Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County No. SCE256533, William J. McGrath, Judge.
McDONALD, J.
A jury convicted Drancy Jackson of felony child abuse (Pen. Code, § 273a, subd. (a)) and found true the special allegation that he personally inflicted great bodily injury on the child in violation of section 12022.7, subdivision (d). Jackson admitted he had suffered a prior prison sentence (§ 667.5, subdivision (b)), a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)), and a prior strike conviction (§ 667, subds. (b)-(i)). The court sentenced Jackson to a total prison term of 13 years.
All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.
On appeal, Jackson argues (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction, (2) it was error to discharge a juror, and (3) it was error to deny his motion for a mistrial.
I
FACTS
A. The Injuries
On August 6, 2005, Jackson was at home with his son J., who was then less than four months old. J.’s mother (Mother), was at work. In the early afternoon, Jackson telephoned Mother and told her J. might be injured and she needed to come home.
Mother arrived home within 10 minutes of receiving the telephone call. Jackson was on the couch and J. was nestled in a beanbag chair next to the couch. Mother observed J. was rigid and his eyes were rolling to one side. She immediately told Jackson to call 9-1-1. She held J. while waiting for paramedics to arrive and noticed the "soft spot" on his head was changing and was starting to bulge outward.
The fontanelle is a softer area on the top of an infant's head where there is only tissue because the skull has not yet fused together.
Paramedics arrived 10 to 15 minutes after Jackson's 9-1-1 telephone call. Paramedic Fuentes examined J. and noticed he was lethargic, his eyes were not tracking and were deviating to the left, his breathing was shallow, his left arm was stiff and shaking in a trembling motion, he had an abnormal "branching" noise from his throat, and his right eye was not responsive to light. Fuentes also noticed the bulging in the fontanelle. Because Fuentes believed J. was suffering some sort of brain damage, paramedics put J. on oxygen and transported him to Children's Hospital.
B. Jackson's Version
In an interview with Deputy Sheriff Cardenas on the evening of August 6, Jackson stated that J. had awakened around 10:30 a.m. that morning and everything appeared normal. J. fell asleep around lunchtime and reawakened around 2:00 p.m. Jackson fixed a bottle for J., propped him on the couch with a "Dinosaur" bottle holder so he could feed himself, and went into the kitchen. While in the kitchen, Jackson heard J. roll off the couch and fall to the floor. It did not sound as though J. hit anything except the floor.
The distance from the couch to the floor was not more than 19 inches, and the floor was covered by a one-half inch carpet pad and a Berber carpet.
Jackson went into the living room and found J. on his back on the floor. Jackson picked the baby up and put him back on the couch, but J. did not want any more of the bottle. Jackson then picked J. up to burp him and noticed the "soft spot" was harder than usual. Shortly after that, Jackson noticed J. appeared drowsy, and within five to seven minutes Jackson noted J.'s eyes were rolling back and he was making moaning sounds as though in pain. Jackson telephoned Mother but did not immediately call 9-1-1 because he did not see any bleeding or bruises. Instead, he put J. on the beanbag chair and waited for Mother to arrive. However, after she arrived, Jackson telephoned 9-1-1.
Jackson's trial testimony was essentially similar to his statement to police.
C. Prosecution Experts
Dr. Jerry Dwek and Dr. Marilyn Kaufhold testified the injuries suffered by J. were consistent with "shaken baby syndrome," and were not consistent with a fall of 19 inches onto a padded surface.
Dr. Dwek reviewed the CT scan of J.'s head and saw subdural hemorrhaging in numerous places. The subdural hemorrhaging was the result of tearing to the bridging or connecting veins. He testified that the nature of the injuries was consistent with shaken baby syndrome, in which the brain suffers injury caused by multiple accelerations and decelerations of the brain's gray and white matter resulting in tearing to the bridging veins. A deceleration injury of this magnitude could be caused by an extremely long fall of two or more stories, but not a fall of two or three feet. Moreover, falls are accompanied by skull fractures or a focalized contusion inside the brain, and neither of those injuries was present here.
