In the criminal context, it is an abuse of discretion to deny a defendant's request for a continuance and proceed with the trial where a private attorney has been retained or an attorney's appearance is on file. People v. Jackson, 216 Ill. App.3d 1, 7 (1991). A trial court does not abuse its discretion, however, when a defendant's request for a continuance to retain a private attorney is based merely on the defendant's desire to obtain counsel.
v. Jackson, 216 Ill.App.3d 1, 7 (1991); People v. Lewis, 165 Ill.App.3d 97, 103 (1988).
¶ 28 The decision to grant or deny a defendant's request for a continuance to obtain private counsel lies within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion. People v. Jackson, 216 Ill. App. 3d 1, 7 (1991). An unreasonable or arbitrary denial of a request for a continuance to obtain private counsel can violate a defendant's right to counsel if the ultimate effect is to deny the defendant
A trial court considering a motion to continue to retain private counsel must balance defendant's constitutional right against the interests in trying the case efficiently. People v. Jackson, 216 Ill.App.3d 1, 6, 158 Ill.Dec. 606, 574 N.E.2d 719, 723 (1991); see People v. Friedman, 79 Ill.2d 341, 349, 38 Ill.Dec. 141, 403 N.E.2d 229, 234 (1980). Thus, " [a] defendant cannot assert that right in order to, even temporarily, thwart the administration of justice or to otherwise impede the effective prosecution of a crime."
He relies on People v. Little (1990), 207 Ill. App.3d 720, 566 N.E.2d 365, People v. Washington (1990), 195 Ill. App.3d 520, 552 N.E.2d 1067, People v. Green (1969), 42 Ill.2d 555, 248 N.E.2d 116, and People v. Sullivan (1977), 52 Ill. App.3d 666, 367 N.E.2d 1042. The State cites People v. Burrell (1992), 228 Ill. App.3d 133, 592 N.E.2d 453, People v. Jackson (1991), 216 Ill. App.3d 1, 574 N.E.2d 719, People v. Phelps (1990), 197 Ill. App.3d 954, 557 N.E.2d 235, People v. Lewis (1988), 165 Ill. App.3d 97, 518 N.E.2d 741, and People v. Capers (1989), 186 Ill. App.3d 367, 542 N.E.2d 528, to support its position that the trial court did not err. The State failed to respond to or distinguish defendant's cases.
No abuse of discretion has been found where the trial court denies a motion for continuance to substitute counsel when it could reasonably conclude that the request was made solely for the purpose of delay because "this right may not be employed as a weapon to indefinitely thwart the administration of justice or to otherwise embarrass the effective prosecution of crime." Friedman, 79 Ill.2d at 349; see also People v. Jackson (1992), 228 Ill. App.3d 868, 875, 593 N.E.2d 760 ("defendant's trial-day request for other counsel [was] little more than a dilatory tactic"); People v. Jackson (1991), 216 Ill. App.3d 1, 7, 574 N.E.2d 719 ("[i]t is apparent that defendant was merely attempting to delay the trial with his last-minute request"); Bodoh, 200 Ill. App.3d at 425 ("defendant's request for new counsel was a defense tactic designed to avoid trial"). Other factors considered in justifying a denial of a continuance based upon a request to substitute other counsel include the lack of evidence that the new attorney was ready, willing and able to take and proceed with the case ( Burrell, 228 Ill. App.3d at 142-43), the failure of the defendant to articulate an acceptable reason for desiring new counsel when he is already represented by an experienced, court-appointed criminal lawyer ( Jackson, 216 Ill. App.3d at 7), and the representation by current counsel for a lengthy period prior to the request for new counsel ( Bodoh, 200 Ill. App.3d at 425 (during the two-year pendency of the case, the defendant never indicated a dissatisfaction with his attorney)).
"Especially when a defendant cannot ‘articulate an acceptable reason for desiring new counsel and is already being represented by an experienced, court-appointed criminal lawyer, it is not an abuse of discretion to deny defendant's trial-day request for a continuance.’ " Id. (quoting People v. Jackson , 216 Ill. App. 3d 1, 7, 158 Ill.Dec. 606, 574 N.E.2d 719, 723 (1991) ). ¶ 38 In this case, defendant had made no real effort to hire counsel.
"[W]hen a defendant cannot ‘articulate an acceptable reason for desiring new counsel and is already being represented by an experienced, court-appointed criminal lawyer, it is not an abuse of discretion to deny defendant's trial-day request for a continuance.’ " People v. Staple , 402 Ill. App. 3d 1098, 1103, 342 Ill.Dec. 603, 932 N.E.2d 1064 (2010) (quoting People v. Jackson , 216 Ill. App. 3d 1, 7, 158 Ill.Dec. 606, 574 N.E.2d 719 (1991) ). ¶ 25 Most important, a court must balance the defendant's right to counsel of his choice against the need for the efficient and effective administration of justice.
defendant's behalf. People v. Jackson, 216 Ill. App. 3d 1, 6, 574 N.E.2d 719, 723 (1991). Furthermore, we acknowledge that the decision whether to grant or deny a continuance rests in the sound discretion of the court.
¶ 17 A trial court's consideration of a motion to continue to secure substitute counsel must balance the defendant's constitutional right to counsel of his choice and the interest of diligently and efficiently completing the trial. People v. Jackson, 216 Ill. App. 3d 1, 6 (1991). Factors for this court to consider when evaluating the trial court's use of its discretion by denying a request by either party for a continuance include: the diligence of the movant; defendant's right to a fair, speedy, and impartial trial; and the interests of justice.