Opinion
4-22-0342 4-22-0343 4-22-0344 4-22-0345
09-19-2022
In re B.H., a Minor v. Iva W., Respondent-Appellant. The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, In re L.H., a Minor The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Iva W., Respondent-Appellant). In re K.H., a Minor The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Iva W., Respondent-Appellant. In re S.I., a Minor The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Iva W., Respondent-Appellant.
This Order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Henry County Nos. 20JA13, 20JA14, 20JA15, 20JA16 Honorable Terence M. Patton, Judge Presiding
JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Cavanagh and Zenoff concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
STEIGMANN JUSTICE
¶ 1 Held: The appellate court affirmed the judgments of the trial court terminating respondent's parental rights because the trial court's findings were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 2 Respondent, Iva W., is the mother of B.H. (born August 2007), L.H. (born January 2009), K.H. (born June 2010), and S.I. (born June 2011). In April 2022, the trial court found respondent was an unfit parent and termination of respondent's parental rights would be in the minor children's best interests. Respondent appeals, arguing that the trial court's fitness and best-interest determinations as to each child were against the manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree and affirm.
¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 4 A. Procedural History
¶ 5 In February 2020, the State filed petitions for adjudication of wardship as to each child, alleging the children were neglected in that the children lived in an environment injurious to their welfare when living with respondent because respondent had (1) tested positive for methamphetamine and (2) been "provided services for substance abuse and *** refused to get services or take requested drug tests," thereby placing the children at risk of harm. See 705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2018). On the same day the petitions were filed, the trial court conducted a shelter care hearing and placed temporary custody and guardianship of all four children with the guardianship administrator of the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS).
¶ 6 In March 2020, the trial court conducted an adjudicatory hearing. Respondent stipulated to the allegations in the petition, and the court adjudicated the children neglected minors. The court also orally admonished respondent that she "must cooperate with the Department of Children & Family Services, comply with the terms of the service plans, and correct the conditions that required the children to be in care or risk termination of [her] parental rights."
¶ 7 In August 2020, the trial court conducted a dispositional hearing at which it entered a written order (1) making B.H., L.H., K.H., and S.I. wards of the court and (2) finding respondent unfit for reasons other than financial circumstances alone to care for, protect, train, educate, supervise, or discipline the minors, and it was in the best interests of the minors to be made wards of the court. The court placed guardianship and custody of the minors with the guardianship administrator of DCFS. The written order also stated, "The parents are admonished that they must cooperate with the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services. The parents must comply with the terms of the service plan and correct the conditions that require the minor[s] to be in care or they risk termination of their parental rights."
¶ 8 B. The Termination Hearing
¶ 9 In October 2021, the State filed petitions to terminate respondent's parental rights as to each of the minor children. The State alleged respondent was an unfit parent within the meaning of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1 et seq. (West 2020)) because she failed to (1) make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the basis for the children's removal during the nine-month periods of (a) August 2020 to May 2021 and (b) January 2021 to October 2021 and (2) make reasonable progress toward the return of the children within those same nine-month periods. See id. §§ 1(D)(m)(i)-(ii).
¶ 10 In April 2022, the trial court conducted a bifurcated termination hearing on the State's petitions.
¶ 111. The Fitness Portion of the Termination Proceedings
¶ 12 a. Randall Aldridge
¶ 13 Randall Aldridge testified that he worked for the Center for Youth and Family Solutions (CYFS) and was the caseworker for the family from May 2021 through October 2021. Aldridge reviewed the case file and notes from prior case workers when he received the file.
¶ 14 Aldridge testified that the service plan for respondent required her to (1) obtain a substance abuse evaluation and complete any recommended treatment, (2) submit to drug testing, (3) complete parenting classes, (4) obtain a mental health evaluation and complete any treatment, (5) obtain and maintain suitable housing, and (6) attend regular visits with the children.
