" ( Workman v. State (1939) 216 Ind. 68 [23 N.E.2d 419, 420].) This rule has been applied to burglary, Moore v. State (1977) 267 Ind. 270 [ 369 N.E.2d 628, 632]; theft, People v. Taylor (1973) 30 Cal.App.3d 117, 121-122 [ 106 Cal.Rptr. 216]; forgery, People v. Jack (1965) 233 Cal.App.2d 446, 456-457 [ 43 Cal.Rptr. 566]; murder, State v. Benton (1970) 276 N.C. 641 [ 174 S.E.2d 793, 801]; and Fritz v. State (1964) 25 Wis.2d 91 [ 130 N.W.2d 279, 281]. The common law rule is contained in California Penal Code section 31.
(12b) The evidence is sufficient to support the giving of the instruction. (See, e.g., People v. Hutchinson, 71 Cal.2d 342, 346 [ 78 Cal.Rptr. 196, 455 P.2d 132]; People v. Murguia, 6 Cal.2d 190, 192 [ 57 P.2d 115]; People v. Hinshaw, 194 Cal. 1, 26-27 [ 227 P. 156]; People v. Kessler, 257 Cal.App.2d 812, 815 [ 65 Cal.Rptr. 248]; People v. Jack, 233 Cal.App.2d 446, 458-459 [ 43 Cal.Rptr. 566] .) The instruction given reads: "The flight of a person immediately after the commission of a crime, or after he is accused of a crime that has been committed, is not sufficient in itself to establish his guilt, but is a fact which, if proved, may be considered by you in the light of all other proved facts in deciding the question of his guilt or innocence.
"While we are satisfied that defendant's statements with respect to his prior offenses fall within the Dorado rule we find no language in Dorado or Stewart indicating that the characteristics of such statements as confessions in some way impregnate a subsequent unrelated case in which they are erroneously introduced so as to require automatic reversal." ( People v. Jack (1965) 233 Cal.App.2d 446, 463 [ 43 Cal.Rptr. 566]; see and compare People v. Coffey (1967) 67 Cal.2d 204, 217-218 [ 60 Cal.Rptr. 457, 430 P.2d 15].) We therefore proceed to undertake an assessment of prejudice in light of the entire record before us.
[Citations.]" ( People v. Jack (1965) 233 Cal.App.2d 446, 452-453 [ 43 Cal.Rptr. 566].) Thus, the ordinary meaning given to "forgery" in California is related to the making or use of a counterfeit or fake document, not to the ordinary meaning of "use," "possession," "transportation," or "being under the influence" of a controlled substance.
(Cf. People v. Jack (1965) 233 Cal.App.2d 446, 453-458 [ 43 Cal.Rptr. 566].) As with the records from Douglass' office, this was sufficient to permit the ALJ to determine whether Douglass actually wrote them.
A consciousness of guilt by appellant may be inferred from the fact of flight and, from the fact of appellant's state of mind of consciousness of guilt, it may be inferred that appellant acted in conformity with that state of mind when he perpetrated the charged offenses. ( People v. Jack (1965) 233 Cal.App.2d 446, 458 [ 43 Cal.Rptr. 566].) When the appellant was brought back to school by Officer Struck, he attempted to exonerate himself by claiming that Lee L. had inserted the pin into the apple.
) Defendant acknowledges that under California law, evidence of flight requires neither a physical act of running nor a far-away haven ( People v. Cannady (1972) 8 Cal.3d 379, 391 [ 105 Cal.Rptr. 129, 503 P.2d 585]; People v. Jack (1965) 233 Cal.App.2d 446, 458-459 [ 43 Cal.Rptr. 566]) but he argues that the evidence of flight in this case is unlike that in the cases that uphold flight instructions, where a defendant engages in conduct that clearly reflects a desire to escape police pursuit. In support of his contention that the evidence of flight was insufficient, defendant relies upon People v. Watson (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 384, 402-403 [ 142 Cal.Rptr. 134] and People v. Coleman (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 1016, 1023 [ 149 Cal.Rptr. 134].
(1) The elements of violation of Business and Professions Code section 4390 are not identical to the elements of forgery as it defined in the Penal Code, and therefore we are not required to interpret section 4390 in the same way that Penal Code section 470 has been construed. (See People v. Jack, 233 Cal.App.2d 446, 458 fn. 9 [ 43 Cal.Rptr. 566].) Business and Professions Code section 4036 defines "prescription" to mean "an oral order given individually for the person for whom prescribed, directly from the prescriber to the furnisher, or indirectly by means of a written order, signed by the prescriber, and shall bear the name and address of the prescriber, his license classification, the name and address of the patient, the name and quantity of the drug or device prescribed, directions for use, and the date of issue. . . ." (Italics added.)
"Prescribing dangerous drugs as defined in Section 4211, without either a prior examination of the patient or medical indication thereof, constitutes unprofessional conduct within the meaning of this chapter." The People's reliance on People v. Jack, 233 Cal.App.2d 446 [ 43 Cal.Rptr. 566], to support the theory that petitioner can be brought within section 11912 of the Health and Safety Code since the act of prescribing is equivalent to an "offer" (§ 11912) to sell is utterly self-defeating. In Jack, the prosecution was under section 4237 of the Business and Professions Code (forging prescriptions) which is precisely the code to which the state should resort in this case.
It was for the jury to determine whether appellant's conduct amounted to flight and the significance and weight to be attached to such circumstance. ( People v. Santo, 43 Cal.2d 319, 330 [ 273 P.2d 249]; People v. Jack, 233 Cal.App.2d 446, 458 [ 43 Cal.Rptr. 566].) (9a) The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting photos showing the decedent's wounds and the position of his body in the automobile.