Opinion
F086899
11-14-2024
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JACOBY TREVON JACKSON, Defendant and Appellant.
Paul Couenhoven, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Louis M. Vasquez, Lewis A. Martinez, and William K. Kim, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Tulare County. Super. Ct. No. PCF440879 Robert Anthony Fultz, Judge.
Paul Couenhoven, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Louis M. Vasquez, Lewis A. Martinez, and William K. Kim, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
SMITH, J.
INTRODUCTION
Appellant Jacoby Trevon Jackson was convicted by jury of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a), count 1), arson of an inhabited structure (§ 451, subd. (b), count 2), and unlawful taking or driving of a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, count 3). In addition, the jury found true a special circumstance alleging that the murder occurred during the commission of a robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)). The jury also found that Jackson had suffered a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)), and a conviction within the meaning of the Three Strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)). The trial court sentenced him to life without the possibility of parole plus a determinate term of 22 years four months in state prison.
All undefined statutory citations are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
Jackson raises two claims on appeal. First, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury's true finding on the robbery-murder special circumstance and his conviction for first degree murder. Second, he contends that the trial court erred by imposing a $10,000 parole revocation restitution fine pursuant to section 1202.45, based upon the fact that Jackson was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On July 25, 2023, the Tulare County District Attorney filed a second amended information charging Jackson with murder (§ 187, subd. (a), count 1) with robbery and rape special circumstances (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A), (C)); arson of an inhabited structure (§ 451, subd. (b), count 2); and driving or taking a vehicle without consent (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a), count 3). The information further alleged that Jackson had a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)), and a prior strike conviction under the Three Strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)).
On July 27, 2023, Jackson's jury trial commenced.
On August 2, 2023, the jury found Jackson guilty of first degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a)); arson of an inhabited structure (§ 451, subd. (b)); and the unlawful taking or driving of a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851). The jury further found true the robberymurder special circumstance allegation, but not true the rape-murder special circumstance allegation. Following a bifurcated proceeding, the court found true the prior serious felony (§ 667, subd. (a)) and prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)).
On August 30, 2023, the trial court sentenced Jackson as follows: life without the possibility of parole plus an aggregate determinate term of 22 years four months.
A timely notice of appeal followed.
The Prosecutor's Case
At approximately 5:58 p.m. on April 9, 2023, fire department personnel from the City of Tulare responded to a call about a structural fire at the 7 Day Spa, a massage parlor in Tulare. Inside, firefighters found an unresponsive, nude woman lying on the floor. A pair of underwear had been stuffed inside of her mouth. The woman was later identified as Xiugun Yuan, also known as "Tina." Yuan was taken to the hospital, where a nurse reported that she smelled of smoke and something burning, with soot on her body, swelling and bruising on her eyes and face, and bruising around her neck. Yuan was in cardiac arrest and had to be revived twice.
On April 10, 2023, while Yuan was sedated and intubated, a sexual assault examination was performed on her. The examination revealed broken blood vessels in her eyes and bruising on her neck, suggesting she had been strangled. Swabs were taken from her vagina and anus.
On April 13, 2023, Yuan succumbed to her injuries. Dr. Logan Shyle Dewitt, the forensic pathologist who conducted Yuan's autopsy, noted faint bruising around her neck, tearing inside her mouth, and genital bruising. Yuan had also suffered internal bleeding in her neck muscles, broken and bleeding cartilage, scalp bleeding, swelling of her brain and throughout her joints, and bruising to her eyes, cheeks, tongue, bottom lip, cervix, and uterus. Dr. Dewitt also found a wadded-up piece of paper or cloth inside of Yuan's vagina. He opined that Yuan's death resulted from manual strangulation and blunt force trauma.
David Rossman, a division chief with the City of Tulare Fire Department, determined that the fire was intentionally set in the waiting lounge using an open flame device, such as a match or a lighter. Surveillance videos from a nearby business depicted Jackson entering the massage parlor on April 9, 2023, with a Snapple bottle. While he was inside, the curtains of the massage parlor moved rapidly.
Approximately one hour and 41 minutes later, Jackson exited the business with a white towel over his head and carrying a white bag. Shortly thereafter, smoke began billowing out of the building and onto the roadway.
On April 20, 2023, Jackson was interrogated by police. He claimed to have been recycling on April 9th, while staying at a homeless encampment. According to Jackson, he borrowed $50 from a woman at the massage parlor and attempted to use her car, which he could not start. As he left, he observed the building on fire. He asked the first person he saw to call 911.
Jackson's DNA could not be excluded as the contributor of male DNA recovered from Yuan's genitalia. He initially claimed that he was only briefly inside the massage parlor but later admitted to having consensual sex with Yuan. Jackson maintained that Yuan gave him money and the keys to her car. He denied inflicting her injuries upon her.
