Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. NA069900, Tomson T. Ong, Judge.
Kathleen M. Redmond, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Robert M. Snider, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
VOGEL, J.
Deborah Jackson was charged with two drug counts, selling and possessing cocaine in violation of Health and Safety Code sections 11352 and 11351.5, with allegations that she had suffered three prior convictions (forgery in 1993, and drug offenses in 1994 and 2001). In May 2006, in conformance with a negotiated plea, she entered a no contest plea to both counts, and the trial court then imposed a state prison sentence (six years, four months), suspended execution of sentence, and placed Jackson on formal probation for five years, with one year in county jail. In January 2007, Jackson was charged with another drug offense which constituted a violation of the terms of her probation. Following an uncontested hearing, the trial court revoked probation and executed its previously imposed sentence of six years, four months, with credit for time served. Jackson appeals, claiming the trial court should have reinstated probation. We disagree and affirm the judgment.
DISCUSSION
The gist of this appeal is a complaint that the trial court should have followed the recommendation of a current probation report and reinstated probation. There are at least three problems with Jackson’s arguments.
First, while it is true that the court could have revoked but not terminated probation and then reinstated probation (People v. Medina (2001)89 Cal.App.4th 318, 322-323), the message sent when a judge suspends execution of a prison term is that the defendant is “on the verge of a particular prison commitment” (id. at p. 323) -- and the presumption is that a violation will result in the termination of probation. Under these circumstances, the trial court’s broad discretion to deny probation will rarely, if ever, be disturbed.
Second, the trial court’s failure to state that it had, as required by law, read and considered the current probation report (which recommended reinstatement of probation) does not mean the court failed to read the report. As always, we presume the court followed the law. (People v. Mosley (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 489, 496, 497.)
It appears that the only reason for the recommendation was the fact that Jackson’s new case had, for reasons that do not appear in the probation report or elsewhere in this record, been disposed of under Proposition 36.
Third, Jackson’s record -- three prior felony and five prior misdemeanor convictions -- and the speed with which she violated probation amply support the trial court’s decision to reject the probation officer’s recommendation. (People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 234.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: MALLANO, Acting P.J., ROTHSCHILD, J.