Opinion
4-23-0169 4-23-0170 4-23-1071
07-12-2023
In re J.T., H.T., and E.T., Minors v. James T., Respondent-Appellant The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee,
This Order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Adams County Nos. 21JA29, 21JA30, 21JA31 Honorable John C. Wooleyhan, Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE CAVANAGH delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Doherty and Knecht concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
CAVANAGH JUSTICE
¶ 1 Held: The trial court's finding respondent was unfit under section 1(D)(m) of the Adoption Act was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The court did not err in admitting service plans into evidence. The State was required to prove only one of the allegations of unfitness in its petition when multiple allegations were alleged.
¶ 2 In November 2022, the State filed a motion to terminate the parental rights of respondent, James T., as to his minor children, J.T., H.T., and E.T. The children's mother, Paulla M., is not a party to this appeal. However, she appealed the termination of her parental rights in appellate court case Nos. 4-23-0305, 4-23-0306, and 4-23-0307. In February 2023, the trial court granted the State's petition and terminated respondent's parental rights.
¶ 3 Respondent appeals, asserting the trial court erred by (1) admitting service plans into evidence without proper foundation and (2) finding he failed to make reasonable progress toward the return of the children in any nine-month period following the adjudication of neglect of the children when the petition listed two nine-month periods, one of which had not yet ended. We affirm.
¶ 4 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 5 In May 2021, the State filed petitions for adjudication of wardship, alleging respondent and Paulla neglected the children under section 2-3(1)(b) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act) (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2020)) in that the children's environment was injurious to their welfare. The State alleged that, on May 3, 2021, J.T. had a black eye with a cut underneath it. J.T. reported respondent accidentally hit her with a plastic dresser. Respondent agreed to take J.T. to her primary care doctor but failed to follow through. Law enforcement was investigating the matter. The petition also alleged that, on May 9, 2021, Paulla gave birth to E.T., and both she and E.T. tested positive for amphetamines. On May 11, 2021, a child protection investigator and a child welfare specialist explained to respondent that, for the family to remain intact, he and Paulla would need to submit to weekly drug screens. However, respondent failed to provide enough saliva to complete a screen. Respondent then agreed to a urine screen but did not complete it. On May 13, 2021, Paulla was arrested on a warrant for felony theft and was in custody as of the date of the filing of the petition. Also on May 13, 2021, the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) took protective custody of the children. DCFS found multiple suspicious bruises on H.T.'s back, shoulders, and arms. The petitions also included a section labeled "Prior History," stating three different dates in 2020 in which respondent was indicated for allegations of inadequately supervising J.T.
¶ 6 On October 4, 2021, respondent admitted to the allegations concerning E.T. and to the prior history portion of the petitions. The trial court accepted respondent's admissions, found the minors were neglected or abused, and placed temporary custody and guardianship of the children with DCFS.
¶ 7 On January 7, 2022, following a dispositional hearing, the trial court found it was consistent with the health, welfare, and safety of the children and in their best interests to make them wards of the court, granting guardianship and custody of the children to DCFS. In doing so, the court found, since October 4, 2021, there had not been any progress towards a return home goal by either parent. The court further found both parents unfit and required them to submit a negative drug screen before visiting with the children.
¶ 8 On November 16, 2022, the State filed a petition for termination of parental rights, alleging, in part, respondent was unfit under section 1(D)(m)(i), (ii) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(i), (ii) (West 2022)) because he failed to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions which were the basis for the removal of the children within any nine-month time period after they were adjudicated neglected under the Juvenile Court Act and failed to make reasonable progress towards the return of the children in any nine-month period after the end of the initial nine-month period after they were adjudicated neglected. The nine-month periods the State relied upon were from October 4, 2021, to July 10, 2022, and from July 11, 2022, to April 11, 2023.
