Opinion
02-21-2024
The PEOPLE, etc., respondent, v. Fermin JAMES, appellant.
Samuel Coe, White Plains, NY, for appellant. Miriam E. Rocah, District Attorney, White Plains, NY (Shea Scanlon Lomma and Raffaelina Gianfrancesco, of counsel), for respondent.
Samuel Coe, White Plains, NY, for appellant.
Miriam E. Rocah, District Attorney, White Plains, NY (Shea Scanlon Lomma and Raffaelina Gianfrancesco, of counsel), for respondent.
FRANCESCA E. CONNOLLY, J.P., ROBERT J. MILLER, DEBORAH A. DOWLING, CARL J. LANDICINO, JJ.
DECISION & ORDER
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Westchester County (Robert A. Neary, J.), rendered November 19, 2021, convicting him of course of sexual conduct against a child in the second degree and endangering the welfare of a child,, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of that branch of the defendant’s omnibus motion which was to suppress his statements to law enforcement officials.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant was convicted of course of sexual conduct against a child in the second degree and endangering the welfare of a child, after a jury trial, at which the complainant testified.
[1–3] The County Court properly denied that branch of the defendant’s omnibus motion which was to suppress his statements to law enforcement officials. "Miranda warnings are required only when a suspect is subjected to custodial interrogation, which, by definition, entails both custody and interrogation" (People v. Lowe, 189 A.D.3d 1461, 1462, 136 N.Y.S.3d 42 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v. Paulman, 5 N.Y.3d 122, 129, 800 N.Y.S.2d 96, 833 N.E.2d 239). "Whether an individual is in custody is generally a question of fact which does not depend on the subjective beliefs of the defendant or the subjective intent of the, police officers" (People v. Ramjattan, 219 A.D.3d 1348, 1349, 196 N.Y.S.3d 474; see People v. Lowe, 189 A.D.3d at 1462, 136 N.Y.S.3d 42). Rather, "[t]he standard for assessing a suspect’s custodial status is whether a reasonable person innocent of any wrongdoing would have believed that he or she was not free to leave" (People v. Paulman, 5 N.Y.3d at 129, 800 N.Y.S.2d 96, 833 N.E.2d 239;, see People v. Ramjattan, 219 A.D.3d at 1849, 196 N.Y.S.3d 474).
[4] Here, the evidence adduced at the suppression hearing established that the defendant voluntarily went to the police station, and although he had the option to drive himself, the defendant requested to ride in the police detective’s vehicle. During the interview, the defendant was not placed in handcuffs, and the detective’s questions were neither accusatory nor coercive. Therefore, the evidence at the suppression hearing supported the County. Court’s conclusion that the statements made by the defendant were not the product of a custodial interrogation (see People v. Paulman, 5 N.Y.3d at 129, 800 N.Y.S.2d 96, 833 N.E.2d 239; People v. Ramjattan, 219 A.D.3d at 1349, 196 N.Y.S.3d 474).
[5] Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the County Court providently exercised its discretion in allowing the jury to utilize a transcript while the recording of the defendant’s videotaped statement was played and properly instructed the jury that the transcript was merely an aid and not evidence, and that to the extent there was any discrepancy between the recording and the transcript, the recording controlled (see People v. Lubow, 29 N.Y.2d 58, 68, 323 N.Y.S.2d 829, 272 N.E.2d 331; People v. Hendricks, 161 A.D.3d 892, 892, 73 N.Y.S.3d 448; People v. Wilson, 207 A.D.2d,463, 464, 615 N.Y.S.2d 769).
[6] The County Court also providently exercised its discretion in denying, as untimely, the defendant’s application for a missing witness charge based on the People’s failure to call the complainant’s father as a witness (see People v. Carr, 14 N.Y.3d 808, 809, 899 N.Y.S.2d 746, 926 N.E.2d 253). Moreover, any testimony by the complainant’s father regarding the exact hours or days he worked was not material to any element of the crimes charged, was cumulative of the testimony of the complainant and the complaint’s mother, and defense counsel was permitted to comment during summation on the People’s failure to call the father as a witness (see People v. Williams, 5 N.Y.3d 732, 734, 800 N.Y.S.2d 360, 833 N.E.2d 695; People v. Morris, 207 A.D.3d 477, 478, 169 N.Y.S.3d 524; People v. Johnson., 139 A.D.3d 967, 974, 34 N.Y.S.3d 62, affd 31 N.Y.3d 942, 73 N.Y.S.3d 113, 96 N.E.3d 209).
Viewing the record as a whole, the defendant was not deprived of the effective assistance of counsel, as defense counsel provided meaningful representation (see People v. Benevento, 91 N.Y.2d 708, 713, 674 N.Y.S.2d 629, 697 N.E.2d 584; People v. Baldi, 54 N.Y.2d 137, 444 N.Y.S.2d 893, 429 N.E.2d 400).
The sentence imposed was not excessive (see People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80, 455 N.Y.S.2d 675).
The defendant’s remaining contention is without merit.
CONNOLLY, J.P., MILLER, DOWLING and LANDICINO, JJ., concur.