Dr. Kaufhold agreed the injuries suffered by J. were consistent with being shaken or slammed onto a soft surface. A shaking motion causes the brain to move back and forth within the head, creating collisions with the skull and causing diffuse brain swelling and bleeding. Dr. Kaufhold stated that when a person falls from a great height, such as three to four stories, the diffuse swelling and bleeding can be similar to the injuries suffered by J. However, when falls involve much shorter distances, such as two to three feet, the injuries are typically limited to a skull fracture and a small focal lesion (a small localized area of bleeding inside the skull adjacent to the fracture) and will not produce the diffuse brain swelling that accompanies a shaking injury. Here, J. had neither the skull fracture nor localized bleeding that would ordinarily accompany a fall from a short distance but instead had the diffuse swelling and bleeding that accompanies shaking injuries.
Dr. Kaufhold agreed that retinal hemorrhaging, which accompanies 80 to 85 percent of shaken baby cases, was not present.
D. Defense Expert
Kenneth Monson, a Ph.D. in mechanical engineering and an assistant adjunct professor in the neurosurgery department at U.C. San Francisco, works in the area of biomechanical engineering. He is not a physician and does not examine or treat patients. He testified the force generated by a short fall of two to three feet was greater than the force generated in studies using dolls to simulate the force generated by shaking, and concluded there was no clear answer as to whether rolling off the couch could produce enough force to cause the types of injuries suffered by J. He also testified it was disputed whether shaking could have caused J.'s injuries, and that it was an open question whether an earlier injury could make the child more susceptible to injury from a second fall. Monson also relied on the "Aoki" study, which summarized anecdotal reports of approximately 21 infants who suffered subdural hematomas from reported falls over short distances, to support his conclusion J.'s fall here could have produced the subdural hematomas.
There was evidence J. had fallen from the couch one week before he sustained the current injuries.
In rebuttal, Dr. Kaufhold testified the Aoki study reported results from Japan contrary to more rigorous studies. She testified the anomalous results from the Aoki study could be attributed to the fact that the injured children of the Aoki study (who did suffer some form of subdural hematoma or brain swelling) had not been subjected to a complete medical evaluation, and the "falls" were witnessed solely by the caregiver and the caregivers' reports were not investigated for veracity. Moreover, there was a strong cultural bias that disavowed the presence of child abuse in Japan. In contrast, studies such as the Williams study, entitled "Witnessed Corroborated Free Falls," studied numerous head injuries and compared the results between two groups: a large group of falls witnessed by multiple persons (at least one of whom was the noncaregiver) and a group of "falls" not witnessed by third parties. In the "witnessed" category of falls by children under three years old, there were no children who fell fewer than 10 feet who lost consciousness, and there were only mild injuries for children who fell from 10 to 22 feet. In contrast, the unwitnessed "falls" group had two deaths and 18 severe injuries from falls fewer than five feet. Other studies involving falls from short distances, where the fall was deemed objectively verifiable, produced a similar absence of significant injuries from brain swelling or subdural hematomas.
D. Other Defense Evidence
Jackson denied shaking or hitting J. J.'s pediatrician testified there was no evidence J. had been abused prior to the August 6, 2005, incident. Numerous witnesses testified Jackson was an excellent parent who never abused or hit his children or any other child for whom Jackson was the caretaker.
II
ANALYSIS
A. Substantial Evidence Supports the Verdict
Jackson argues the evidence is insufficient to support the guilty verdict. We conclude there is sufficient evidence from which the jury could have concluded Jackson actively inflicted the injuries on J.
The prosecution below argued the alternative theory that Jackson was guilty under section 273a, subdivision (a) because, by placing J. on the couch and leaving him, Jackson was criminally negligent by willfully permitting J. to be endangered under circumstances likely to produce great bodily harm. We need not determine whether the evidence was sufficient to support the prosecutor's alternative theory because our Supreme Court, as well as the United States Supreme Court, has "held that when a prosecutor argues two theories to the jury, one of which is factually sufficient and one of which is not, the conviction need not be reversed, because the reviewing court must assume that the jury based its conviction on the theory supported by the evidence. [Citations]." (People v. Seaton (2001) 26 Cal.4th 598, 645.)
