Opinion
2-21-0255
04-14-2022
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PARIS JACKSON-TYLER, Defendant-Appellant.
This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Kane County. No. 19-CF-1010, Honorable Kathryn D. Karayannis, Judge, Presiding.
McLAREN JUSTICE delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Schostok and Birkett concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
McLAREN JUSTICE.
¶ 1 Held: The record reflected that the trial court properly considered mitigating factors in sentencing defendant.
¶ 2 Defendant, Paris Jackson-Tyler, appeals his sentence of 7½ years' incarceration for aggravated driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI), a Class X felony (625 ILCS 5/11- 501(a)(2), (d)(2)(E) (West 2018)). He contends that the trial court erred when it began its sentencing determination with the statutory minimum and considered only whether aggravating evidence justified an upward adjustment and not whether mitigating evidence moderated or negated an upward adjustment. Because the record shows that the trial court properly considered both the aggravating and mitigating evidence, we affirm.
¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 4 The State charged defendant with multiple offenses in connection with his driving under the influence of alcohol on May 27, 2019. On November 25, 2019, defendant pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated DUI, and the court dismissed the remaining charges. There was no sentencing agreement.
¶ 5 The factual basis for the plea was that, on May 27, 2019, at approximately 2:48 a.m., a state trooper observed a vehicle driven by defendant traveling 70 miles-per-hour in a posted 50 miles-per-hour zone. The vehicle was swerving within its lane and signaling improperly. When the trooper stopped the vehicle and spoke with defendant, the trooper detected the odor of alcohol on defendant's breath. Defendant had bloodshot, glassy eyes and his speech was slurred. He admitted to drinking and consuming his first drink at approximately midnight. Defendant agreed to perform standardized field tests but failed them. He refused to take a breathalyzer test. The trooper concluded that defendant was under the influence of alcohol and arrested him. An inventory of the vehicle revealed a partially full bottle of tequila. Also found was a cup in the center console that smelled of alcohol. Defendant had at least five prior DUI convictions.
¶ 6 After giving defendant his plea admonishments, the court found that the plea was voluntary. Defendant confirmed his understanding that there was no sentencing agreement and that the sentencing range was 6 to 30 years' incarceration. 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-25(a) (West 2018).
¶ 7 The presentence investigation report (PSI) showed that defendant's prior traffic offenses included not only the DUI offenses but also five convictions for driving with a suspended or revoked license. He also had prior convictions of unlawful possession of a controlled substance, criminal damage to property, disorderly conduct, criminal trespass, criminal trespass to land, invasion of privacy, and domestic battery. Before his arrest, defendant had two jobs. He supported his pregnant wife and stepson. He also helped care for a daughter from a previous relationship. In 2006, he completed an outpatient substance abuse program. In 2015, he competed a substance abuse program while in custody and, upon release, completed another outpatient substance abuse program. He acknowledged that he had a serious alcohol problem and would probably benefit from further treatment.
¶ 8 At the sentencing hearing, Ezequiel Gutierrez testified that, on May 27, 2019, at about 2:30 a.m., he was on Interstate 88 when he saw defendant's car swerving. Gutierrez called 911. Concerned that defendant was falling sleep, Gutierrez honked his horn but defendant did not appear to react and continued swerving in and out of lanes.
¶ 9 A state trooper testified that she saw defendant's vehicle traveling at inconsistent speeds and wandering into adjacent lanes. The trooper stopped defendant's vehicle and observed that he had bloodshot, glassy eyes that were "half open, half closed, and he appeared to be falling asleep." His breath smelled of alcohol. When the trooper asked defendant for his driver's license, he admitted that his license was suspended. The State presented additional evidence consistent with the factual basis for the plea.
¶ 10 The State argued that multiple factors in aggravation applied, particularly that defendant's conduct threatened serious harm, he had a history of criminal activity, and there was a need for deterrence. The State asked for a 10-year sentence of incarceration.
¶ 11 Defendant presented letters on his behalf about his good character and willingness to help others. Several people likewise testified to defendant's good character and asked that he receive the minimum sentence. Defendant gave an allocution statement and apologized for his actions. He stated that he wanted to "keep moving forward, keep bettering [him]self." He claimed that he was "doing great when [he] got out of jail at [sic] 2015" and "did great from 2015 to this point here." Nevertheless, he recognized that he needed help.
