competent to stand trial, the inquiry is whether the defendant "'"has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding—and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him."'" (Timothy J. v. Superior Court (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 847, 857, citing Dusky v. United States (1960) 362 U.S. 402.) The rights of due process are extended to juvenile delinquency proceedings, including the right to the effective assistance of counsel. Thus, if a juvenile court entertains a reasonable doubt as to the minor's competency, it should conduct a hearing on the minor's present competence. (Timothy J. v. Superior Court, supra, at pp. 857-858.)
If the juvenile court finds there is a reason to doubt that a minor who is the subject of a section 601 or 602 petition is capable of understanding the proceedings or of cooperating with his attorney, California Rules of Court, rule 5.645(d) requires the court to "stay the proceedings and conduct a hearing regarding the child's competence." "A defendant is presumed competent unless the contrary is proven by a preponderance of the evidence. [Citations.] On appeal, the reviewing court determines whether substantial evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, supports the trial court's finding." (People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 131.)
The mere fact that a defendant's counsel may opine that a defendant is not competent does not require a trial court either to declare a doubt as to the defendant's competency or to hold a competency hearing. (People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1111-1112.) J.B.'s counsel offered no evidence whatsoever that J.B. was not competent. On August 16, 2010, J.B.'s counsel filed a "Notice of Potential Declaration of Doubt" stating "the undersigned counsel for the Minor [J.B.] may declare a doubt as to the competency of the Minor to proceed with his defense." The next day, counsel declared a doubt. The court asked counsel to state the basis for declaring a doubt. Counsel responded, "The basis is that there is an issue. I believe I have the document here. This is a fresh document. A copy is handed to the D.A. herewith. I have an original and one copy for the court dated August 17, 2010 that I declare a doubt as to whether the minor is competent to understand, proceed with, participate in, and/or assist counsel in this case and/or the issues, options and attendant consequences or risks arising therefrom. And I request that Dr. Anderson be appointed to perform a competency evaluation."
The trial court correctly found that it could not suspend proceedings based on counsel's opinion without substantial evidence that J.B. was not competent. The court took notice of the two volumes of J.B.'s court file, showing his extensive participation in court proceedings, and stated that the court had spoken with J.B. on previous occasions, and nothing before the court provided an evidentiary basis for suspending proceedings. The court then said, "So unless there is anything further, the court at this time will not find a doubt." J.B.'s counsel replied, "Submitted, you honor. There is nothing else I can do except to declare a doubt." We conclude, as did the trial court, that J.B.'s counsel had no evidentiary basis for his declaration that there was a doubt as to J.B.'s competence. Manifestly, the trial court committed no error in declining to suspend proceedings in the absence of any evidence at all that J.B. was not competent.
J.B. also contends the trial court's decision to commit him to the Division of Juvenile Justice was an abuse of discretion because there was no substantial evidence he stood in need of rehabilitative punishment (§ 202), or that such punishment would be beneficial in rehabilitating him (§ 734). Section 202 states in pertinent part: "(a) The purpose of this chapter is to provide for the protection and safety of the public and each minor under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and to preserve and strengthen the minor's family ties whenever possible[.] . . . If the minor is removed from his or her own family, it is the purpose of this chapter to secure for the minor custody, care, and discipline as nearly as possible equivalent to that which should have been given by his or her parents. . . . [¶] (b) . . . Minors under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court as a consequence of delinquent conduct shall, in conformity with the interests of public safety and protection, receive care, treatment, and guidance that is consistent with their best interest, that holds them accountable for their behavior, and that is appropriate for their circumstances. This guidance may include punishment that is consistent with the rehabilitative objectives of this chapter. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] (d) Juvenile courts and other public agencies charged with enforcing, interpreting, and administering the juvenile court law shall consider the safety and protection of the public, the importance of redressing injuries to victims, and the best interests of the minor in all deliberations pursuant to this chapter . . . ."
Section 734 provides: "No ward of the juvenile court shall be committed to the [Division of Juvenile Justice] unless the judge of the court is fully satisfied that the mental and physical condition and qualifications of the ward are such as to render it probable that he will be benefited by the reformatory educational discipline or other treatment provided by the [Division of Juvenile Justice]."
