People v. Jackson

15 Citing cases

  1. In re Cathy M

    326 Ill. App. 3d 335 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001)   Cited 17 times
    Holding that section 2-102 of the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code ( 405 ILCS 5/2-102 (West 2000)), which requires an involuntary recipient of psychotropic medications to be advised in writing of the medications' side effects, protects the recipient's due process rights and thus declining to find the statutory right easily waived

    In the criminal context, it is an abuse of discretion to deny a defendant's request for a continuance and proceed with the trial where a private attorney has been retained or an attorney's appearance is on file. People v. Jackson, 216 Ill. App.3d 1, 7 (1991). A trial court does not abuse its discretion, however, when a defendant's request for a continuance to retain a private attorney is based merely on the defendant's desire to obtain counsel.

  2. People v. Montgomery

    2023 Ill. App. 3d 200389 (Ill. App. Ct. 2023)   Cited 4 times
    In Montgomery, the appellate court also reversed and remanded the matter for a new sentencing hearing before a different judge.

    v. Jackson, 216 Ill.App.3d 1, 7 (1991); People v. Lewis, 165 Ill.App.3d 97, 103 (1988).

  3. People v. Montijo

    2018 Ill. App. 5th 140538 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018)

    ¶ 28 The decision to grant or deny a defendant's request for a continuance to obtain private counsel lies within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion. People v. Jackson, 216 Ill. App. 3d 1, 7 (1991). An unreasonable or arbitrary denial of a request for a continuance to obtain private counsel can violate a defendant's right to counsel if the ultimate effect is to deny the defendant

  4. People v. Staple

    402 Ill. App. 3d 1098 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010)   Cited 26 times
    In People v. Staple, 402 Ill. App. 3d 1098, 1108, 932 N.E.2d 1064, 1073 (2010), this court also found no error in reciting the four principles to the venire and then inquiring into the jurors' understanding and acceptance of those principles in small groups.

    A trial court considering a motion to continue to retain private counsel must balance defendant's constitutional right against the interests in trying the case efficiently. People v. Jackson, 216 Ill.App.3d 1, 6, 158 Ill.Dec. 606, 574 N.E.2d 719, 723 (1991); see People v. Friedman, 79 Ill.2d 341, 349, 38 Ill.Dec. 141, 403 N.E.2d 229, 234 (1980). Thus, " [a] defendant cannot assert that right in order to, even temporarily, thwart the administration of justice or to otherwise impede the effective prosecution of a crime."

  5. People v. Childress

    276 Ill. App. 3d 402 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995)   Cited 36 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that a defendant will lose his right to counsel of choice if he attempts to "thwart justice, delay or embarrass the effective administration of justice"

    He relies on People v. Little (1990), 207 Ill. App.3d 720, 566 N.E.2d 365, People v. Washington (1990), 195 Ill. App.3d 520, 552 N.E.2d 1067, People v. Green (1969), 42 Ill.2d 555, 248 N.E.2d 116, and People v. Sullivan (1977), 52 Ill. App.3d 666, 367 N.E.2d 1042. The State cites People v. Burrell (1992), 228 Ill. App.3d 133, 592 N.E.2d 453, People v. Jackson (1991), 216 Ill. App.3d 1, 574 N.E.2d 719, People v. Phelps (1990), 197 Ill. App.3d 954, 557 N.E.2d 235, People v. Lewis (1988), 165 Ill. App.3d 97, 518 N.E.2d 741, and People v. Capers (1989), 186 Ill. App.3d 367, 542 N.E.2d 528, to support its position that the trial court did not err. The State failed to respond to or distinguish defendant's cases.

  6. People v. Robinson

    254 Ill. App. 3d 906 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993)   Cited 14 times
    Stating a prosecutor can reflect on witness's credibility: if based on facts in the record or fair inferences or if they are invited responses to defendant's comments made in closing

    No abuse of discretion has been found where the trial court denies a motion for continuance to substitute counsel when it could reasonably conclude that the request was made solely for the purpose of delay because "this right may not be employed as a weapon to indefinitely thwart the administration of justice or to otherwise embarrass the effective prosecution of crime." Friedman, 79 Ill.2d at 349; see also People v. Jackson (1992), 228 Ill. App.3d 868, 875, 593 N.E.2d 760 ("defendant's trial-day request for other counsel [was] little more than a dilatory tactic"); People v. Jackson (1991), 216 Ill. App.3d 1, 7, 574 N.E.2d 719 ("[i]t is apparent that defendant was merely attempting to delay the trial with his last-minute request"); Bodoh, 200 Ill. App.3d at 425 ("defendant's request for new counsel was a defense tactic designed to avoid trial"). Other factors considered in justifying a denial of a continuance based upon a request to substitute other counsel include the lack of evidence that the new attorney was ready, willing and able to take and proceed with the case ( Burrell, 228 Ill. App.3d at 142-43), the failure of the defendant to articulate an acceptable reason for desiring new counsel when he is already represented by an experienced, court-appointed criminal lawyer ( Jackson, 216 Ill. App.3d at 7), and the representation by current counsel for a lengthy period prior to the request for new counsel ( Bodoh, 200 Ill. App.3d at 425 (during the two-year pendency of the case, the defendant never indicated a dissatisfaction with his attorney)).

  7. People v. White

    2020 Ill. App. 4th 160793 (Ill. App. Ct. 2020)   Cited 8 times

    "Especially when a defendant cannot ‘articulate an acceptable reason for desiring new counsel and is already being represented by an experienced, court-appointed criminal lawyer, it is not an abuse of discretion to deny defendant's trial-day request for a continuance.’ " Id. (quoting People v. Jackson , 216 Ill. App. 3d 1, 7, 158 Ill.Dec. 606, 574 N.E.2d 719, 723 (1991) ). ¶ 38 In this case, defendant had made no real effort to hire counsel.

  8. People v. Ramsey

    2018 Ill. App. 2d 151071 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018)   Cited 10 times

    "[W]hen a defendant cannot ‘articulate an acceptable reason for desiring new counsel and is already being represented by an experienced, court-appointed criminal lawyer, it is not an abuse of discretion to deny defendant's trial-day request for a continuance.’ " People v. Staple , 402 Ill. App. 3d 1098, 1103, 342 Ill.Dec. 603, 932 N.E.2d 1064 (2010) (quoting People v. Jackson , 216 Ill. App. 3d 1, 7, 158 Ill.Dec. 606, 574 N.E.2d 719 (1991) ). ¶ 25 Most important, a court must balance the defendant's right to counsel of his choice against the need for the efficient and effective administration of justice.

  9. People v. Tannahill

    2016 Ill. App. 5th 150169 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016)

    defendant's behalf. People v. Jackson, 216 Ill. App. 3d 1, 6, 574 N.E.2d 719, 723 (1991). Furthermore, we acknowledge that the decision whether to grant or deny a continuance rests in the sound discretion of the court.

  10. People v. Richardson

    2013 Ill. App. 3d 120404 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013)

    ¶ 17 A trial court's consideration of a motion to continue to secure substitute counsel must balance the defendant's constitutional right to counsel of his choice and the interest of diligently and efficiently completing the trial. People v. Jackson, 216 Ill. App. 3d 1, 6 (1991). Factors for this court to consider when evaluating the trial court's use of its discretion by denying a request by either party for a continuance include: the diligence of the movant; defendant's right to a fair, speedy, and impartial trial; and the interests of justice.