¶ 15 Regarding parenting classes, Aldridge acknowledged that respondent nearly completed the classes but had missed one, which she had tried to make up. Aldridge told respondent he would contact the service provider to find out what she needed to do next and let her know the next steps. He contacted the service provider but never heard back and therefore never told respondent what she needed to do to complete parenting classes.
¶ 16 Regarding substance abuse treatment, Aldridge testified that respondent had been receiving treatment and counseling through Bridgeway before he was assigned to the case but she had disengaged after missing a counseling session. Aldridge said he spoke with respondent about the importance of reengaging in treatment and completing it. Aldridge stated he never received any information from the service provider or respondent that she had reengaged in or completed substance abuse treatment while he was the caseworker. Aldridge explained that if a service had been completed before he was assigned the case, verification of completion would have been in the file and the service would have been discontinued.
¶ 17 Aldridge further testified that respondent never engaged in or completed mental health services while he was her caseworker. Regarding visits, respondent had two visits with L.H. and one with S.I. The other two children did not want to see respondent, and the children's mental health counselors recommended no visitation.
¶ 18 Aldridge explained that he had a difficult time contacting respondent. He would leave voice messages on the number she provided but respondent frequently failed to call back and would later tell him that she did not receive the message. Aldridge also left messages with respondent's mother. Respondent was living at her mother's house and provided her mother's phone number as a reliable means of contacting respondent. Aldridge said he tried repeatedly to schedule a home evaluation of respondent's residence but was never able to assess the home because respondent never responded to schedule the evaluation. Aldridge noted that respondent did not appear for scheduled drug tests in March and April 2021. He acknowledged that respondent had tested negative for all substances while she was in treatment at Bridgeway.
¶ 19 Aldridge opined that when he left CYFS, respondent was no closer to having the children returned to her care than when he was assigned to the family's cases.
¶ 20 b. Alyssa Franqui
¶ 21 Alyssa Franqui testified that she was employed at CYFS in two different positions between August 2019 and January 2022. Franqui stated she was the caseworker for the children in this case until April or May 2021. Franqui only had contact with respondent in passing and never discussed what respondent needed to do to receive more visitation because that was not Franqui's job.
¶ 22 Franqui testified that respondent had very few visits with the children, either in person or remotely, while she was the caseworker. At one point, the decision was made to stop visits. Respondent had not been able to conduct video visits because of a "[l]ack of communication. We could not secure a time or a number and then it would just be missed." Additionally, CYFS had received letters from the children's mental health counselor, recommending visitations be stopped. Franqui also stated the decision was based on "meetings that we [(the counselor and Franqui)] were having about how the children were feeling and reacting, that it was in the best interest of the children to stop with visitations for the time period."
¶ 23 Franqui testified that toward the end of her being the children's caseworker, respondent had begun engaging in services, stating, "At the end of my time of having the case is when we started up visitation in person again, and at that point in time it was only for an hour or two." The visits never transitioned to unsupervised. However, Franqui agreed that the one visit she did observe went well. That visit occurred a few weeks before the case was transferred to Aldridge.
¶ 24 The State rested, and respondent did not present any evidence.
¶ 25 c. Respondent's Testimony
¶ 26 The guardian ad litem (GAL) called respondent to testify. Respondent testified that the case was opened in January 2020 and she was required to complete (1) substance abuse evaluation, (2) mental health evaluation, and (3) drug testing. Respondent went to Bridgeway in Kewanee, Illinois, to complete her mental health and substance abuse evaluations. Respondent insisted she was not required to participate in drug treatment but she did so anyway. She stated that her substance abuse counselor told her she no longer needed treatment and would be moved to mental health treatment. Respondent explained that Bridgeway told her that, due to anticipated staffing changes, respondent would be put on a waiting list to receive mental health counseling. Respondent decided to continue seeing her substance abuse counselor so she would not have a gap in treatment. Respondent never heard from Bridgeway about mental health treatment and never contacted them to renew or reschedule treatment.
