Opinion
Argued June 28, 1999
October 4, 1999
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Eng, J.).
ORDERED that the judgment is reversed, on the law, and a new trial is ordered.
The trial court erred in denying the defendant's challenge for cause to a prospective juror. Where there is evidence that a prospective juror's state of mind is likely to preclude him or her from rendering an impartial verdict ( see, CPL 270.20[b]), the prospective juror is required to state in unequivocal terms that he or she would be able to render a verdict based solely on the evidence adduced at trial ( see, People v. Torpey, 63 N.Y.2d 361, 367; People v. Blyden, 55 N.Y.2d 73, 77-78). In evaluating whether the prospective juror has made an unequivocal declaration, the trial court must consider the prospective juror's entire testimony ( see, People v. Torpey, supra, at 368; People v. Blyden, supra, at 78). The prospective juror at issue, who had been a crime victim, could only declare that she "hope[d]" her experience would not affect her. Where there remains any doubt in the wake of such statements, when considered in the context of the prospective juror's overall responses, the prospective juror should be discharged for cause ( see, People v. Zachary, 260 A.D.2d 514 [2d Dept., Apr. 12, 1999]; People v. Jordan, 244 A.D.2d 360; People v. Blyden, supra, at 78).
Since the defendant thereafter exhausted all of his peremptory challenges, the error mandates a new trial ( see, People v. Molinari, 252 A.D.2d 532).
In view of the foregoing, we need not reach the remaining issue.
RITTER, J.P., KRAUSMAN, FLORIO, and FEUERSTEIN, JJ., concur.