Summary
reversing by memorandum opinion the order of a trial court which vacated a conviction when the prosecuting deputy district attorney was not a member of any bar
Summary of this case from State v. GambrellOpinion
July 16, 1990
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (Beldock, J.).
Ordered that the order dated December 6, 1989, is reversed, on the law, the motion is denied, and the judgment of conviction is reinstated; and it is further,
Ordered that the judgment is modified, on the law, by reversing the conviction of robbery in the second degree, vacating the sentence imposed thereon, and dismissing that count of the indictment; as so modified, the judgment is affirmed.
Although it was improper for Assistant District Attorney Penofsky to have prosecuted this matter, since he was not admitted to the practice of law in this State, the defendant has failed to demonstrate any resulting prejudice. Absent such a showing of prejudice, this procedural irregularity is insufficient to constitute reversible error (see, People v Reyes, 161 A.D.2d 201; People v. Linares, 158 A.D.2d 296; People v Munoz, 153 A.D.2d 281, 284-285; cf., People v. Felder, 47 N.Y.2d 287, 295-296).
However, we agree with the defendant's contention that the evidence, even when viewed in a light most favorable to the People (see, People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620), was legally insufficient to sustain his conviction for robbery in the second degree. The only evidence presented by the People to support this charge was the complainant's testimony that the defendant grabbed her pocketbook and removed an order of protection therefrom. A trier of fact could not reasonably conclude from the record that the defendant intended to "deprive" the complainant of her property (see, Penal Law § 155.00; People v. Williams, 147 A.D.2d 515, 516; People v. Pierre, 131 A.D.2d 604; People v Gentile, 127 A.D.2d 686, 687-688). Moreover, the People failed to establish that the complainant suffered from a "physical injury", another necessary element of robbery in the second degree as charged here (see, Penal Law § 160.10 [a]). The complainant's testimony, and the hospital records admitted into evidence, merely revealed that she suffered from a bruised eye, with slight swelling and redness, and received medical attention for it. In addition, there was no indication that the complainant experienced any pain (see, People v. Franklin, 149 A.D.2d 617; People v. Holden, 148 A.D.2d 635; People v. Goins, 129 A.D.2d 733, 734). Therefore, the conviction for that charge must be reversed.
The defendant's remaining contentions are either unpreserved for appellate review or need not be addressed in light of the foregoing analysis. Thompson, J.P., Lawrence, Harwood and Balletta, JJ., concur.