¶ 27 Respondent admitted she had a history of methamphetamine use but testified that she had not used methamphetamine in over a year. Since January 2021, respondent had been working at a leather factory in Kewanee. Respondent was currently living at her mother's house in Galva, Illinois, and had moved there around March 2021. Respondent explained that she last saw her paramour, whose arrest for drug possession precipitated the case, while moving out of their apartment in March 2021. Respondent stated the relationship had ended "a few months ago" and she did not want anything to do with him. Her mother had an order of protection against respondent's paramour.
¶ 28 Regarding parenting classes, respondent's testimony was substantially similar to Aldridge's testimony. Regarding substance abuse treatment, respondent acknowledged she missed her last appointment and needed to reschedule it to reengage in services. She called to reschedule twice but never heard back. She had not attended counseling at Bridgeway since March 2021. Respondent testified she had not reached out to CYFS or any other agency since Aldridge left in October 2021. Respondent was not even aware that she had a new caseworker.
¶ 29 Respondent testified that she had several different phone numbers during the life of the case but she always provided an updated number to her caseworker. Respondent further gave them her mother's phone number, which she said was always the most reliable way of contacting her. Respondent maintained she was unaware that she had missed calls. Respondent also stated she wanted more visitation with her children and engaged in it whenever she could but DCFS stopped visitations for reasons she did not fully understand. Respondent then stated the following:
"I felt that it didn't matter what I did. I was doing all the stuff that I was
supposed to. I was doing the Bridgeway. I was doing the classes. I was doing everything. And they still-I got two visits. I got one with my oldest daughter and one with my oldest son. After that I got nothing. They stopped the visits, so I stopped."
¶ 30 On cross-examination, respondent agreed that she had not engaged in any type of substance abuse or mental health treatment since March 2021. Respondent acknowledged she understood she needed to complete those services to have her children returned to her. Respondent further acknowledged that after she did not hear back from Bridgeway, she did not contact anyone at CYFS to get help restarting services. Respondent again stated she stopped engaging in services because her visitations had stopped. Respondent explained, "And at that point, I just felt like-like it didn't matter, I guess. Like I wasn't going to get them back."
¶ 31 d. The Trial Court's Parental Fitness Findings
¶ 32 After hearing arguments from the parties, the trial court noted the State had the burden of proving unfitness by clear and convincing evidence. The court further noted that it had repeatedly admonished respondent at court hearings that she was required to cooperate with DCFS and complete her service plan or she risked termination of her parental rights. The court determined that respondent's failure to complete parenting classes was not entirely respondent's fault and Aldridge bore some of the blame. However, the court noted that at some point, respondent needed to follow up with her caseworkers and tell them what was going on.
¶ 33 Regarding substance abuse and mental health treatment, the trial court credited Aldridge's testimony that respondent engaged in those services but never completed them. Aldridge spoke with respondent and explained he did not have any verification of completion. When respondent told Aldridge she thought she had completed it, Aldridge contacted the counselor, who told him respondent had missed her last appointment. Aldridge relayed this information to respondent and told her she needed to reengage.
¶ 34 The trial court then stated the following:
"Now, [respondent]-both listening to the testimony, comparing her testimony to the other evidence and observing her as she testified, I don't find the mom to be a very accurate reporter of the events that have transpired over the last couple of years. She is very vague about a lot of things. She seemed very unsure about a lot of her answers. It seemed like a lot of them were just kind of guesses. And we had a lot of explanations for what's going on, why she didn't finish everything, but upon questioning why did she stop going to Bridgeway, she said she stopped going because she stopped getting her visitation. And later on, that was followed up on other questions and she said, again, she stopped doing her treatment, going to Bridgeway because she felt it didn't matter what she did; she wasn't getting visitation with the children.
Now, visitation is at the discretion of DCFS. Did they rightly or wrongly limit the visitation? I don't know. That's not an issue for today. But the fact of the matter is that's not grounds to stop doing treatment. That is a reason to get treatment done as fast as you possibly can get everything else done."
