However, this argument goes only to the weight of the evidence, not to whether it is relevant. People v Ivers, 459 Mich 320, 329-330; 587 NW2d 10 (1998). In the recording, defendant is discussing the fact that he is in jail facing criminal charges.
Hearsay, which is a statement other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, is inadmissible at trial unless there is a specific exception allowing its introduction. See MRE 801, MRE 802, and People v Ivers, 459 Mich 320, 331; 587 NW2d 10 (1998). The excited utterance exception permits the admission of hearsay statements that (1) arise out of a startling event, and (2) are made while the declarant was under the excitement caused by that event.
The Court reasoned as follows: Evidence of [the victim's] pregnancy and her subsequent abortion are not evidence of a specific instance of the victim's sexual conduct. Although this evidence necessarily implies that sexual activity occurred that caused the pregnancy, the pregnancy and abortion are not evidence regarding a specific instance of sexual conduct. As we have previously stated, whether evidence falls within the purview of the rape-shield statute concerns whether the evidence "amount[s] to or reference[s] specific conduct," People v Ivers, 459 Mich 320, 329; 587 NW2d 10 (1998), not whether the evidence constitutes a consequence of or relates to sexual activity generally. In this case, the pregnancy and abortion evidence alone does not describe a particular or specific sexual encounter. The evidence demonstrates only that at least one act of sexual intercourse occurred in 2014 and does not describe one particular occurrence of sexual conduct. Because [the victim's] pregnancy and abortion are not evidence of a particular occurrence of sexual conduct, evidence thereof does not fall under the purview of the rape-shield statute, and the Court of Appeals erred in determining otherwise.
In this regard, we note that the admission of evidence at trial must comply with the Rules of Evidence, which are more restrictive than at the preliminary hearing on the admissibility of the evidence. See MRE 104(a); MRE 1101(b); People v Ivers, 459 Mich 320, 334; 587 NW2d 10 (1998) (BOYLE, J., concurring) ("The trial court is not limited by the Rules of Evidence in what it may consider in making its determination of admissibility, with the exception of privileges."). But, as the trial court hinted in rendering its ruling, the mere mention, let alone evidence that a witness submitted to a polygraph examination will not be admissible at trial.
The statute will not bar "testimony regarding sexual subjects involving the complainant if such testimony falls outside the scope of the statute." People v Sharpe, 319 Mich App 153, ___; 899 NW2d 787, 793 (2017), quoting People v Ivers, 459 Mich 320, 328; 587 NW2d 10 (1998) (quotation marks omitted). "Although consent is not a relevant defense to a CSC charge involving an underage minor, Michigan courts have applied the rape-shield statute in cases involving child victims."
Hearsay, which is a statement other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing and is offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, is inadmissible at trial unless there is a specific exception allowing its introduction. See MRE 801(c), MRE 802, and People v Ivers, 459 Mich 320, 331; 587 NW2d 10 (1998). The surveillance supervisor's statement was not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, i.e., for the purpose of establishing that Naso's vehicle was stolen.
Hearsay, which is a statement other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, is inadmissible at trial unless there is a specific exception allowing its introduction. See MRE 801, MRE 802, and People v Ivers, 459 Mich 320, 331; 587 NW2d 10 (1998) (Boyle, J, concurring). Although the trial court sustained defendant's hearsay objection when the prosecutor initially sought to elicit the hearsay statements from Patricia Lee, the prosecutor proceeded to establish a foundation for admitting the statements under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule, MRE 803(2).
Hearsay, which is a statement other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, is inadmissible at trial unless there is a specific exception allowing its introduction. See MRE 801, MRE 802, and People v Ivers, 459 Mich 320, 331; 587 NW2d 10 (1998). The Confrontation Clause prohibits the admission of all out-of-court testimonial statements unless the declarant was unavailable at trial and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.
Hearsay, which is a statement other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing and is offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, is inadmissible at trial unless there is a specific exception allowing its introduction. See MRE 801, MRE 802, and People v Ivers, 459 Mich 320, 331; 587 NW2d 10 (1998). "The Confrontation Clause prohibits the admission of all out-of-court testimonial statements unless the declarant was unavailable at trial and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination."
Hearsay is inadmissible unless there is a specific exception allowing for its introduction. People v Ivers, 459 Mich. 320, 331 (Boyle, J., concurring); 587 N.W.2d 10 (1998). The prosecution suggests that the statement is a statement wholly against codefendant's penal interest and thus admissible pursuant to MRE 804(b)(3).