Moreover, a person does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in property which he has "abandoned." Abel v United States, 362 U.S. 217, 241; 80 S Ct 683; 4 L Ed 2d 668 (1960); Hester v United States, 265 U.S. 57, 58; 44 S Ct 445; 68 L Ed 898 (1924); People v Jackson, 175 Mich. App. 562; 438 N.W.2d 84 (1988); People v Wright, 151 Mich. App. 354; 390 N.W.2d 187 (1986); People v Boykin, 119 Mich. App. 763; 327 N.W.2d 351 (1982); United States v Thomas, 275 US App DC 21, 23-24; 864 F.2d 843 (1989). As the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia recently explained:
Similarly, a police officer's decision to follow someone does not by itself amount to intimidating conduct that would cause a reasonable person to believe that he or she was not at liberty to leave. People v Jackson, 175 Mich App 562, 563-564; 438 NW2d 84 (1988).
Moreover, even if Plaintiff were to argue that the encounter was a seizure because the FPS agent followed him to the Senator's office, an "officer's decision to follow someone does not by itself amount to intimidating conduct that would cause a reasonable person to believe that he or she was not at liberty to leave." People v. Lucynski, No. 353646, 2020 WL 7417506, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 17, 2020) (citing People v. Jackson, 175 Mich. App. 562, 563-64 (1988)). However, a material question of fact exists as to whether Plaintiff was seized by the FPS agents on the first floor.