DISCUSSION
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence Supporting Jackson's Conviction for First Degree Murder and the Robbery-Murder Special Circumstance
The prosecutor presented two theories of liability to establish Jackson's guilt for first degree murder. The first was that Yuan's murder was premeditated and deliberate (classic first degree murder). The second was that Jackson had committed the murder during the commission of a robbery or a rape (felony murder). The jury convicted Jackson of first degree murder and found true the robbery-murder special circumstance. Jackson argues that not only was there insufficient evidence showing that the murder was premediated and deliberate, but the evidence showing that the murder occurred during the commission of a robbery was also insufficient. As a result, he asserts that his conviction for first degree murder must be reversed, and the jury's true finding on the special circumstance must be stricken. We disagree.
A. Legal Principles
When evaluating a sufficiency of evidence claim," 'we review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence-that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value-from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.'" (People v. Cravens (2012) 53 Cal.4th 500, 507.)
"The test for evaluating a sufficiency of evidence claim is deferential." (People v. Flores (2020) 9 Cal.5th 371, 411.) "We must presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact that the trier of fact could reasonably deduce from the evidence." (People v. Medina (2009) 46 Cal.4th 913, 919.) "We must also 'accept logical inferences that the jury might have drawn from the circumstantial evidence.'" (People v. Flores, at p. 411.) "The conviction shall stand 'unless it appears "that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support [the conviction]." '" (People v. Cravens, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 508.) Since the test is whether substantial evidence supports the jury's verdict, not whether the evidence proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt (see People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 139), a party who attacks the sufficiency of the evidence bears an enormous burden. (See People v. Sanchez (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 325, 330.)
B. Analysis
1. Evidence of Premeditation and Deliberation
"All murder which is perpetrated by means of ... any ... kind of willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing, ... is murder of the first degree." (§ 189.)"' "[W]illful" '" simply means" 'intentional.'" (People v. Moon (2005) 37 Cal.4th 1, 29.) A verdict of premeditated murder requires more than a showing of intent to kill, however. (People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1080.)" 'Deliberation' refers to careful weighing of considerations in forming a course of action; 'premeditation' means thought over in advance." (Ibid.) Planning, motive, and manner of killing are pertinent to a determination of whether premeditation and deliberation exist. (People v. Marks (2003) 31 Cal.4th 197, 230; People v. Perez (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1117, 1125; People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15, 26-27.) However, "these factors are not exclusive nor are they invariably determinative." (People v. Marks, supra, at p. 230.)
In assessing the sufficiency of evidence of premeditation and deliberation, courts often use the "Anderson factors," which include: planning, i.e., facts about what the defendant did prior to the killing that show he was engaged in activity toward killing; motive, i.e., facts about the defendant's prior relationship with the victim from which the jury could reasonably infer a motive to kill the victim; and method, i.e., facts about the manner of killing from which the jury could reasonably infer that the defendant had a preconceived design to take the victim's life in a particular way. (People v. Shamblin (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1, 10 &fn. 16 (Shamblin), citing People v. Anderson, supra, 70 Cal.2d at pp. 26-27.)
"[W]hile premeditation and deliberation must result from' "careful thought and weighing of considerations"' [citation], [our Supreme Court] continue[s] to apply the principle that '[t]he process of premeditation and deliberation does not require any extended period of time.'" (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 332.) "Premeditation and deliberation can occur in a brief interval. 'The test is not time, but reflection. "Thoughts may follow each other with great rapidity and cold, calculated judgment may be arrived at quickly." '" (People v. Memro (1995) 11 Cal.4th 786, 863.)
Jackson contends there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict of first degree murder based upon premeditation and deliberation. However, the record belies his assertion.
With respect to the method of the killing, Yuan died as a result of manual strangulation and blunt force traumatic injury. Whether murder by manual strangulation supports an inference of premeditation and deliberation is a fact-specific inquiry. "This prolonged manner of taking a person's life, which requires an offender to apply constant force to the neck of the victim, affords ample time for the offender to consider the nature of his deadly act." (People v. Hovarter (2008) 44 Cal.4th 983, 1020 (Hovarter).) "[W]here strangulation occurs over a prolonged period of time, a rational juror could find that the killer committed a premeditated and deliberate murder." (Shamblin, supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at p. 11.)