¶ 9 On February 21, 2023, the trial court held a hearing on the State's petition. Bethany Greenwood, a child welfare specialist at Chaddock, the agency designated by DCFS to manage the case, testified she was the children's caseworker between October 2021 and March 2022. The case was transferred to another caseworker in March 2022 after Greenwood obtained an emergency order of protection against Paulla. Greenwood testified she developed and evaluated a service plan in November 2021 that covered the months of May 2021 to November 2021. Under that plan, respondent was required to complete parenting classes, visitation, substance abuse screenings, mental health treatment, cooperate with the agency, and maintain housing. Greenwood rated respondent's parenting task unsatisfactory because he had not yet begun parenting classes. She stated he was referred to the January 2022 parenting class. Greenwood rated respondent unsatisfactory on the substance abuse and cooperation tasks because he had positive drugs screens during that time and he did not keep up to date with his employment status. Greenwood also rated respondent's mental health task unsatisfactory because he had not engaged in services. Further, Greenwood rated respondent's housing and employment tasks unsatisfactory because a previous caseworker reported seeing marijuana and paraphernalia on a table during a visit with the children and there was a concern about people who frequently used drugs visiting the home. Respondent also did not have stable employment. Greenwood testified respondent received satisfactory ratings in demonstrating appropriate parenting skills, not having other people at visits without approval, cooperating with the people who supervised the visits, meeting with the caseworker for scheduled and unscheduled visits, signing all necessary releases, cooperating with urine and blood tests when requested, and maintaining the structural components of the home.
¶ 10 The State offered as evidence State's exhibit No. 4, a copy of the service plan prepared by Greenwood. Respondent's counsel objected based on lack of foundation. The State then recalled Greenwood as a witness, who testified service plans were completed in the ordinary course of Chaddock's business. She stated the plans gave a complete and accurate account of the parents' progress during the dates of the plans. She further testified she created the service plan in State's exhibit No. 4, and it was made on or about the date she evaluated the plan. The plan had to be submitted and approved by a supervisor, who ensured the information was accurate. The trial court admitted the exhibit over respondent's objection.
¶ 11 Kelsey Platt, a child welfare specialist supervisor at Chaddock, testified she approved a service plan, marked as the State's exhibit No. 5. The plan was developed by caseworker Brett Landwehr on April 21, 2022, to cover the time from November 2021 to April 2022. Platt stated the plan was created in the ordinary course of Chaddock's business. She further stated service plans were made on or about the time periods reported in the plan and contained a complete and accurate account of the parents' progress during those times. Platt testified the tasks in State's exhibit No. 5 remained the same as the previous plan.
¶ 12 Platt testified respondent's visitation was suspended by court order on April 21, 2022, due to lack of engagement in services and visitation. Although respondent was referred to a parenting class on January 22, 2022, he was discharged due to nonattendance and rated unsatisfactory on his parenting task. The trial court overruled an objection from respondent that questions about the ratings called for hearsay. The State argued Platt had personal knowledge of the plan, and the court stated Platt could testify to the contents of the plan that she supervised.
¶ 13 Platt testified respondent was rated unsatisfactory in cooperation because he did not engage in his recommended services and did not provide documentation that was requested for work. He was rated unsatisfactory in his substance abuse task because he did not engage in services, he did not start services that he reported, and he had positive drug screens. Respondent was rated unsatisfactory in his mental health task because he was discharged from services for unsatisfactory attendance. Respondent was also rated unsatisfactory in his housing task because a caseworker could not enter the home to assess it due to respondent sharing the home with Paulla, who had threatened a caseworker, and because of reports that individuals were still using "substances" in the home. The court admitted State's exhibit No. 5 into evidence without objection from respondent.
¶ 14 Mary Miller, a child welfare specialist at Chaddock, testified the case was transferred to her in October 2022 after Brett Landwehr left the agency. Miller remained the caseworker for the children up to the date of the hearing and created the service plan for the reporting period of April 2022 to November 2022, which was labeled as State's exhibit No. 6. Miller testified she also evaluated the plan and it was prepared in the regular course of Chaddock's business. She further stated the service plan was made on or about the time reported in the plan and contained a complete and accurate account of the parents' progress during that time.
