Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County.Super. Ct. No. RIF140571 Elisabeth Sichel, Judge. Affirmed.
Sharon M. Jones, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
McKinster, Acting P.J.
Defendant and appellant Benjamin Jackson, Jr., appeals after he pleaded guilty to several felony offenses, including first degree burglary, multiple counts of receiving stolen property, possession of a controlled substance, felon in possession of a firearm, and grand theft.
His appellate counsel has filed a brief under authority of Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 [87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493], and People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, raising no issues on appeal. We have undertaken the required review and discovered no meritorious appellate issues. We therefore affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Around 4:00 p.m. on November 30, 2007, a Riverside Police Department officer responded to the report of a Mr. Paolini that someone had broken into his home and stolen various items of property, including a gun in a case.
A few hours later that same day, at approximately 6:40 p.m., the officer saw a “gold plated” car violating traffic laws. He made a traffic stop and spoke to the driver, defendant. Defendant advised the officer that he was on parole. The officer therefore searched defendant’s car and found rock cocaine, a crack pipe, jewelry, and other goods (including a gun in a case) that matched the description of the property taken in the Paolini burglary. The officer arrested defendant.
Inside defendant’s car, officers found numerous articles of electronics and jewelry. A parole search of defendant’s residence also turned up additional stolen property that was eventually traced to at least two other burglary victims.
Defendant was charged with burglary of the Paolini residence, one count of receiving stolen property from the Paolini residence, one count of receiving stolen property from a second victim, one count of receiving stolen property from a third victim, one count of possession of cocaine, one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm (a 2002 drug conviction was the predicate felony), and one count of grand theft of a firearm.
The information alleged eight prior prison term enhancements, based on a 1982 conviction of second degree burglary, a 1985 conviction of receiving stolen property, a 1986 conviction of petty theft with a prior, a 1989 conviction of vehicle theft, a 1990 conviction of burglary, a 1991 conviction of burglary, a 1993 conviction of first degree burglary, and a 2002 conviction of drug possession.
The information alleged additionally that defendant had suffered three prior serious felony convictions and three qualifying strike priors, based on a 1979 conviction of robbery, defendant’s 1993 conviction of first degree burglary, and a 1994 conviction of first degree burglary.
Defendant ultimately pleaded guilty to all charges and admitted all the prior conviction and prison term allegations.
The court exercised its discretion to strike two of the three special prior (strike) allegations; the most recent strike conviction was 14 years old, and the other two dated back to 1979 and 1993. In light of defendant’s age (48 years old), health issues, the relatively “low level” of the current crimes, and the indicated second-strike sentence of 28 years 4 months, defendant would not be eligible for release until he was 72 years of age. The court believed the indicated sentence was appropriate to the nature of the crimes, the defendant’s character and circumstances, and protection of the public. Accordingly, the court imposed the aggravated term of six years on the principal count, the burglary, doubled to 12 years as a second strike. The court imposed a two-year term, stayed under Penal Code section 654, for receiving stolen property as a product of the burglary. Sentence on the second receiving stolen property count was one year four months (one-third the middle term, doubled as a second strike), consecutive to the principal term. The court imposed two four-year terms, to run concurrently, on the possession of controlled substances and possession of a firearm offenses. The court stayed sentence on the grand theft of a firearm and the third receiving stolen property offenses. The court stayed imposition of the one-year terms for the eight prior prison term allegations, but imposed three five-year terms for the serious felony allegations. The total determinate term was 28 years 4 months.
Defendant’s counsel filed a notice of appeal, indicating that defendant wished to appeal his sentence or other matters occurring after the plea.
Appellate defense counsel has suggested that a possible area of inquiry is whether the trial court abused its discretion in selecting the aggravated term on the principal offense.
Defendant has been afforded the opportunity to file a supplemental brief raising any additional issues. No supplemental brief has been filed.
ANALYSIS
I. Standard of Review
When counsel files a brief setting forth a summary of the facts and proceedings, but raises no specific issues, the Court of Appeal must conduct an independent review of the entire record to determine whether it reveals any issues which would, if resolved favorably to the appellant, result in reversal or modification of the judgment. (People v. Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436, 441-442.)
II. Defendant Was Properly Sentenced
We have reviewed the entire record in this matter and have discovered no error in defendant’s sentence. Indeed, other courts might have disagreed with the trial judge’s decision to strike two of the special prior serious felony (strike) allegations. (People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497; see also People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 163-164.) Even though defendant’s strike priors were old, he had an unremitting pattern of recidivist criminal activity.
The current offenses included defendant’s personal commission of a residential burglary, in which he forced entry, and took not only jewelry and electronics, but also a firearm.
Defendant’s habitual and complete disregard for the strictures of the law, and for the rights and safety of others, merited a severe sentence. The court did not abuse its discretion in selecting the aggravated term for the principal offense. The record does not disclose any other potential errors.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: Richli, J., King, J.