In Shamblin, the expert's testimony that manual strangulation of the victim "could have taken anywhere from one to five minutes" supported the jury's first degree murder verdict. (Shamblin, supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at p. 11.) Similarly, in Hovarter, the appellate court found substantial evidence of premeditation and deliberation where the evidence adduced at trial demonstrated that the defendant had strangled the victim over a period of time between five and eight minutes. (Hovarter, supra, 44 Cal.4th at pp. 10191020.) Likewise, in People v. Stitely, a pathologist's testimony "that lethal pressure had been applied [to the victim's] neck for a 'long' time" supported the jury's premeditation finding. (People v. Stitely (2005) 35 Cal.4th 514, 544 (Stitely).)
Here, as distinct from Shamblin, Hovarter, and Stitely, there was no evidence demonstrating how long it may have taken Jackson to strangle Yuan. The forensic pathologist who testified at Jackson's trial opined that death could have occurred "from seconds to days." Although Jackson clearly possessed the intent to kill, we cannot presume premeditation from the intent to kill. (See People v. Boatman (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1264, citing People v. Bender (1945) 27 Cal.2d 164, 181 ["the mere intent to kill is not the equivalent of a deliberate and premeditated intent to kill"].)
While this does render the issue of premeditation and deliberation much closer, other factors demonstrate that the murder"' "occurred as the result of preexisting thought and reflection rather than unconsidered or rash impulse." '" (People v. Boatman, supra, 221 Cal.App.4th at p. 1264, citing People v. Pearson (2013) 56 Cal.4th 393, 443.) Jackson did not simply strangle Yuan. He beat her so badly that she was nearly unrecognizable from photographs taken following the attack. In fact, the forensic pathologist opined that she died as a result of blunt force trauma and manual strangulation.
If there were any doubt concerning whether Jackson had premeditated and deliberated Yuan's murder, we further observe that Jackson set the building on fire with Yuan, nude and unresponsive, inside. From this evidence, the jury could reasonably conclude that Jackson was not acting impulsively. But rather, that at some point during the attack, he formed a plan to kill Yuan, and thereafter, acted in conformity with that plan.
With respect to the remaining Anderson factors, Jackson further concedes there was evidence of motive, a fact which is undeniable from the evidence adduced at trial. (See Anderson, supra, 70 Cal.2d at pp. 26-27.) The trial evidence showed that Jackson entered the massage parlor with a preconceived plan to commit either a sex-related offense or a robbery. Though there were injuries all over Yuan's body, including bruising to her cervix and uterus, and wadded up paper or fabric was found inside of her vagina, Jackson claimed that he and Yuan had engaged in consensual sex. Jackson further claimed that Yuan gave him $50, a bag of waters and juices, as well as the keys to her vehicle so that he could pick-up his girlfriend. The jury could reasonably reject Jackson's version of events and find that by setting the building on fire, Jackson intended to destroy the evidence of his crimes, including Yuan herself.
The fact that the jury found the rape-murder special circumstance not true does not undermine our conclusion that he may have initially entered the massage parlor with a plan to commit a sex crime.
Jackson submits that there was no evidence of planning. To that end, he asserts that the brutal nature of the crime is consistent with an explosion of rage, versus premeditation. (See People v. Alcala (1984) 36 Cal.3d 604, 626 ["The fact that a slaying was unusually brutal, or involved multiple wounds, cannot alone support a determination of premeditation. Absent other evidence, a brutal manner of killing is as consistent with a sudden, random 'explosion' of violence as with calculated murder"].)
We agree that while there was evidence that Jackson entered the massage parlor with the intent to commit a sex offense or a robbery, there was no evidence showing that he entered the massage parlor with a preconceived plan to commit murder. Nonetheless, Jackson's assertion that Yuan's murder was the result of a sudden explosion of violence is not well taken. As discussed, Yuan was not just strangled, she suffered bruises and swelling all over her body, suggesting that she was hit repeatedly. And, while Yuan was still alive, Jackson set fire to the building. Although he may not have entered the massage parlor with a plan to kill Yuan, circumstantial evidence supports the conclusion that he formed such a plan at some point during the attack.
Assuming however that this evidence was insufficient to support a finding of premeditation and deliberation, the record does not support Jackson's claim of prejudice. "[I]f a jury is presented with multiple theories supporting conviction on a single charge and on review one theory is found unsupported by sufficient evidence, reversal is not required if sufficient evidence supports the alternate theory and there is no affirmative basis for concluding the jury relied on the factually unsupported theory because it is presumed jurors would not rely on a factually deficient theory." (People v. Llamas (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1729, 1740.) Here, the record lacks any indication that the jury relied upon premeditation and deliberation in convicting Jackson of first degree murder. And, as discussed further below, there is substantial evidence supporting Jackson's liability for first degree murder under the felony murder theory.
