People v. Jackson

19 Citing cases

  1. People v. Lancellotti

    19 Cal.App.4th 809 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993)   Cited 25 times
    Holding that manufacturing a controlled substance from its component chemicals, by definition, does not necessarily include the finished product

    The evidence in this case clearly establishes that appellant was in the middle of the manufacturing process for methamphetamine, because ". . . the conduct proscribed by section 11379.6 encompasses the initial and intermediate steps carried out to manufacture, produce or process [a controlled substance]." ( People v. Jackson (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1493, 1504 [ 267 Cal.Rptr. 841].) When appellant cited People v. Jackson as authority for his second contention on appeal, he apparently did not notice that that case clearly rejects his first contention.

  2. People v. Heath

    66 Cal.App.4th 697 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998)   Cited 21 times

    It stated: "`[T]he conduct proscribed by [Health and Safety Code] section 11379.6 encompasses the initial and intermediate steps carried out to manufacture, produce or process [a controlled substance].'" ( Lancellotti, supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at p. 813, italics added, quoting People v. Jackson (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1493, 1504.) Similarly, the court stated: "`The ongoing and progressive making, assembly or creation of [a controlled substance] from its component chemicals may, but does not necessarily by definition, include the culmination of the manufacturing process, the finished . . . product.'"

  3. People v. Dean

    No. F064134 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 5, 2014)   Cited 1 times

    (Ibid.) In People v. Jackson (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1493 (Jackson), a bench trial on charges of manufacturing phencyclidine (PCP) was submitted to the judge on the transcripts of preliminary hearings, a hearing on a motion to suppress evidence, and several evidentiary stipulations by the parties. (Jackson, supra, 218 Cal.App.3d at p. 1497 and fn. 1.) On appeal from their convictions, defendants argued that the magistrate who presided over their preliminary hearings erred by visiting the site of the alleged PCP lab on an ex parte basis and relying on his observations to determine that the site was located in an isolated and rural area.

  4. People v. Tenbrink

    F076668 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 4, 2019)

    In addition, a defendant need not have completed the process; a conviction can be upheld even when no completed product is found. (People v. Lancellotti (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 809, 811 (Lancellotti); People v. Jackson (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1493, 1503-1504 (Jackson).) In Lancellotti, a search was conducted of the defendant's storage locker and "virtually all the equipment needed to produce methamphetamine" was found, including a chemical precursor to methamphetamine and two catalysts used in the process.

  5. People v. Bergen

    166 Cal.App.4th 161 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008)   Cited 36 times
    In Bergen, the defendant appealed from a judgment of conviction upon plea of no contest to manufacturing concentrated cannabis by using butane to extract the resin (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379.6, subd. (a)). He contended he should have been charged under Health and Safety Code section 11358, which addresses processing resin from marijuana, instead of Health and Safety Code section 11379.6, subdivision (a).

    This case concerns only chemical extraction and not section 11379.6(a)'s alternative prohibition on manufacturing controlled substances through chemical synthesis. (Cf., e.g., People v. Jackson (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1493, 1500, 1503-1505 [ 267 Cal.Rptr. 841] [PCP production involves the chemical synthesis of multiple reagents].) Section 11358, in contrast, could potentially apply to any number of possible alternative methods for producing concentrated cannabis.

  6. People v. Luna

    170 Cal.App.4th 535 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009)   Cited 18 times
    In Luna, the court concluded that the defendant's purchase of the tools necessary to manufacture hashish, as well as several (but not all) of the ingredients required, was merely preparation for the crime of manufacturing a controlled substance and did not qualify as committing ""'some appreciable fragment'"" of the crime itself.

    Thus, while the manufacturing process need not be complete, it must at least be started. (See, e.g., People v. Jackson (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1493, 1503-1504 [ 267 Cal.Rptr. 841]; People v. Stone (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 707, 713-714 [ 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 401] ( Stone); Heath, supra, 66 Cal.App.4th at p. 705; People v. Combs (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 422, 427 [ 211 Cal.Rptr. 617]; People v. Hard (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 272, 279 [ 5 Cal.Rptr.3d 107].) These decisions illustrate that Health and Safety Code section 11379.6, subdivision (a), criminalizes participation in each and every stage of the manufacturing process, "from inception through completion."

  7. People v. Rimert

    No. F043718 (Cal. Ct. App. Jun. 27, 2005)

    The conduct proscribed by section 11379.6, subdivision (a) encompasses the initial and intermediate steps carried out to manufacture, produce, or process methamphetamine. (People v. Jackson (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1493, 1503-1504.) The Legislature “intended to criminalize all acts which are part of the manufacturing process, whether or not those acts directly result in completion of the final product.”

  8. Brierton v. Department of Motor Vehicles

    130 Cal.App.4th 499 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005)   Cited 53 times

    Under this standard, an officer may stop and briefly detain a suspect for questioning for a limited investigation even if the circumstances fall short of probable cause to arrest. ( People v. Jackson (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1493, 1501 [ 267 Cal.Rptr. 841]; see also Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 [ 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 88 S.Ct. 1868].) (6) Reasonable suspicion that criminal conduct has occurred does not require that an officer observe all elements of criminal conduct; rather, it requires that officer to be able to "point to specific articulable facts that, considered in light of the totality of the circumstances, provide some objective manifestation that the person detained may be involved in criminal activity."

  9. Valenzuela v. Superior Court

    33 Cal.App.4th 1445 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995)   Cited 2 times
    In Valenzuela v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1445 [ 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 781], the court concluded the enhancement did not apply to offers to sell a large amount of cocaine where there was no evidence the cocaine existed.

    (Cf. People v. Good, supra, 217 Cal.App.3d at p. 1537 [sentence enhancement can be based on seizure of solution containing drug in unfinished, liquid form]; People v. Jackson (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1493, 1503-1504 [ 267 Cal.Rptr. 841] [conviction for manufacturing phencyclidine (PCP) does not require existence of PCP since language of applicable statute prohibits not only manufacturing but also producing or processing PCP].)

  10. State v. Martens

    274 Kan. 459 (Kan. 2002)   Cited 24 times
    In Martens, however, the title of the statute in question implied that attempts of manufacturing methamphetamine were also covered by the statute.

    The statutory definitions of the terms "manufacture" and "controlled substance" in the Uniform Controlled Substances Act include but do not mandate the consummation of a final product. See People v. Lancellotti, 19 Cal.App.4th 809, 814, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 640 (1993) (quoting People v. Jackson, 218 Cal.App.3d 1493, 1504, 267 Cal.Rptr. 841) ("`The ongoing and progressive making, assembly or creation of [a controlled substance] from its component chemicals may, but does not necessarily by definition, include the culmination of the manufacturing process, the finished . . . product.' [Citation omitted.]"). In other words, to prove the crime of manufacture of methamphetamine, the State must show that the defendant (1) intentionally (2) completed the manufacture of methamphetamine or (3) could have successfully manufactured methamphetamine.