Standard of Review
When reviewing a claim attacking the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, " 'the question we ask is "whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." ' [Citations.]" (People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1175.) As an appellate court, we " 'must view the evidence in a light most favorable to respondent and presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.' " (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 576.) We focus on the whole record, not isolated bits of evidence. (People v. Slaughter (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1187, 1203.) If the verdict is supported by substantial evidence--evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value--we accord due deference to the verdict and will not substitute our conclusions for those of the trier of fact. (People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1078.) A conviction will not be reversed for insufficient evidence unless it appears "that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support [the conviction]." (People v. Redmond (1969) 71 Cal.2d 745, 755.)
The same deferential standard of review applies in cases in which the prosecution relies primarily on circumstantial evidence. (People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 396.) "Although it is the duty of the jury to acquit a defendant if it finds that circumstantial evidence is susceptible of two interpretations, one of which suggests guilt and the other innocence [citations], it is the jury, not the appellate court [that] must be convinced of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. ' "If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact's findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also be reasonably reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment." ' " (People v. Bean (1988) 46 Cal.3d 919, 932-933.)
Evaluation
A "[v]iolation of section 273a, subdivision (a) ' "can occur in a wide variety of situations: the definition broadly includes both active and passive conduct, i.e., child abuse by direct assault and child endangering by extreme neglect." ' [Quoting People v. Smith (1984) 35 Cal.3d 798, 806.]" (People v. Valdez (2002) 27 Cal.4th 778, 784.) Moreover, the crime is a general intent crime: the defendant need not intend the harmful results of his acts but instead "the mens rea for the crime [is] the intent to perform the underlying injurious act on a child." (People v. Valdez, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 786.)
Jackson argues reversal is required because In re Maria R. (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 731 held the defendant must intend to commit the proscribed conduct and intend that the harmful results occur, and there is no evidence Jackson intended to injure J. However, two courts have criticized and refused to adopt this aspect of Maria R. (see People v. Pointer (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 1128, 1135, fn. 5; People v. Vargas (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 1455, 1469, fn. 8), and People v. Sargent (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1206, 1221-1224 made clear that the active infliction aspect of this statute is a general intent crime. Because we conclude the evidence supports the conviction under the active infliction aspect of section 273a, subdivision (a), we reject Jackson's claim that reversal is required based on insufficient evidence of his intent to inflict the harmful result.
Here, the expert testimony provides substantial evidence that J.'s injuries were the result of a physical shaking. The courts have repeatedly held that the prosecution may rely on expert testimony to prove the injuries suffered by a child were the result of abuse rather than attributable to accident. (See, e.g., People v. Albritton (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 647, 656 [expert medical testimony that nature of injuries showed death was caused by shaken baby syndrome and injuries were inconsistent with defendant's version of events supported section 273a conviction]; People v. Mills (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 898, 920-921 [expert medical testimony that nature of injuries showed injuries resulted from child abuse and injuries were inconsistent with defendant's version of events supported conviction].) There was no sign of a traumatic focalized injury (such as a bruise or cut or skull fracture) from a single collision of J.'s skull with the floor or other object, or a concentrated thick single hematoma from such a collision; instead, there was a widespread thin layered hematoma (as well as diffuse swelling of the brain) consistent with shaking. Moreover, the studies supported the conclusion that the diffuse swelling and hematoma were inconsistent with a short fall. Finally, the early and rapid onset of severe brain swelling and its associated symptoms were consistent with shaking but inconsistent with a single concussive blow to the head creating a subdural hematoma.
Although Jackson produced an expert who disputed the conclusions of the prosecution doctors, "[t]he conflict among the experts' opinions . . . did not render the evidence insufficient. . . . In finding [against the defendant], the jury necessarily rejected his experts' contention . . . . The credibility and weight of the expert testimony was for the jury to determine, and it is not up to us to reevaluate it." (People v. Flores (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 625, 632-633.) The jury "could reasonably believe the evidence of the prosecution witnesses and reject that of the defense witness." (People v. Mercer (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.) Monson was not a medical doctor, he relied on a study of questioned veracity and apparently overlooked more rigorous studies. He conceded that he assumed the brain swelling was caused by the subdural hematoma but that it was a "medical issue" whether J.'s brain swelling was caused by a subdural hematoma in this case.