¶ 12 Defense counsel acknowledged that probation was unavailable and asked for the minimum prison sentence. Specifically, counsel said that "the minimum should be the preferred sentence going forward, or in other words, that should be the starting point here today in terms of how much time [defendant] should serve." Counsel argued multiple factors in mitigation, particularly defendant's remorse, employment record, family obligations, attempts at treatment, and desire to rehabilitate. He also argued that defendant's conduct did not cause or threaten serious harm, nor did he contemplate that it would cause or threaten such harm.
¶ 13 The court sentenced defendant to 7½ years' incarceration with credit for 268 days of time served. The court stated that it reviewed the PSI, evidence, letters, testimony, defendant's allocution statement, attorneys' arguments, financial impact of incarceration, and factors in aggravation and mitigation. As a negative mitigation factor, the court found that, contrary to defendant's assertion, he threatened serious harm by traveling over the speed limit and "swerving all over the road" while appearing to be falling asleep. However, the court did find in mitigation that defendant did not contemplate that his conduct would cause or threaten serious harm. The court gave "little weight" to the factor of whether there was a substantial ground tending to justify or excuse defendant's conduct. Specifically, defendant's alcoholism did not excuse his driving while intoxicated. The court commented on whether defendant's character and attitude made it unlikely that he would commit another crime. It stated that, although defendant seemed to be a good person, he had a "serious alcohol issue, which is causing a big risk to the public when he chooses to drive, and unfortunately, he chooses to do that regularly when he is under the influence of alcohol." Regarding rehabilitative potential, the court was concerned about defendant's lack of substance abuse treatment since 2015. The court considered "quite heavily" the letters submitted on defendant's behalf and credited defendant for cooperating with the police and pleading guilty.
¶ 14 In aggravation, the court noted that defendant's driving threatened not merely "general societal harm" but also "serious harm to others." Defendant also had "clearly a history of prior delinquency or criminal activity." The need for deterrence was also a factor. Further, the court expressed doubt about defendant's commitment to rehabilitation given his recurrent DUI episodes and failure to seek treatment in recent years.
¶ 15 Defendant moved for reconsideration of his sentence, arguing that (1) it was excessive, (2) the court improperly applied factors in aggravation, and (3) the court improperly refused to apply factors in mitigation. At the hearing on the motion, the court stated that it had reviewed the motion, the PSI, and its notes of the sentencing hearing and independently recalled the witnesses' testimony. The court repeated what it deemed as relevant factors in mitigation and aggravation. The court stated:
"So I understand that everybody would like to start with the six years and, you know, that's where I start is six years. It's a mandatory sentence, minimum sentence of six years, and that's where I start when I consider this and I-I based upon his history-his history and treatment, prior treatment that was not successful, his failure to obtain treatment when he was out, I considered all of that and everything I have already commented on in relation to his rehabilitation potential and I think seven-and-a-half-years is an appropriate sentence."Thus, the court denied the motion to reconsider.
¶ 16 Defendant appealed, and we summarily remanded the matter for counsel to file a certificate under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (eff. July 1, 2017) and a new motion to reconsider the sentence. People v. Jackson-Tyler, No. 2-20-0541 (Jan. 15, 2021) (unpublished minute order). On remand, counsel filed an amended motion to reconsider the sentence, arguing in part that the court improperly refused to apply factors in mitigation and improperly weighed the mitigating evidence. Counsel also alleged:
"[Defendant] faced a mandatory minimum sentence of six years within [the Department of Corrections (DOC)]) at fifty percent. During the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor did not admit evidence nor provide witness testimony that warranted a sentence greater than the mandatory minimum. Stated another way and presuming the Court began the sentencing hearing with a sentence of six years in [DOC] at fifty percent, the prosecutor failed to admit evidence or present testimony that supported a departure from the mandatory minimum sentence."
¶ 17 At the hearing, the trial court repeated that it had considered the pertinent aggravating and mitigating factors. Then, referencing defendant's argument that the State did not provide evidence to support a sentence above the minimum, the court stated:
"[Defendant's argument] indicates that the State-excuse me, the Court should start at a six year sentence. That is exactly what I did in my mind and I believe even the transcript supports the fact that I started with a six year-six years as the minimum and that's where I was starting and then depending on evidence in aggravation and mitigation would go, of course I couldn't go lower, I could go higher, and I considered the aggravation and mitigation and I looked at all that again to refresh my memory as to what was presented. There was in fact evidence to support granting more than the minimum sentence. The concern for the safety of the public which was testified to by an independent witness [who] came in at sentencing and who was very concerned about the extremely erratic driving.
