Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. P04CRM0045
BLEASE, Acting P. J.
Defendant’s probation was revoked when he “left” a two year treatment program approximately two months after entering the program. Defendant argues the evidence that he “left” the program was insufficient to show a willful violation of probation. We disagree and shall affirm the order revoking defendant’s probation.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Defendant pleaded guilty in 2004 to unlawful possession of a forged driver’s license and unlawful possession of a forged check. The court suspended imposition of sentence, placed defendant on three years formal probation, and required him to serve 365 days in jail. In February 2007, defendant’s probation was revoked and reinstated after he failed to notify his probation officer of his current address. Defendant was ordered to enroll in Delancey Street, a substance abuse program. Defendant failed to report to Delancey Street, his probation was again revoked, and an arrest warrant was issued.
Defendant admitted the probation violation. The trial court imposed and stayed a state prison term of three years, eight months. The court ordered probation reinstated and continued, and ordered defendant to complete a two year program at Delancey Street. The court ordered defendant transported directly to Delancey Street on April 3, 2008, where he was to be enrolled immediately, and ordered the program to file 90-day status reports and to notify the court if defendant left the program.
On May 30, 2008, the probation department received notice from Delancey Street that defendant “left Delancey Street on May 30, 2008, without successfully completing our program.” The trial court again ordered probation revoked, and defendant requested a probation violation hearing.
At the hearing, defendant testified that “at some point after May 30th [he was] no longer in Delanc[e]y Street[.]” He stated that immediately after he was “no longer in Delanc[e]y Street,” he hitchhiked from San Francisco to the El Dorado County jail. The trip took him 11 days.
Defendant argued there was insufficient evidence he willfully violated probation. The trial court responded: “He wasn’t terminated from the program, he left the program. That’s a volitional act.” The court ordered execution of the previously stayed sentence.
DISCUSSION
Citing People v. Galvan (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 978, 983, which held that it is an abuse of discretion to revoke probation “if the probationer did not willfully violate the terms and conditions of probation[,]” defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion because the evidence he “left” the Delancey Street program was not sufficient evidence he willfully left the program. We shall conclude the evidence was sufficient to support a conclusion under the appropriate burden of proof that defendant willfully violated the terms of his probation agreement.
Trial courts have very broad discretion in determining probation violations, and only in extreme cases should an appellate court interfere with the discretion of the trial court. (People v. Rodriguez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 437, 443.) Proof that a probationer has violated the conditions of probation need be made only by a preponderance of the evidence. (Id. at p. 442.) Thus, since defendant’s claim is based on the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine whether the record contains substantial evidence from which the court could find it more probable than not that he willfully violated the probation agreement. As with any substantial evidence question, we review the evidence and any reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. (People v. Coffman (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 89.)
The trial court’s determination that defendant willfully violated the conditions of his probation were based on the letter from Delancey Street stating that defendant “left” the program “without successfully completing [the] program[,]” and that defendant did not contact the probation department from the time he left on May 30, until he turned himself in approximately 11 days later. Defendant argues there was no evidence that his failure to complete the program was willful, and that while the term “left” may imply a volitional act, “the decision to leave may not be willful or volitional.” Defendant offers by way of example, that his decision to leave would not have been volitional if he had been ordered to leave due to lack of room. We are unpersuaded.
The terms of defendant’s probation included the court’s direction that defendant “participate in and successfully complete” the Delancey Street program for a period of two years. The court told defendant: “if you fail the program in Delancey Street, if you leave the program for any reason, you would waive all of your credits. [¶] Basically, you would be going to prison for the maximum sentence I could impose, the purpose being to have you succeed in the program. To put it simply, you will be on the train to state prison. The only thing that keeps you from getting there for the maximum term is your successful completion of the Delancey Street program.” (Italics added.) The court further noted it had been determined that the program had room for him, and that someone would pick up defendant and deliver him to the program. Furthermore, the order of probation directed “the Delancey Street program to notify the court if the defendant leaves the program.” Defendant assented to the terms of this order by signing it.
It is apparent from the terms of the probation agreement set forth by the trial court that defendant could not leave the Delancey Street program for any reason before successfully completing the program. Thus, the only question is whether defendant willfully left the program. His reasons for leaving were immaterial.
It was reasonable for the trial court to infer from the Delancey Street letter that defendant left the program willfully, and was not forced out through no fault of his own. Had defendant been removed from the program because the program had no room, the letter would have said as much. There was room to accommodate defendant when he entered the program, a two year program, and it is highly improbable that the program would have taken on defendant if there had not been room for him the entire two years it took to complete the program. It is also highly improbable the program would have accepted someone else if it meant having to throw out defendant.
The trial court was also aware of defendant’s prior performance on probation, and that this was not the first time he had violated probation. The first time, defendant failed to enter Delancey Street.
Defendant’s history on probation and the implication of the letter from Delancey Street reporting defendant had “left” the program, and not that he had been removed from the program, constituted sufficient evidence from which the trial court could reasonably infer that defendant’s action in leaving the program was willful. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering his probation terminated and executing the previously imposed sentence.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: SIMS , J., ROBIE , J.