A plain reading of section 241.1(a) reveals that, despite defendant's argument to the contrary, "[t]he fact that the offender must be a convicted felon is merely an element of the crime, it is not an `enhancement' provision." Gonzalez, 151 Ill. 2d at 88; see also People v. Jackson, 269 Ill. App. 3d 851, 855 (1995). We find no reason to depart from existing Illinois law.

¶ 31 Finally, the State cites People v. Jackson, 269 Ill.App.3d 851, 207 Ill.Dec. 212, 646 N.E.2d 1299 (1995), for its holding “ ‘section 24–1.1 is not merely an “upgraded” version of the offense created by section 24–1; rather, it is a separate, distinct offense. The fact that the offender must be a convicted felon is merely an element of the crime, it is not an “enhancement” provision.

As defendant acknowledges, the statute at hand will be upheld if rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. See People v. Jackson, 269 Ill. App. 3d 851, 857 (1995) (because personal liberty deprived by lawful incarceration does not constitute a fundamental right, such legislation will be upheld if it is rationally related to a legitimate state purpose). Section 24-1.7(a) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (the Code) states, in pertinent part, as follows:

Additionally, equal protection requires that similarly situated individuals be treated in a similar manner. People v. Jackson, 269 Ill. App.3d 851 (1995). The United States and Illinois Constitutions do not prohibit the State from drawing lines that treat different classes of people differently.

The clause grants all people "equal protection of the laws," which means that the states must apply the law equally and cannot give preference to one person or class of persons over another. Jackson, 646 N.E.2d 1299. To sufficiently show one person was treated unequally than another similarly saturated person states a constitutional right violation, to establish the violation, discrimination against one person in favor of another with no rational basis for the differentiation in treatment must be shown.

The unlawful use of a weapon by a felon statute has also been determined constitutional by this court. People v. Jackson, 269 Ill. App. 3d 851 (1995) (holding the unlawful use of a weapon by a felon statute is constitutional and that it is constitutional to distinguish felons in the context of firearm possession.). As set forth below, defendant's conviction under the unlawful use of a weapon statute will be vacated under the one-act, one-crime doctrine, therefore it is unnecessary to consider its constitutionality at this juncture.

¶ 7 On appeal, the State contends that the trial court erroneously dismissed the armed habitual criminal charge and unlawful use of a weapon by a felon charges against Velez. The State argues that the trial court contradicted the plain language of section 111–2 of the Code when it ruled that the State was required to submit proof of Velez's prior felony convictions at the preliminary hearing in order to meet the elements of the charges by information. In response, Velez cites People v. Thomas, 407 Ill.App.3d 136, 142, 347 Ill.Dec. 889, 943 N.E.2d 179, 184 (2011), and People v. Jackson, 269 Ill.App.3d 851, 855, 207 Ill.Dec. 212, 646 N.E.2d 1299, 1303 (1995), to argue that proof of a defendant's prior felony conviction is a required element of the charges of being an armed habitual criminal and unlawful use of a weapon by a felon. The State does not dispute this.

On March 21, 2011, the State filed a timely notice of appeal. Therefore, this court has jurisdiction to consider the State's arguments on appeal pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 603 (eff. Oct. 1, 2010) and Illinois Supreme Court Rule 606 (eff. Mar. 20, 2009). ¶ 7 On appeal, the State contends that the trial court erroneously dismissed the armed habitual criminal charge and unlawful use of a weapon by a felon charges against Velez. The State argues that the trial court contradicted the plain language of section 111-2 of the Code when it ruled that the State was required to submit proof of Velez's prior felony convictions at the preliminary hearing in order to meet the elements of the charges by information. In response, Velez cites People v. Thomas, 407 Ill. App. 3d 136, 142, 943 N.E.2d 179, 184 (2011), and People v. Jackson, 269 Ill. App. 3d 851, 855, 646 N.E.2d 1299, 1303 (1995), to argue that proof of a defendant's prior felony conviction is a required element of the charges of being an armed habitual criminal and unlawful use of a weapon by a felon. The State does not dispute this.

This situation falls within the scope of section 111-3(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which states that prior convictions used to enhance a sentence "from one classification of offense to another higher level classification of offense" are not elements of an offense and shall not be disclosed to the jury. 725 ILCS 5/111-3(c) (West 2006); cf. People v. Jackson, 269 Ill. App. 3d 851, 854-55, 646 N.E.2d 1299, 1303 (1995) (concluding that section 111-3(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not apply to a conviction for unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon under section 24-1.1 of the Criminal Code). The State relies upon the cases of Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 136 L. Ed. 2d 574, 117 S. Ct. 644 (1997), and People v. Walker, 211 Ill. 2d 317, 812 N.E.2d 339 (2004), to support its position that the court properly submitted the stipulation to the jury.

The plain language of section 24-1.1 reveals that the legislature's intent was to keep dangerous weapons, including but not limited to firearms, out of the hands of convicted felons in any situation whether it be in the privacy of their own home or in a public place. See People v. Carmichael, 343 Ill.App.3d 855, 278 Ill.Dec. 683, 799 N.E.2d 401 (2003); People v. Jackson, 269 Ill.App.3d 851, 207 Ill.Dec. 212, 646 N.E.2d 1299 (1995). In addition, the legislature intended to impose a harsher penalty for those felons in possession of a weapon when they have committed a forcible felony in the past because they necessarily had a history of using or threatening physical force or violence against another individual. 720 ILCS 5/24-1.