¶ 15 Miller testified she rated respondent unsatisfactory on his parenting tasks because his visits were suspended and he did not complete parenting classes. She marked him unsatisfactory in his cooperation task because he did not meet with her, did not keep his appointments, and did not keep her informed of changes. Miller marked respondent unsatisfactory in his mental health task because he did not follow the recommendations of his assessment and engage in treatment. Although respondent tested negative for all substances during the time covered by the plan, he was marked unsatisfactory in his substance abuse task because of his lack of engagement in the treatment program. Respondent was not able to maintain stable employment and had not gained employment until after the service plan was completed. Miller also marked respondent unsatisfactory in his housing task because he moved into his brother's basement, placed his things in storage, admitted the basement was an inappropriate living situation, and did not intend for the basement to be his permanent location. Miller stated respondent asked how the children were doing, but he did not send any cards, gifts, or letters to the children, he did not provide them with Christmas gifts, and he had not made any sufficient progress to have his visits with the children reinstated. The trial court admitted State's exhibit No. 6 into evidence without objection from respondent.
¶ 16 The trial court found the State proved the allegations in the petition by clear and convincing evidence. The court found respondent unfit and noted respondent never sought to have visitation reinstated after it was suspended and he failed to resolve the issues preventing him from reunification with the children during the time periods alleged in the petition.
¶ 17 The trial court proceeded immediately to the best interest portion of the hearing. Miller testified the children were placed with their maternal grandmother and stepfather as foster parents. Miller favorably described the placement and testified the children were bonded to their foster parents. The foster parents met the children's needs and had signed permanency paperwork. The older children, especially J.T., were "extremely excited" about being adopted. Miller opined it was in the best interest of the children to be adopted by their foster parents.
¶ 18 The trial court found the State proved by a preponderance of the evidence it was in the best interest of the children to terminate parental rights and change the goals of their cases to adoption or guardianship.
¶ 19 This appeal followed.
¶ 20 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 21 Respondent contends the trial court erred by (1) admitting service plans into evidence without proper foundation and (2) finding he failed to make reasonable progress toward return of the children in any nine-month period following the adjudication of neglect of the children when the petition listed two nine-month periods, one of which had not yet ended. Respondent does not argue the court erred in its factual determination of unfitness if the exhibits were properly admitted or that it erred in its best interest determination.
¶ 22 Respondent first contends the trial court's finding of unfitness was against the manifest weight of the evidence because it was based on improperly admitted exhibits.
¶ 23 Involuntary termination of parental rights under the Juvenile Court Act is a two-step process. In re J.H., 2020 IL App (4th) 200150, ¶ 67. The State must first prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent is unfit under any single ground listed in section 1(D) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2022)). J.H., 2020 IL App (4th) 200150, ¶ 67. If the State proves the parent meets one of the definitions of an "unfit person" in section 1(D), the trial court will hold a subsequent and separate hearing, in which the State must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence the proposed termination of parental rights would be in the child's best interests. Id.
¶ 24 We will not disturb a finding of unfitness unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Id. ¶ 68. "A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if the evidence clearly calls for the opposite finding [citation], such that no reasonable person could arrive at the [trial] court's finding on the basis of the evidence in the record [citation]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
¶ 25 Service plans and DCFS investigative records are admissible under section 2-18(4)(a) of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/2-18(4)(a) (West 2022)), which is a variation of the business record exception to the hearsay rule. In re Aniylah B., 2016 IL App (1st) 153662, ¶ 30. Except in delinquency proceedings when a minor's liberty is at stake, proceedings under the Juvenile Court Act employ the general rules of civil practice unless the Juvenile Court Act specifically governs the procedure at issue. In re A.B., 308 Ill.App.3d 227, 234 (1999). The Juvenile Court Act specifically provides for the admission of business records into evidence so long as statutory foundational requirements are met. 705 ILCS 405/2-18(4)(a) (West 2022).
¶ 26 Section 2-18(4)(a) of the Juvenile Court Act provides:
"Any writing, record, photograph or x-ray of any hospital or public or private agency, whether in the form of an entry in a book or otherwise, made as a memorandum or record of any condition, act, transaction, occurrence or event relating to a minor in an abuse, neglect or dependency proceeding, shall be admissible in evidence as proof of that condition, act, transaction, occurrence or event, if the court finds that the document was made in the regular course of the business of the hospital or agency and that it was in the regular course of such business to make it, at the time of the act, transaction, occurrence or event, or within a reasonable time thereafter. *** All other circumstances of the making of the memorandum, record, photograph or x-ray, including lack of personal knowledge of the maker, may be proved to affect the weight to be accorded such evidence, but shall not affect its admissibility." Id.