¶ 35 The trial court further noted that respondent only ended her relationship with her paramour because her mother got an order of protection. Regarding respondent's trouble communicating, the court stated it understood how frustrating it can be to have caseworkers change multiple times and how difficult it can be to stay up to date. However, the court emphasized that "[CYFS] is still in the same place. Their phone number is still the same. They don't go anywhere. They-you can always reach out to them." The court continued as follows:
"So what I hear a lot of is I was waiting for somebody else to do something. Waiting for them to do this or waiting for them to call me back. And then we really get to the crux of the matter when she admits she basically stopped going to Bridgeway in March of 2021[,] because she wasn't able to see her kids and she figured what's the point. And I agree with [the GAL] who says that it's hard being a parent and you've got to be willing to do the hard things for your children."
¶ 36 The court explained respondent stopped going to treatment two months before the end of the first nine-month period and never reengaged in services thereafter. Accordingly, the court found the State had proven that respondent had failed to make (1) reasonable efforts and (2) reasonable progress during the two nine-month periods alleged in the petition.
¶ 37 2. The Best-Interest Portion of the Termination Proceedings
¶ 38 Immediately after the fitness proceedings concluded, the trial court conducted a hearing on whether terminating respondent's parental rights was in the children's best interests.
¶ 39 Erica Buckman testified she was a child welfare and placement specialist with CYFS and had been the children's caseworker since November 2021. Buckman testified that the children had been placed with their great-aunt, Sara I., since the case opened in February 2020. Buckman saw the children three times a month and had observed their living situation. The children were bonded with Sara, who was meeting all of their medical, material, emotional, and educational needs. The children were bonded to Sara and comfortable in their placement. Buckman believed it was in the children's best interests to terminate respondent's parental rights so Sara could adopt them, which she intended to do.
¶ 40 Buckman testified that the children had not interacted with respondent since May 2021. The children lived in a garage that Sara converted into a home. Sara had remodeled the garage to include four bedrooms and a living area. Sara's parents lived in a separate residence on the property. Buckman had inspected the converted home and had no concerns. The children had access to food in their converted living space, and they used the bathroom in the separate residence, which they had unrestricted access to.
¶ 41 Sara I. testified that she was the children's great-aunt and foster parent. Sara lived in a home that she had converted from a garage on her parents' property. Sara had renovated the garage by installing four bedrooms, one for each child, each ventilated with a window. The bedrooms were on either end of the converted home with a cooking and living area in the middle. Sara slept on the couch in the living area. The converted home did not have running water or a formal kitchen, but Sara had a refrigerator, freezer, microwave, hot plate, and toaster oven, which she used to prepare light meals. Sara frequently used her parents' kitchen to cook. There was food readily available and plenty of bottled water. The children could also access food and water at Sara's parents' house.
¶ 42 Sara explained that her parents, who were in their mid-eighties, lived in a mobile home next to the converted home. The mobile home had running water, a kitchen, and a bathroom, which the children had easy access to and used daily. Her parents helped watch the children when needed, although their age caused some difficulties. Sara testified that she had seen "documentation" that showed her parents were leaving the property to Sara when they died. Sara's parents had also verbally informed their family of their intentions to do so.
¶ 43 Sara further testified that she intended to perform a further expansion in the near future to install a bathroom and kitchen in the converted home. Sara was 55 years old and stated that, although she was unemployed, she had sufficient income from (1) disability insurance and (2) government stipends for the children such that she could provide for all of the children's material needs. Sara was willing to provide permanency through adoption. Sara made sure that the children were attending all of the medical appointments, including mental health counseling to deal with issues from previously living with respondent. Sara also made sure the children were attending school and doing well. The children had now made plans for their futures, such as what professions they wanted to enter, which they had not done previously.
¶ 44 The trial court found termination of respondent's parental rights to be in the children's best interests. The court noted it had reviewed the statutory best interest factors and all relevant non-statutory factors. The children were safe, happy, and healthy living with Sara, which they had been doing for over two years. The court acknowledged that the living arrangements were "not ideal" but explained that the children had ready access to food, drinking water, and bathroom facilities. The court also noted that Sara was in the process of remodeling further to add a kitchen and bathroom. Further, Buckman had inspected the home, including in the winter, and determined it had adequate heat.
