Opinion
2011-08-2
Mark Diamond, New York, N.Y., for appellant.Janet DiFiore, District Attorney, White Plains, N.Y. (Laurie Sapakoff, Lois Cullen Valerio, and Richard Longworth Hecht of counsel), for respondent.
Mark Diamond, New York, N.Y., for appellant.Janet DiFiore, District Attorney, White Plains, N.Y. (Laurie Sapakoff, Lois Cullen Valerio, and Richard Longworth Hecht of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Westchester County (Cohen, J.), rendered December 9, 2008, convicting him of attempted criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
The County Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the defendant's motion to withdraw his plea of guilty without a hearing ( see CPL 220.60[3] ). “The decision to permit a defendant to withdraw a previously entered plea of guilty rests within the sound discretion of the County Court and generally will not be disturbed absent an improvident exercise of discretion” ( People v. Douglas, 83 A.D.3d 1092, 1092, 921 N.Y.S.2d 324, see People v. Seeber, 4 N.Y.3d 780, 793 N.Y.S.2d 826, 826 N.E.2d 797; People v. Duncan, 78 A.D.3d 1193, 912 N.Y.S.2d 283; People v. Haffiz, 77 A.D.3d 767, 909 N.Y.S.2d 490; People v. Pooler, 58 A.D.3d 757, 871 N.Y.S.2d 707). “Only in the rare instance will a defendant be entitled to an evidentiary hearing” ( People v. Tinsley, 35 N.Y.2d 926, 927, 365 N.Y.S.2d 161, 324 N.E.2d 544; see People v. Perez, 83 A.D.3d 738, 738, 919 N.Y.S.2d 887; People v. Smith, 54 A.D.3d 879, 880, 863 N.Y.S.2d 818). “Instead, it is sufficient if the court affords the defendant an opportunity to present his [or her] arguments with respect to withdrawal”
( People v. Griffith, 78 A.D.3d 1194, 1195, 913 N.Y.S.2d 264; see People v. Perez, 83 A.D.3d at 738, 919 N.Y.S.2d 887).
Here, the defendant's contention that he was heavily medicated at the time of his plea was not supported by the evidence submitted with his motion ( see People v. Hansen, 269 A.D.2d 467, 704 N.Y.S.2d 269), and the plea colloquy reveals nothing to suggest that he was disoriented or unable to understand the proceedings or work with his attorney ( see People v. Kessler, 5 A.D.3d 504, 505, 772 N.Y.S.2d 582; People v. Wheeler, 249 A.D.2d 774, 774–775, 672 N.Y.S.2d 155). Furthermore, the evidence of the defendant's medical history submitted in support of his motion was insufficient to rebut the presumption that he was competent to enter a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent plea ( see People v. Morgan, 87 N.Y.2d 878, 880, 638 N.Y.S.2d 942, 662 N.E.2d 260; see People v. Batista, 82 A.D.3d 1113, 919 N.Y.S.2d 350; People v. Bilal, 79 A.D.3d 900, 902, 912 N.Y.S.2d 678; People v. Gallo, 73 A.D.3d 804, 804–805, 899 N.Y.S.2d 655; People v. M'Lady, 59 A.D.3d 568, 873 N.Y.S.2d 331; People v. Hansen, 269 A.D.2d 467, 704 N.Y.S.2d 269; cf. People v. Galea, 54 A.D.3d 686, 863 N.Y.S.2d 695). Additionally, “[t]he defendant's assertions that defense counsel forced him to plead guilty and that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel are belied by his statements under oath on the record acknowledging that his plea had not been coerced and that the plea was being entered of his own free will” ( see People v. Douglas, 83 A.D.3d at 1092, 921 N.Y.S.2d 324; People v. Duncan, 78 A.D.3d at 1194, 912 N.Y.S.2d 283; People v. Turner, 23 A.D.3d 503, 805 N.Y.S.2d 614; People v. Martinez, 78 A.D.3d 966, 967, 910 N.Y.S.2d 684; People v. Gedin, 46 A.D.3d 701, 847 N.Y.S.2d 231; People v. Hall, 195 A.D.2d 521, 600 N.Y.S.2d 274).
The defendant's challenge to the procedure by which he was sentenced as a second felony offender ( see CPL 400.21) is unpreserved for appellate review ( see People v. Pellegrino, 60 N.Y.2d 636, 637, 467 N.Y.S.2d 355, 454 N.E.2d 938; People v. Carrion, 65 A.D.3d 693, 884 N.Y.S.2d 483; People v. Lopez, 49 A.D.3d 899, 899–900, 854 N.Y.S.2d 500; People v. Carpenter, 52 A.D.3d 729, 860 N.Y.S.2d 599). In any event, the challenge is without merit, as the County Court followed the procedure set forth in CPL 400.21 after it permitted the defendant to challenge the constitutionality of the alleged predicate convictions even after he had knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to assert such a challenge during his plea ( see CPL 400.21; cf. People v. Smith, 56 A.D.3d 695, 871 N.Y.S.2d 159).