Opinion
H051540
12-17-2024
In re I.R., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. v. I.R., Defendant and Appellant. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. 23JV45916A.
WILSON, J.
After a contested jurisdictional hearing, the juvenile court sustained a wardship petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, subdivision (a), finding true beyond a reasonable doubt the allegations that appellant I.R. annoyed or molested a child (Pen. Code, § 647.6, subd. (a)(1)) based on two incidents in which he exposed his buttocks to several middle school students. The juvenile court declared I.R. a ward of the court and placed him on probation.
Unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
On appeal, I.R. appears to argue that the dispositional order must be reversed because: 1) the victims/witnesses spoke with each other about the incidents prior to testifying at the jurisdictional hearing and thus engaged in misconduct, 2) the juvenile court erred in admitting testimony regarding the second incident which took place nine days after the initial incident, 3) his counsel was ineffective, and 4) there was insufficient evidence presented to support the jurisdictional findings. The Attorney General argues that I.R. has forfeited his "undeveloped claims" and, alternatively, there is no merit to his arguments.
I.R.'s opening brief-he filed no reply-is not a model of organization or clarity. We have nonetheless undertaken our best efforts to parse the legal arguments raised therein.
For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm the dispositional order.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
A. Procedural history
On January 12, 2023, the Santa Clara County District Attorney's office filed a wardship petition against I.R. under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, subdivision (a). The petition alleged that, "[o]n or about and between April 20, 2022 and April 29, 2022," I.R. annoyed or molested a child, specifically "Jane Doe I, II, III, IV."
All dates are from 2022 unless otherwise specified.
On June 29, 2023 and August 10, 2023, the juvenile court held a contested jurisdictional hearing in I.R.'s case, where it heard testimony from, among other witnesses, the victims K.C., T.V., J.S., and B.V.
We refer to the victims in the proceedings by their initials only to protect their personal privacy interests pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(4).
After taking the matter under submission, the juvenile court sustained the allegations on August 30, 2023. At a dispositional hearing on October 6, 2023, the juvenile court declared I.R. a ward of the court and placed him on probation.
I.R. timely appealed.
B. Factual background
1. Prosecution's case
a. The April 20 incident involving K.C., T.V., and B.V.
K.C. testified that, on April 20, she was a sixth grader and attended middle school in San Jose. She was on school grounds with two of her friends, T.V. and B.V., after school had ended that day. As K.C. and her friends started walking toward the parking lot to be picked up by their parents, she saw an African-American man, "who seemed to be way too old for middle school," "entering the back gate of the school" grounds. The man was walking in the same direction as K.C. and her friends, so K.C. told her friends to stop walking so he would remain ahead of them and in view. K.C. testified the man was about 6 feet tall, with a skinny build, and he was wearing a black hoodie, black sweatpants, and had a black mask.
On cross-examination, K.C. clarified that it was odd for the man to be on campus because he "wasn't the age of a teacher or a middle schooler."
After the man got ahead of K.C.'s group, he pulled his hoodie up above his rear end, then bent over as if to pick something up off the ground. K.C. said that it seemed as if the man's pants were already down and had previously been covered by his hoodie. The man was not wearing underwear and K.C. could see his exposed buttocks. K.C. also saw something "blue and white" sticking out of the man's anus, which appeared to be "the handle of .... like a toilet brush cleaner, like the end of it ...." The man was about 24 feet away from K.C.
The man then straightened up, covering his buttocks again, and looked back to K.C. and her friends. He walked away from her group and exited the school.
A few minutes later, when K.C. and her friends were in the school parking lot, K.C. saw the man again on a street corner at the end of the school. The man "kept looking back around the corner on the street where [K.C.] was and then going back down the street, back and forth."
T.V. testified that, after school on April 20, she was with her classmates, K.C. and B.V., on the school grounds. She saw an African-American man, "[a]bout 6-foot" tall and "skinny", wearing a black hoodie, black sweatpants, black shoes, and a black mask. The man was standing about 24 feet in front of her and her friends, facing away from them, when he pulled his pants down. T.V could see the man's bare buttocks and "something blue" "sticking out his butt." (Sic.) T.V. said that the man did not bend over but remained upright when he exposed his buttocks. The man then pulled his pants up and left the school grounds. T.V. said that the man looked at her and her friends both before and after he dropped his pants.
On cross-examination, T.V. said that the man's pants were "sagging" with the "waistband ... down to around his knees[.]" His hoodie was covering his buttocks, but they were exposed when the man "bent down in front" of her and her friends. On redirect, T.V. clarified that she did not see if the man lifted his hoodie because she and B.V. were turned away; it was only after K.C. got her attention that she looked and saw the man had bent over and exposed his buttocks.
Afterward, while T.V. was in the parking lot, she saw the man "poking his head out around the corner[,]" "staring at [her] and [K.C.]"
B.V. testified that she was walking with her classmates K.C. and T.V. on school grounds on the afternoon of April 20. A man who was walking in front of them, perhaps 25 feet, "bent down and flashed" them. B.V. could see the man's buttocks and a "blue stick" inserted in the man's anus. B.V. said that man was wearing a black hoodie, a black mask, sweats, black shoes, and possibly sunglasses. The man's sweatpants were "really saggy" and it looked like he had bent over to pick something up off the ground, but she did not see anything on the ground. B.V. said the man pulled his hoodie up as he bent over.
b. The April 29 incident involving J.S.