¶ 45 The trial court emphasized that the children needed permanency and were getting it from their current placement. They were generally doing well in school and attending counseling. Respondent had not had contact with the children for a long time and was not anywhere close to being in a place where the children could be returned. "[B]ased on all of these factors," the court concluded termination of respondent's parental rights to be in the children's best interests.
¶ 46 This appeal followed.
¶ 47 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 48 Respondent appeals, arguing that the trial court's fitness and best-interest determinations as to each child were against the manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree and affirm.
¶ 49 A. The Fitness Determinations
¶ 50 Respondent argues the trial court's findings that respondent failed to make reasonable efforts and reasonable progress in each case were against the manifest weight of the evidence. It is well settled that "[b]ecause each of the statutory grounds of unfitness is independent, the trial court's finding may be affirmed where the evidence supports a finding of unfitness as to any one of the alleged grounds." In re Adoption of P.J.H., 2019 IL App (5th) 190089, ¶ 11, 143 N.E.3d 805. Based on our review of the record, we conclude that the court's findings that respondent failed to make reasonable progress within the applicable nine-month periods were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Accordingly, we discuss only those findings.
¶ 511. The Applicable Law
¶ 52 The State must prove unfitness as defined in section 1(D) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2020)) by clear and convincing evidence. In re N.G., 2018 IL 121939, ¶ 28, 115 N.E.3d 102. Section 1(D)(m)(ii) of the Adoption Act defines an unfit person as a parent who fails to make "reasonable progress toward the return of the child" during any nine-month period following an adjudication of neglect or abuse. 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2020). Reasonable progress is an objective review of the steps the parent has taken toward the goal of reunification and examines the demonstrability and quality of those steps. In re Ta.T., 2021 IL App (4th) 200658, ¶ 51, 187 N.E.3d 763. Reasonable progress exists when the trial court can conclude that, in the near future, it will be able to order the children returned to parental custody. Id.
¶ 53 A determination of parental unfitness involves factual findings and credibility determinations that the trial court is in the best position to make. In re M.I., 2016 IL 120232, ¶ 21, 77 N.E.3d 69. Accordingly, a trial court's finding of parental unfitness will not be reversed unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. N.G., 2018 IL 121939, ¶ 29. A decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence when the opposite conclusion is clearly apparent. Id.
¶ 54 2. This Case
¶ 55 Here, Aldridge testified that, while he was the caseworker, he did not receive any information that respondent completed or attended (1) substance abuse treatment, (2) a mental health evaluation and any recommended treatment, and (3) parenting classes. Aldridge explained that respondent had not completed these services before he received the file because if she had, the service would have been marked completed and it would no longer be required. He never saw any verification that she had completed these services.
¶ 56 Aldridge acknowledged that respondent attended all but one session of her parenting classes and he failed to inform her how to complete this service despite telling her he would do so. Nonetheless, parenting classes aside, respondent never completed any other service. Her own testimony confirmed as much. Respondent stated she stopped attending services when her visitations stopped, explaining she felt like the situation was hopeless and believed she could not do anything to get her kids back. However understandable or sincere respondent's feelings and beliefs may have been, she was still required to engage in services. As the trial court noted, the discontinuing of visitations meant respondent needed to work harder, not give up.
¶ 57 This court has repeatedly recognized the difficulty parents face when the State has filed a petition to terminate parental rights, and it has commended, deservedly so, those parents who redouble their efforts instead of doing the easy thing and giving up. In re S.I., 2020 IL App (4th) 200098-U, ¶ 75; In re D.A.G., 2020 IL App (4th) 190779-U, ¶ 62 ("Rather than giving up, respondent engaged in counseling after the permanency goal changed to substitute care."); In re J.S., 2019 IL App (4th) 180721-U, ¶ 49 ("[R]espondent could have easily given up after J.S.'s permanency goal was changed from return home to substitute care in June 2018. Instead, respondent worked even harder to complete her services."). Those parents may have ultimately still had their parental rights terminated, but as we have noted, their hard work and dedication allowed them to drastically improve their lives. S.I., 2020 IL App (4th) 200098-U, ¶ 75; D.A.G., 2020 IL App (4th) 190779-U, ¶ 62.; J.S., 2019 IL App (4th) 180721-U, ¶ 49. Unfortunately, respondent's decision to stop her efforts gave the trial court more than enough clear and convincing evidence to find that she failed to make reasonable progress during the relevant nine-month periods.