2. Evidence Supporting the Felony Murder Rule and the Robbery-Murder Special Circumstance
Jackson also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for first degree murder under the felony-murder rule, as well as the jury's true finding on the robbery-murder special circumstance. We will evaluate his challenge to both simultaneously, given the substantial overlap in the evidence.
"A robbery-murder special circumstance requires a finding that the 'murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in, or was an accomplice in, the commission of, attempted commission of, or the immediate flight after committing, or attempting to commit' a '[r]obbery in violation of Section 211 or 212.5.' (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17), (a)(17)(A))." (People v. Thomas (2023) 14 Cal.5th 327, 378.) If" 'there was an intent at the time of [a] murder to commit a robbery ..., and the murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of a robbery or attempted robbery,'" the robbery-murder special circumstance may apply. (People v. Lindberg (2008) 45 Cal.4th 1, 33, fn. 10.)
Here, there was ample evidence demonstrating that Jackson killed Yuan during the commission of a robbery. Jackson, who was transient and living in a tent, entered the massage parlor with nothing. By his own admission, he came into the business to "borrow" money from Yuan, suggesting that obtaining money was his goal. Jackson left with $50, bottles of juice and water, and Yuan's car keys. From this evidence, the jury could reasonably conclude that Jackson intended to commit a robbery among other possible crimes, and that he killed Yuan during the commission of the robbery. (See People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 529, citing People v. Turner (1990) 50 Cal.3d 668, 688 ["[W]hen one kills another and takes substantial property from the victim, it is ordinarily reasonable to presume the killing was for purposes of robbery"]; see also, People v. Thomas, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 378, citing People v. Hardy (2018) 5 Cal.5th 56, 91 [" '"' [i]f a person commits a murder, and after doing so takes the victim's wallet, the jury may reasonably infer that the murder was committed for the purpose of obtaining the wallet, because murders are commonly committed to obtain money'"' "]; and People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 166 [finding the fact that the defendants were in possession of the victim's car shortly after she was murdered, "by itself" permitted the jury to conclude that the "defendants removed [the victim's] car against her will by killing her, thus committing from a robbery and an intentional murder while engaged in a robbery"].)
Although Yuan was subsequently revived and lived three days after the incident, neither of the parties contend that this fact rendered application of the felony-murder rule inapplicable.
Jackson asserts that the most reasonable conclusions that could be drawn from the evidence adduced at trial were that he had sex with Yuan, killed her, set the fire, and then seized items of minimal value from the business as he fled. Thus, pursuant to Jackson's theory, he did not form the intent to steal until after the murder had occurred. (See People v. Morris (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1, 19, disapproved on another point in In re Sassounian (1995) 9 Cal.4th 535 ["a conviction of robbery cannot be sustained in the absence of evidence that the defendant conceived his intent to steal either before committing the act of force against the victim, or during the commission of that act; if the intent arose only after the use of force against the victim, the taking will at most constitute a theft"].)
However, the fact that there are alternative inferences that could be drawn from the evidence does not support reversal of Jackson's conviction. "[I]f the circumstances reasonably justify the jury's findings, the judgment may not be reversed simply because the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding." (People v. Letner and Tobin, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 162.) Finding Jackson's assertion to the contrary unpersuasive, we conclude that because there was ample evidence to support his conviction for first degree murder upon a felony-murder theory and the jury's true finding on the special circumstance, reversal is unwarranted.
II. Imposition of the Parole Revocation Restitution Fine (§ 1202.45)
At sentencing, the trial court imposed a $10,000 parole revocation restitution fine pursuant to section 1202.45. Jackson contends that the fine must be stricken because he was sentenced to a prison term of life without the possibility of parole. We disagree.
A. Legal Principles
Section 1202.45 requires the court to impose a parole revocation restitution fine "[i]n every case where a person is convicted of a crime and his or her sentence includes a period of parole." (§ 1202.45, subd. (a).) The fine is stayed until the person is granted parole and it is ultimately levied only if the parole is revoked. (Id., subd. (c).)
A parole revocation restitution fine is unauthorized if the sole sentence is life in prison without the possibility of parole. (See People v. Jenkins (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 805, 819.) However, if the defendant's sentence includes a determinate term in addition to a term of life without the possibility of parole, imposition of the restitution fine is required. (See People v. Brasure (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1037, 1075.)
Here, Jackson was sentenced to a term of life without the possibility for parole for the jury's true finding on the robbery-murder special circumstance. However, he was also sentenced to a determinate term of 22 years four months in state prison for his remaining convictions. Consequently, based upon the fact that Jackson was sentenced to a determinate term, in addition to a term of life without the possibility of parole, imposition of the parole revocation fine was required.
DISPOSITION
The judgment of conviction is affirmed.
WE CONCUR:
PENA, ACTING P. J. SNAUFFER, J.