We conclude a reasonable jury could have found Jackson guilty of violating section 273a, subdivision (a), based on the prosecution's active infliction theory, and we therefore reject Jackson's claim the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction.
B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Addressing the Jury Misconduct Issue
After the jury began deliberating, the court learned Juror No. 3 had a cousin (with whom Juror No. 3 had grown up) who had reportedly fallen out his crib when he was four months old and had suffered brain damage; this history was not disclosed during voir dire. The court also learned Juror No. 3 had interjected this information into the jury deliberations. The court investigated the problems, and ultimately dismissed Juror No. 3, but denied Jackson's motion for mistrial. Jackson asserts (1) it was improper to dismiss Juror No. 3, and (2) the court's investigation amounted to an improper interference with the deliberation process.
Background
During voir dire, the parties informed the jury that the case involved brain injuries to a three-month-old child, the defense claimed the injuries were caused by a fall from the couch to the floor, and the prosecution disputed the injuries resulted from a fall. The court informed the jury the focus of voir dire would be to identify anyone who could not be fair and impartial because of their personal experiences with a similar case, such as one "whose own child or grandchild may have been severely injured under circumstances in which it was not clear to them whether or not it was an accident or intentional." The court admonished the prospective jurors that if they had any biases that might interfere with the ability to be fair or impartial, "you need to divulge them to us, even if we do not specifically ask about them."
The prosecutor asked the prospective jurors a series of questions probing into their children's falls, hitting their heads, and whether any of the incidents resulted in any brain injury. The court also asked whether the jurors "or anyone close to you" had been subjected to child abuse, "even if it may not have been considered that at the time," and later asked whether anyone had thought that "something about your life history, your attitudes, or something that has occurred in your life that I have not specifically asked about that you believe out of fairness, these attorneys ought to know about you, even if I have not asked about it?" Several prospective jurors subsequently revealed, in response to additional voir dire questions from the attorneys, that their child had fallen in various fashions and suffered injuries requiring a visit to the emergency room. Juror No. 3 did not reveal his cousin's injuries during voir dire.
During deliberations on Thursday, the foreperson gave a note to the bailiff reciting that some of the jurors were concerned Juror No. 3 had experience with a cousin who fell our of a crib at four months old and suffered brain damage, and he "should have brought that issue up before now." The court proposed, without objection, to investigate the matter by bringing Juror No. 3 into court to determine what happened, and thereafter to bring the remainder of the jury in to find out what was said and whether the jurors believed they could set aside Juror No. 3's comments during the remainder of their deliberations.
The court questioned Juror No. 3 out of the presence of the other jurors, and asked whether he had said anything to the other jurors about his prior experiences; Juror No. 3 admitted he had. Juror No. 3 explained that, on the previous day (Wednesday), the jury was discussing the length of J.'s fall and he brought up that he learned (from his father) that a cousin with whom Juror No. 3 had grown up had fallen from his crib, hit his head, and suffered permanent brain damage. Juror No. 3 stated the discussion was brief, but the subject was raised on Thursday morning by at least two other jurors who said Juror No. 3 should have raised the subject before. Juror No. 3 stated he felt defensive about it, and responded by telling the complaining jurors that they should have him replaced if they felt he was biased. Juror No. 3 conceded he had thought seriously about bringing the subject up during voir dire but decided not to because he didn't think it was important. The court ruled that Juror No. 3 should be excused.
The court then interviewed the other jurors serially to ask (1) what had occurred in the deliberations and (2) whether each juror could set aside the comments by Juror No. 3 and decide the matter based on the evidence introduced at trial. The jurors confirmed Juror No. 3 had interjected into the deliberations that his cousin with whom he had grown up had sustained brain damage from reportedly falling from his crib at age four months, and Juror No. 3's comment had prompted another juror (Juror No. 6) to comment "see, it does happen." However, the jurors all affirmed they would be able to set aside the information introduced by Juror No. 3 and decide the case on the evidence.
