Whether to tender a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter is within the discretion of the trial court. (See People v. Jacobs (1976), 44 Ill. App.3d 290, 292-93.) This discretion, however, is controlled by clear guidelines from this court. If there is evidence in the record that, if believed by the jury, would reduce a crime from murder to manslaughter, a defendant's request for a manslaughter instruction must be granted. ( People v. Handley (1972), 51 Ill.2d 229, 235; Jacobs, 44 Ill. App.3d at 292.

This difference is due to the legislative classification of homicide, which we have no control over and, consequently, which makes these cases distinguishable. Choate v State, 19 Okla. Cr. 169; 197 P. 1060 (1921); Oxendine v State, 335 P.2d 940 (Okla, 1958); People v Jacobs, 44 Ill. App.3d 290; 357 N.E.2d 821 (1976). Defendant Langworthy cites Cagle v State, 211 Ala. 346; 100 So 318 (1924), as an example of a state which allows voluntary intoxication to reduce murder to manslaughter.

• 6 Defendant's next assignment of error is that the trial court erred in refusing to give the jury tendered instructions concerning the offenses of voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. It is well settled that in a murder trial, if there is any evidence in the record which, if believed by the jury, would reduce the crime to manslaughter, it would be error for the trial court to refuse to give such an instruction. However, these instructions should not be given if the evidence clearly demonstrates that the crime was murder and there is no evidence in the record to support a manslaughter conviction. ( People v. Handley (1972), 51 Ill.2d 229, 282 N.E.2d 131; People v. Jacobs (1976), 44 Ill. App.3d 290, 357 N.E.2d 821.) We will deal first with the propriety of the voluntary manslaughter instruction in this case.

The trial court must exercise its discretion in deciding whether the evidence requires a manslaughter instruction. People v. Jacobs, 44 Ill. App.3d 290, 357 N.E.2d 821 (2d Dist. 1976). • 2 Defendant was convicted of murder under section 9-1(a)(3) of the Criminal Code. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 9-1(a)(3).)

The murder was committed on June 20, 1970. See People v. Jacobs, 44 Ill. App.3d 290, 2 Ill.Dec. 601, 357 N.E.2d 821 (1976). Jacobs appeared before the Illinois Prisoner Review Board ("Board") for parole release consideration in 1979, 1980, and 1981. Jacobs alleges that on each occasion the Board denied him parole for the reason that "your release at this time would deprecate the seriousness of your offense and promote disrespect for the law."

Holman and the State agree that because only one homicide occurred, three of the four convictions of murder must be vacated. (See People v. Brownell (1980), 79 Ill.2d 508, 524; People v. Bone (1982), 103 Ill. App.3d 1066, 1068; People v. Jacobs (1976), 44 Ill. App.3d 290, 291.) They also agree that two of the felony-murder convictions based on burglary should be vacated, and we approve this agreement.

At the least, the conflict in appellant's testimony as to his state of mind at the time of the shooting presented a question for the jury to resolve. When there is any evidence, no matter how slight, that raises the question whether the offense is murder or manslaughter, the trial court is bound to submit the issue to the jury for its determination. Phillips v. State, 238 Ga. 497, 499, 233 S.E.2d 758, 760 (1977); Gonzales v. State, 546 S.W.2d 617, 618 (Tex.Crim. 1977); People v. Jacobs, 44 Ill. App.3d 290, 292, 357 N.E.2d 821, 824 (1976). By ruling that the evidence in this case did not, "as a matter of law", present any question regarding manslaughter, the trial court "passed upon the strength, credibility and tendency of the evidence", and it decided what would normally be a question of fact.

It is within the trial court's discretion to determine which instructions to render to the jury. ( People v. Jacobs (1976), 44 Ill. App.3d 290, 357 N.E.2d 821.) The voluntary manslaughter instruction based on sudden and intense passion will not be given unless the defendant produces some evidence that, if believed by the jury, would reduce the crime from murder to voluntary manslaughter. ( People v. Handley (1972), 51 Ill.2d 229, 282 N.E.2d 131.

However, it is equally well settled that such an instruction should not be given if the evidence clearly demonstrated that the crime was murder and there is no evidence to support the conviction of manslaughter. [Citation.]" People v. Jacobs (1976), 44 Ill. App.3d 290, 292-93. • 7 Prior to the shooting, defendant initiated a shoving match with the victim and pointed a gun at him.

• 2 We find no inconsistency. The admission into evidence of the prior threats was pursuant to well established Illinois law. As a matter of law Mr. Lane's activities could not provide the basis for the provocation relied upon by the defendant for such acts must cause the killer to act under a "sudden and intense passion resulting from serious provocation * * *." (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 9-2; People v. Jacobs (1976), 44 Ill. App.3d 290, 357 N.E.2d 821.) The defendant's citation of People v. Free (1976), 37 Ill. App.3d 1050, 347 N.E.2d 505, and People v. Clark (1973), 15 Ill. App.3d 756, 305 N.E.2d 218, have no application here as they relate to adultery constituting provocation.