Opinion
696 KA 17-01714
11-15-2024
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT, v. TIFFANIE IRWIN, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
D.J. & J.A. CIRANDO, PLLC, SYRACUSE (JOHN A. CIRANDO OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. TIFFANIE IRWIN, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT PRO SE. WILLIAM J. FITZPATRICK, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, SYRACUSE (BRADLEY W. OASTLER OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
D.J. & J.A. CIRANDO, PLLC, SYRACUSE (JOHN A. CIRANDO OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
TIFFANIE IRWIN, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT PRO SE.
WILLIAM J. FITZPATRICK, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, SYRACUSE (BRADLEY W. OASTLER OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
PRESENT: WHALEN, P.J., LINDLEY, OGDEN, DELCONTE, AND KEANE, JJ.
Appeal from a judgment of the Oneida County Court (Michael L. Dwyer, J.), rendered December 19, 2016. The judgment convicted defendant, upon a plea of guilty, of manslaughter in the first degree and assault in the second degree.
It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.
Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting her, upon her Alford plea, of manslaughter in the first degree (Penal Law § 125.20 [1]) and assault in the second degree (§ 120.05 [2]). As an initial matter, we conclude that defendant's waiver of the right to appeal is invalid inasmuch as both the written waiver signed by defendant and County Court's oral waiver colloquy mischaracterized the nature of the right that defendant was being asked to cede, portraying the waiver as an absolute bar to any appeal and any postconviction relief, and there is no clarifying language in either the oral or written waiver indicating that appellate review remained available for certain issues (see People v Thomas, 34 N.Y.3d 545, 564-566 [2019], cert denied __US__, 140 S.Ct. 2634 [2020]; People v Zabko, 206 A.D.3d 1642, 1642-1643 [4th Dept 2022]; see e.g. People v Austin, 206 A.D.3d 1716, 1717 [4th Dept 2023]; People v Cossette, 199 A.D.3d 1397, 1398 [4th Dept 2021], lv denied 37 N.Y.3d 1160 [2022]).
Contrary to defendant's contention in her main and pro se supplemental briefs, the court properly refused to suppress evidence obtained as a result of four search warrants. Specifically, defendant contends that three of the search warrants lacked particularity with respect to the places to be searched and that all four warrants lacked particularity with respect to the items to be seized. We reject defendant's contentions. "To meet the particularity requirement, a search warrant must (1) 'identify the specific offense for which the police have established probable cause,' (2) 'describe the place [or person] to be searched,' and (3) 'specify the items to be seized by their relation to designated crimes'" (People v Wiggins, 229 A.D.3d 1095, 1096 [4th Dept 2024], quoting United States v Galpin, 720 F.3d 436, 445-446 [2d Cir 2013]; see People v Saeli [appeal No. 1], 219 A.D.3d 1122, 1124 [4th Dept 2023]). Assuming, arguendo, that defendant's challenges to the warrants are "preserved for our review because [their] validity [on those grounds] was expressly decided by the court" (People v Colon, 192 A.D.3d 1567, 1568 [4th Dept 2021], lv denied 37 N.Y.3d 955 [2021]; see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Prado, 4 N.Y.3d 725, 726 [2004], rearg denied 4 N.Y.3d 795 [2005]), we conclude that the warrants, which are "cloak[ed]... with a presumption of validity" (People v DeProspero, 91 A.D.3d 39, 44 [4th Dept 2011], affd 20 N.Y.3d 527 [2013] [internal quotation marks omitted]) and are not to "be read in a hypertechnical manner" (People v Hanlon, 36 N.Y.2d 549, 559 [1975]), were issued upon probable cause and described with sufficient particularity the places or person to be searched and the things to be seized (see People v Nieves, 36 N.Y.2d 396, 400 [1975]; see generally U.S. Const, 4th Amend; NY Const, art 1, § 12). As written, the warrants were" 'specific enough to leave no discretion to the executing officer[s]'" (People v Brown, 96 N.Y.2d 80, 84 [2001]; see People v Herron, 199 A.D.3d 1476, 1479 [4th Dept 2021]).
We also reject defendant's contention in her main and pro se supplemental briefs that her Alford plea should be vacated. Initially, we note that "so long as [a] plea agreement is voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently made, the fact that it is linked to the prosecutor's acceptance of a plea bargain favorable to [third persons] does not, by itself, make defendant's plea illegal" (People v Fiumefreddo, 82 N.Y.2d 536, 544 [1993]). "Although 'connected pleas can present concerns which require special care...,' the inclusion of a third-party benefit is just one factor to consider in determining whether a plea was voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made" (People v Shaw, 222 A.D.3d 1401, 1402 [4th Dept 2023], lv denied 42 N.Y.3d 930 [2024], quoting Fiumefreddo, 82 N.Y.2d at 545). Here," 'the record establishes that defendant's Alford plea was the product of a voluntary and rational choice, and the record... contains strong evidence of actual guilt'" (Herron, 199 A.D.3d at 1477; see People v Wilson, 197 A.D.3d 1006, 1007 [4th Dept 2021], lv denied 37 N.Y.3d 1100 [2021]).
We have reviewed defendant's remaining contentions in her main brief, including her challenge to the severity of her negotiated sentence, and conclude that none warrants modification or reversal of the judgment.