¶ 58 If any further evidence was needed, we note that the evidence presented showed that respondent did not maintain regular contact with her caseworker and never took the initiative to reengage in services. We agree with the trial court that although Aldridge or others may have been able to do a little more to help respondent, respondent's willingness to simply wait, apparently for months, to be told what to do next was not reasonable. Respondent could have and should have contacted Aldridge and told him she was not being provided access to the services she needed and he needed to correct the problem. Respondent also could have contacted her providers directly.
¶ 59 Additionally, respondent missed her last two drug tests, failed to schedule a time for Aldridge to inspect the home she was living in, and was never able to consistently engage in visitation, much less progress beyond supervised visits. In short, abundant evidence existed that respondent had not made measurable progress such that the children could be returned home in the near future. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court's findings were proper.
¶ 60 B. The Best-Interest Determinations
¶ 611. The Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶ 62 At the best-interest stage of termination proceedings, the State bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that termination of parental rights is in the child's best interest. In re C.P., 2019 IL App (4th) 190420, ¶ 71, 145 N.E.3d 605. In reaching a best-interest determination, the trial court must consider, within the context of the child's age and developmental needs, the following factors:
"(1) the child's physical safety and welfare; (2) the development of the child's identity; (3) the child's familial, cultural[,] and religious background and ties; (4) the child's sense of attachments, including love, security, familiarity, continuity of affection, and the least disruptive placement alternative; (5) the child's wishes and long-term goals; (6) the child's community ties; (7) the child's need for permanence, including the need for stability and continuity of relationships with parent figures and siblings; (8) the uniqueness of every family and child; (9) the risks related to substitute care; and (10) the preferences of the person available to care for the child." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re J.B., 2019 IL App (4th) 190537, ¶ 32, 147 N.E.3d 953; see also 705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2020).
¶ 63 A reviewing court affords great deference to a trial court's best-interest finding because the trial court is in a superior position to view the witnesses and judge their credibility. C.P., 2019 IL App (4th) 190420, ¶ 71. An appellate court "will not disturb the trial court's decision regarding a child's best interests *** unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence." Id. ¶ 68. A best-interest determination is against the manifest weight of the evidence only when the opposite conclusion is clearly the proper result. Id.
¶ 64 2. This Case
¶ 65 Buckman testified that the children were living with their great-aunt, Sara I. The children, all at least 10 years old, expressed a desire to be adopted by Sara and did not want to return to respondent. Sara was willing and wanting to adopt the children, had been caring for them for the last two years, and had been able to meet all of their material and emotional needs. The children were mostly doing well in school, and Sara made sure the children made it to all of their counseling appointments to continue to address any issues that were holding them back. The children had a strong bond with Sara, and they had begun to plan for the future for the first time, demonstrating her ability to provide permanence and develop their identities.
¶ 66 We acknowledge, as the trial court did, that the living situation was far from ideal. However, Buckman testified she had no concerns because the children (1) had their own rooms, (2) had access to food and bottled water in the converted garage, (3) were just steps away from a bathroom with running water, which they used frequently, and (4) their rooms were adequately heated and ventilated. Sara testified she had seen the documents showing her elderly parents, who owned the property, intended to leave it to her when they passed. Nothing in the record suggests that the children were unsafe or in danger of not having their needs met. The trial court was well advised of the living arrangements and appropriately considered them before making its decision. Accordingly, we conclude the trial court's findings that termination of respondent's parental rights was in the children's best interests were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 67 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 68 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court's judgments.
¶ 69 Affirmed.