¶ 27 Section 2-18(4)(a) of the Juvenile Court Act is a variation of the common-law "business records" exception to the hearsay rule. A.B., 308 Ill.App.3d at 235. "Business records are considered reliable, and thus admissible, because of the regular, prompt, and systematic manner in which they are kept and the fact that they are relied upon in the operation of the business." Id. "For a writing to be admissible as a business record under section 2-18(4)(a), the proponent must establish a foundation showing that the writing was (1) made as a memorandum or record of the event, (2) made in the ordinary course of business, and (3) made at the time of the event or within a reasonable time thereafter." Id. "The author of the writing need not testify or be shown to be unavailable; anyone familiar with the business and its procedures may testify about how the writing was prepared." Id.
¶ 28 Here, as to State's exhibit No. 4, the trial court properly determined the State provided an adequate foundation for the admission of the service plan into evidence. After respondent objected based on a lack of foundation, Miller was recalled as a witness and specifically testified the plan accurately memorialized respondent's progress, was prepared in the regular course of business, and was made contemporaneously with the events it purported to record. See id. at 235-36.
¶ 29 As to the other exhibits, respondent forfeited his argument the trial court erred in admitting the service plans reflected in State's exhibit Nos. 5 and 6 without proper foundation because respondent never objected to admission of those exhibits. A respondent's failure to object forfeits consideration of the claimed error on appeal unless the respondent can demonstrate plain error. See In re M.W., 232 Ill.2d 408, 430-31 (2009). Respondent presents no argument that plain error applies. Thus, respondent has forfeited any plain error claim on appeal. See People v. Nieves, 192 Ill.2d 487, 503 (2000); Ill. S.Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). In any event, we note those exhibits also had proper foundation. In each instance, a witness testified the plan at issue accurately memorialized respondent's progress, was prepared in the regular course of business, and was made contemporaneously with the events the plan purported to record.
¶ 30 Citing A.B., 308 Ill.App.3d at 236, and In re M.H., 2020 IL App (3d) 190731, ¶ 19, respondent also suggests the trial court erred by allowing the witnesses to testify about the content of the exhibits. We first note, other than a generic objection that Platt's testimony about the service plan in State's exhibit No. 5 called for hearsay, respondent never objected to any testimony about the contents of the plans. Thus, respondent forfeited the issue. Regardless, the cases respondent relies on involved testimony about service plans from witnesses who had secondhand knowledge, at best, of the events that led to the conclusions contained in the plans. See A.B., 308 Ill.App.3d at 237; M.H., 2020 IL App (3d) 190731, ¶ 20. Such is not the case here, where each witness had firsthand knowledge of the plan they testified about. Accordingly, the court did not err in admitting the evidence.
¶ 31 Respondent next argues the trial court erred by finding he failed to make reasonable progress toward return of the children in any nine-month period following the adjudication of neglect of the children when the petition listed two nine-month periods, one of which had not yet ended.
¶ 32 Under the Adoption Act, the State may prove unfitness by showing failure by a parent to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the basis for the removal of the child from the parent during any nine-month period following the adjudication of a neglected or abused minor. 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(i) (West 2022). The State must prove by clear and convincing evidence one statutory factor of unfitness for the termination of parental rights. In re M.S., 302 Ill.App.3d 998, 1002 (1999). "Therefore, this court need not consider other findings of unfitness where sufficient evidence exists to satisfy any one statutory ground." Id.; see also In re F.P., 2014 IL App (4th) 140360, ¶ 83 (holding one statutory ground is enough to support a finding that someone was an "unfit person").
¶ 33 Here, respondent also does not dispute the trial court's finding that, during the first nine-month period of October 4, 2021, to July 10, 2022, he failed to make reasonable progress towards the return of the children. The court was not required to also find the second period alleged, from July 11, 2022, to April 11, 2023, applied.
¶ 34 Respondent also does not argue the trial court erred in its ultimate determination of unfitness or that it was in the best interest of the children to terminate his parental rights. Accordingly, we need not address those matters. However, we nevertheless note the facts do not demonstrate the court should have reached the opposite result in its findings. Accordingly, the court's determinations were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 35 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 36 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
¶ 37 Affirmed.