The following day, Jackson moved for a mistrial. He argued the court had interfered with the jury's deliberations by asking which jurors agreed with the dismissed juror. He also asserted there had been improper deliberations outside of the jury room because the jury foreperson had discussed the matter with another juror or jurors during a lunch recess. The court denied the motion.
Dismissal of Juror No. 3 Was Not an Abuse of Discretion
Jackson first asserts that because jurors are entitled to bring their life experiences into the jury room and share them with their fellow jurors (People v. Schmeck (2005) 37 Cal.4th 240, 307; People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 162), the fact Juror No. 3 shared his cousin's story was not misconduct and the decision to dismiss him was therefore an abuse of discretion.
A court may discharge a juror and order an alternate to serve "upon other good cause shown to the court [that he or she is] unable to perform his or her duty." (§ 1089.) We review for abuse of discretion the trial court's determination to discharge a juror and order an alternate to serve, and if there is any substantial evidence to support the trial court's ruling, we will uphold it. (People v. Marshall (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 843.) When a juror conceals material information during voir dire that tends to show bias, a court has discretion to discharge the juror. (People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 400 ["When the trial court discovers during trial that a juror misrepresented or concealed material information on voir dire tending to show bias, the trial court may discharge the juror if, after examination of the juror, the record discloses reasonable grounds for inferring bias as a 'demonstrable reality,' even though the juror continues to deny bias"]; accord, In re Hitchings (1993) 6 Cal.4th 97, 120 ["when a juror conceals material information on voir dire, 'that information establish[es] substantial grounds for inferring that [the juror] was biased . . . despite . . . protestations to the contrary' "].) A court may also discharge a juror who evidences an inability to follow the court's instructions. (People v. Daniels (1991) 52 Cal.3d 815, 864-865.)
The trial court here concluded Juror No. 3's failure to disclose his personal experience (which involved information going to the heart of the case) was misconduct because he intentionally decided not to bring the matter to the court's attention. The court specifically found Juror No. 3 was "mindful of it during the jury selection process, and made a decision not to bring it up." "Whether a failure to disclose is intentional or unintentional and whether a juror is biased in this regard are matters within the discretion of the trial court. Except where bias is clearly apparent from the record, the trial judge is in the best position to assess the state of mind of a juror or potential juror on voir dire examination." (People v. McPeters (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1148, 1174-1175.) Because substantial evidence supports this finding, the trial court had grounds to discharge Juror No. 3 for concealment of this experience during voir dire.
Jackson asserts the concealment was inadvertent because no direct questions were asked about extended family members. However, the voir dire alerted the prospective jurors to the nature of the disputed issue; the broad questioning asked whether the jurors "or anyone close to you" had been subjected to child abuse, "even if it may not have been considered that at the time," and whether anyone had "something that has occurred in your life that I have not specifically asked about that you believe out of fairness, these attorneys ought to know about you, even if I have not asked about it"; and Juror No. 3 admitted he was "mindful of [the] event with [his] cousin] . . . [and] debated about whether [he] should bring it up, and decided not to." This evidence supports the trial court's finding.
Moreover, the court noted that Juror No. 3 had brought his outside knowledge into the jury room. Interjecting outside information into the deliberations, at least when the information is not a matter of common knowledge, can support a finding of misconduct. (People v. Nesler (1997) 16 Cal.4th 561, 570-574.) Here, the issue of whether an infant can sustain severe brain damage from a fall was a hotly contested issue, and is not one that can be deemed to be a matter of common knowledge. Therefore the trial court had substantial evidence on which to conclude that Juror No. 3's introduction of his experience with his cousin was misconduct and could preclude Juror No. 3 from acting without bias in the deliberations.