The [defendant's other convictions for felony matters to the extent that it is able to be clarified, I did not rely on the [defendant's other D.U.I. offenses to give a double enhancement essentially to make this sentence more than the minimum because of his other D.U.I.'s simply by the virtue of him having other D.U.I.'s. I did consider the fact that it did suggest that he is not being rehabilitated by the sentences that have been imposed. For example, on his most recent D.U.I. right before this one, he was sentenced to, I believe, four years in [DOC], was out approximately in two-and-a-half years. During that two-and-a-half year period [he] did not get any treatment for his own admission to substance abuse issues, and so I considered that as a rehabilitative factor when deciding whether or not something other than the minimum sentence was appropriate. He had prior felony convictions for[d] riving on a [r] evoked or [s]uspended [l]icense. He had prior felony convictions for drug related offenses. There was a misdemeanor conviction for domestic violence and there were a couple traffic tickets which at least some of them he got court supervision on. So there were other offenses other than D.U.I. offenses which suggested to me that more than a minimum sentence on this particular case was appropriate."
The court denied the motion, and defendant appeals.
¶ 18 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 19 Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion at sentencing by considering only whether aggravating factors warranted an increase over the minimum sentence and not whether mitigating factors moderated or negated any increase. We disagree.
¶ 20 A trial court has wide latitude in sentencing a defendant as long as it does not ignore relevant mitigating factors or consider improper aggravating factors. People v. McGee, 2020 IL App (2d) 180998, ¶ 8. The weight given these factors depends on the circumstances of each case. People v. Ferguson, 2020 IL App (3d) 200041, ¶ 12. We will not disturb a sentence within the statutory range unless the trial court abused its discretion. People v. Stacey, 193 Ill.2d 203, 209-10 (2000). We will deem a sentence excessive only if it is greatly at variance with the spirit and purpose of the law or manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense. Id. at 210. We may not substitute our judgment for the trial court's merely because we might differently weigh the pertinent sentencing factors. People v. Rathbone, 345 Ill.App.3d 305, 313 (2003). If mitigating evidence was before the trial court, we presume that the court considered it. People v. Bruce, 299 Ill.App.3d 61, 68 (1998).
¶ 21 Defendant relies on People v. Markiewicz, 246 Ill.App.3d 31 (1993), to support his argument that the trial court's comments that it started at the six-year minimum sentence and then considered whether to go higher show that it did not consider mitigating evidence. In Markiewicz, the trial court stated several times that it would not consider the evidence that the defendant sought educational opportunities while incarcerated. Id. at 53-54. The trial court explained that this evidence did not fit any of the statutory factors in mitigation. Id. at 54. The appellate court disagreed, holding that the defendant's efforts to better his education bore upon his rehabilitative potential. Id. at 55-56. The appellate court remanded the case for resentencing. Id. at 56.
¶ 22 In contrast, the trial court here specifically stated that it considered the mitigating evidence. At the sentencing hearing, the court discussed the aggravating and mitigating factors in detail and explained the weight that it accorded each factor. At the hearing on the first motion to reconsider, the court reiterated the factors in aggravation and mitigation and reaffirmed that it had given certain mitigating factors little weight. Finally, at the hearing on the amended motion to reconsider, the court stated: "I started with a six year-six years as the minimum and that's where I was starting and then depending on evidence in aggravation and mitigation would go, of course I couldn't go lower, I could go higher, and I considered the aggravation and mitigation and I looked at all that again to refresh my memory as to what was presented." (Emphases added.)
¶ 23 There is no specific formula in the statutory sentencing provisions for determining the length of a defendant's sentence. Instead, the statutory factors in mitigation merely "shall be accorded weight in favor of withholding or minimizing a sentence of imprisonment." 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.1(a) (West 2018). The trial court's statement that it could not go lower than six years' imprisonment was correct. Indeed, defendant himself asked the court to start its determination with a six-year term of incarceration. See People v. Harding, 2012 IL App (2d) 101011, ¶ 17 (" [U]nder the doctrine of invited error, a defendant may not request to proceed in one manner and later contend on appeal that the course of action was in error.") In imposing sentence, the court discussed mitigating and aggravating factors and explained their weight. The record provides no reason to doubt the court's statements confirming that it applied the mitigating factors. Further, given the serious aggravating factors, such as defendant's criminal history and failed attempts at rehabilitation, the record suggests that the sentence would have been significantly higher had the court not considered the mitigating factors. Indeed, the court sentenced defendant to only 1 ½ years above the minimum-significantly below the possible 30 years' maximum and the 10 years requested by the State.
III. CONCLUSION
¶ 24 The trial court's sentence was not an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, for the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Kane County.
¶ 25 Affirmed.