The juvenile court has broad discretion in choosing juvenile placements. (In re Eddie M. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 480, 507.) "Under section 202, juvenile proceedings are primarily 'rehabilitative' (id., subd. (b)), and punishment in the form of 'retribution' is disallowed (id., subd. (e)). Within these bounds, the court has broad discretion to choose probation and/or various forms of custodial confinement in order to hold juveniles accountable for their behavior, and to protect the public. (Id., subd. (e).) . . . Given these aims, and absent any contrary provision, juvenile placements need not follow any particular order under section 602 and section 777, including from the least to the most restrictive. [Citations.] Nor does the court necessarily abuse its discretion by ordering the most restrictive placement before other options have been tried. [Citations.]" (In re Eddie M., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 507; see also In re Julian R. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 487, 496-497.) In other words, a more restrictive placement may be ordered even absent previous resort to less restrictive placements. (In re Eddie M., supra, at p. 507; In re Ricky H. (1981) 30 Cal.3d 176, 183, superceded by statute as stated in In re Michael D. (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1392, 1396.)
The juvenile court considers the minor's age, the circumstances and gravity of the offense, any previous delinquent history, and other relevant and material evidence in making a disposition determination. (§ 725.5; In re Jonathan T. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 474, 484-485; In re John F. (1983) 150 Cal.App.3d 182, 184.) "A [Division of Juvenile Justice] commitment is not an abuse of discretion where the evidence demonstrates a probable benefit to the minor from the commitment and less restrictive alternatives would be ineffective or inappropriate. [Citation.]" (In re M.S. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1250; see also In re Jonathan T., supra, at p. 485.)
We review juvenile court disposition orders for an abuse of discretion and indulge all reasonable inferences to support the decision. (In re Jonathan T., supra, 166 Cal.App.4th at p. 485; In re Antoine D. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 1314, 1320.) "An appellate court will not lightly substitute its decision for that rendered by the juvenile court. We must indulge all reasonable inferences to support the decision of the juvenile court and will not disturb its findings when there is substantial evidence to support them. [Citations.]" (In re Lorenza M. (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 49, 53; see also In re Asean D. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 467, 473.)
We find no abuse of discretion. J.B. was an admitted gang member. He abused alcohol and drugs, including Ecstasy and marijuana, to a significant extent. His behavior worsened with each offense, going from commission of property offenses, including burglary and vandalism, to violent or potentially violent offenses, including battery upon his mother and robbery with the use of a knife. J.B. spent 18 months in camp, yet he committed the robbery less than two months after his release. J.B.'s counsel asked that he be evaluated for placement at the Dorothy Kirby Center, but the court pointed out to counsel that J.B. had been previously evaluated for placement at Dorothy Kirby and was found to be unsuitable.
In the probation report, J.B.'s probation officer wrote, after a lengthy discussion of J.B.'s social history, "This officer considered recommending the camp community placement program but given that the minor was just released from camp on 04/01/10, after being in camp for eighteen months, it appears the time minor spent in camp did not have a positive impact on minor's willingness to comply with his court ordered conditions of probation. Unfortunately, this officer has exhausted all the juvenile resources for this minor to [aid] him in his rehabilitation process. The minor's conduct under home on probation grant has been less than satisfactory as well as his past camp behavior. The minor continues to engage in gang activity putting himself and the community in danger."
The trial court listened to the arguments of counsel and the statements of J.B. and his mother. The court explained thoroughly and compassionately on the record all the reasons why the court concluded that J.B. would benefit most by placement with the Department of Juvenile Justice, so that J.B. could receive the benefits of the gang intervention program and try to turn his life around before he turned 18. The court considered the history of J.B.'s juvenile offenses, the intelligence and potential that J.B. displayed in a letter he wrote the court, the support he received from his mother and school authorities, despite which he had numerous violations of probation and camp rules, frequent fights, even while in custody awaiting the adjudication hearing. The court described J.B.'s failure to improve in camp placement, Dorothy Kirby's rejection of J.B. as a placement candidate there, and concluded that J.B. would benefit from the reformatory discipline or other treatment provided by the Division of Juvenile Justice. The court acted well within its discretion based on sound reasons explained with care in deciding J.B. should be committed to the Division of Juvenile Justice.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
GRIMES, J. WE CONCUR:
BIGELOW, P. J.
FLIER, J.