Jackson relies on People v. Schmeck, supra, 37 Cal.4th 240 and People v. Yeoman, supra, 31 Cal.4th 93 to argue that a juror may relate his own experiences to the other jurors without committing misconduct. However, those cases merely held that the particular outside subject matter raised by the jurors in those cases involved matters of common knowledge (Yeoman, at p. 162 [effect of drugs "has become a subject of common knowledge among laypersons"]; Schmeck, at p. 307 [possibility a prisoner sentenced to life without possibility of parole could nevertheless be released earlier " 'is a matter "of common knowledge appreciated by every juror" ' "]), and does not signal approval for jurors to bring in extrinsic information not commonly known to all jurors.
The Court Properly Denied the Motion for Mistrial
Jackson moved for a mistrial, alleging (1) the court's investigation into Juror No. 3's misconduct improperly interfered with the jury's deliberative process because the court asked which jurors agreed with the dismissed juror, and (2) there had been improper deliberations outside of the jury room because the jury foreperson had discussed Juror No. 3's comments with another juror or jurors during a lunch recess. The court denied the motion.
Jackson appears to argue on appeal that we should reverse because the foreperson (as well as the jurors with whom the foreperson had the discussion) were not discharged for misconduct even though they discussed the case outside the jury room. However, the evidence supports the trial court's conclusion that the lunchroom discussion did not involve any deliberations or discussions about the evidence, but was limited to whether or not the jury needed to alert the court to Juror No. 3's comments. We are satisfied that this de minimus discussion involved only an administrative question and that the record as a whole shows there was no reasonable probability Jackson suffered actual harm from the lunchroom discussion. (See People v. Cochran (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 826, 830-831.)
When a trial court is alerted to the possibility of juror misconduct, "the court 'must "make whatever inquiry is reasonably necessary" ' to resolve the matter." (People v. Hayes (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1211, 1255 [quoting People v. Hedgecock (1990) 51 Cal.3d 395, 417). The court has "considerable discretion" in conducting the requisite investigation (People v. Prieto (2003) 30 Cal.4th 226, 274), including interviewing the individual jurors. (People v. Thomas (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1477, 1482.) However, it must be cautious that its investigation does not intrude on the independent deliberative processes of the jury. (People v. Keenan (1988) 46 Cal.3d 478, 535-536.)
Jackson argues the court's inquiry resulted in identifying at least one juror--Juror No. 6--sympathetic to Juror No. 3's statement that severe injuries could result from a short fall. He asserts that the court, by asking each juror whether they could disregard Juror No. 3's views, effectively denigrated the defense argument and isolated and disempowered Juror No. 6, thereby intruding on the independence of the deliberative process. Moreover, Jackson argues that because the court told Juror No. 6 she needed to be able to deliberate after putting "whatever [Juror No. 3] said[] in a little box. Close that box, lock it, and not reopen it until after this trial is over with," the court effectively told Juror No. 6 to ignore her prior life history (and any opinions she formed based thereon) and to instead focus solely on the scientific evidence. The record as a whole, however, does not support Jackson's argument. Although the court did ask Juror No. 6 (and the other jurors) whether Juror No. 6 could disregard what Juror No. 3 had related about his cousin, the court specifically disavowed any suggestion that she should set aside her independently formed opinions. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by conducting an investigation that ensured improper extrinsic matter would be ignored while simultaneously avoiding any impingement on the judgments formed by the remaining jurors insofar as such judgments were untainted by Juror No. 3's comments.
The court asked if Juror No. 6 could set aside what Juror No. 3 had said, and Juror No. 6 responded she could "set it aside, but I believe that that could happen." The court then asked "did you believe it could happen before [Juror No. 3] brought it up?" and Juror No. 6 responded "yes." The court then stated, "I am not asking you to change your beliefs in any way, just I am asking that you disregard what [Juror No. 3] said, and not allow it to enter into your deliberation process." Juror No. 6 responded, "Yeah, that's fine. Because I felt one way before he said that." Juror No. 6 later reiterated that, "I will not rely on [what Juror No. 3 said]. [¶] . . . [¶] . . . I believed one way, and my opinion has not changed. So he did not change my opinion."
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: BENKE, Acting P. J., NARES, J.