J.S. testified that, on April 29, she was in seventh grade. After school that day, she was waiting on the school grounds when a man walked past her and, when he was about 15 feet away from her, pulled down his pants. The man was not wearing underwear and J.S. could see his naked buttocks. J.S. also saw some sort of "stick" that was "yellow" "sticking out of his butt." After perhaps two seconds, the man pulled his pants up and walked away. J.S. said the man was wearing a black hoodie and black sweatpants, but she did not recall if he was wearing anything on his face. J.S. took a "quick video" of the man as he was walking away and then ran to the school's office to report what happened. She and some school staff members went back outside and, around five minutes later, J.S. saw the man again. A police officer arrived and detained the man. J.S. identified I.R. in court as the man who exposed himself to her that day.
J.S. attended the same middle school as K.C., T.V., and B.V.
On April 29, San Jose police officer Edgar Ramirez responded to a report of an indecent exposure at the middle school. When he arrived, the school's principal directed Ramirez's attention to I.R., who was wearing clothing as described by J.S. Ramirez asked I.R., who was "taller, thinner" than himself, to sit on the curb. I.R. was holding a large plastic bottle of soda and a large bag of candy. Ramirez determined that I.R. lived 0.3 miles from the middle school, which was approximately 7 minutes away on foot.
N.G. testified that, on April 29, she was the principal at the middle school attended by J.S., K.C., T.V., and B.V. I.R. was a former student of hers, and she saw him on the school grounds that day.
N.G. said that I.R. graduated from middle school in 2020. The parties stipulated that I.R. was born in 2005 and, in April 2022, was enrolled in high school.
On April 21, N.G. sent an email to all students' parents alerting them that, the previous afternoon, "a six-foot tall, African-American male wearing black sweatpants, a black hoodie, mask, and sunglasses committed an indecent exposure" on campus, witnessed by three students.
Defense counsel elicited this evidence to show that it might have been the source of the witnesses' descriptions of I.R.
2. Defense case
I.R.'s great-uncle G.R. testified that he lived with I.R. and I.R.'s parents in April. On April 20, G.R. picked I.R. up from high school around 12:30 p.m. and brought him home. G.R. said that I.R. did not leave the house at all that afternoon. On crossexamination, G.R. confirmed that I.R. was wearing black sweatpants and a black hoodie when he was detained on April 29 and that I.R. "typically" wore such athletic apparel, including "Adidas-type" pants and "a dark gray or black hoodie." G.R. did not know if I.R. was wearing "that type of clothing" on April 20.
I.R. testified that he was a senior in high school and on April 20, his great-uncle picked him up from school and brought him home. At home, I.R. played videogames in his room and did not leave the house the rest of the day. I.R. denied that he was on the middle school grounds on April 20 and further denied exposing his buttocks that day.
I.R. testified that, on April 29, he had gone to 7-Eleven and was walking home by cutting across the middle school campus. This was not his usual route home from the convenience store. As I.R. walked across the campus, a "mother" "came up to [him], aggressively, and started cursing [him] out." A vice principal from the school then came up and told him to wait until the police arrived. Police arrived and detained him, but I.R. was not sure why they did so. I.R. said that he had seen maybe 10 students on campus as he was walking but denied exposing his buttocks to any students or staff that day.
3. Jurisdictional findings
After the close of evidence, the juvenile court took the matter under submission and announced its findings at a subsequent hearing. The court noted that it "evaluated the testimony of all witnesses and the credibility or believability with guidance from CALCRIM [Nos.] 226, 301, 302, and 315[,]" and further stated that "[t]he four witnesses who are alleged as victims in the petition testified consistently and credibly as to the description of the male suspect who showed them his butt with an item protruding from the anus as bent down in front of them." The juvenile court indicated that it reviewed the elements of the offense and "according to the testimony of these witnesses, the conduct was directly related to a child .. [and] a person having been subjected to that conduct would be disturbed or irritated or offended." Due to the similarity in the events described by the witnesses, the court "logically and reasonably infer[red] that the perpetrator of the offenses on April 20th [] was the same as the one on April 29th[.]" The court concluded that sufficient evidence had been presented to sustain the petition's allegations beyond a reasonable doubt.
II. Discussion
A. Forfeiture
The Attorney General initially argues that we should deem all of I.R.'s claims forfeited due to his failure to comply with California Rules of Court, rules 8.204(a)(1)(B) and 8.412(a)(2) in that his opening brief fails to "[s]tate each point under a separate heading or subheading summarizing the point, and support each point by argument and, if possible, by citation of authority." He also notes that the brief "is muddled, with no case citations and only cursory citation to codes and the Constitution with virtually no coherent application of those authorities to the law."
Unspecified rule references are to the California Rules of Court.
We need not analyze whether and to what extent I.R.'s brief is procedurally defective because we will utilize our discretion under rule 8.204(e)(2)(C) to disregard the noncompliance and consider the merits of whether the juvenile court erred in sustaining the allegations in the petition.
B. No error in considering J.S.'s testimony
I.R. first argues that his rights to due process and equal protection were violated because, in his view, "[t]he 4 teenage witnesses acted in concealed togetherness, jointly cooperated in comparing their testimonies." I.R. relies on J.S. stating that the first time she was asked about seeing an object inserted in I.R.'s anus was when she spoke with the other victims/witnesses the morning of the jurisdictional hearing.
The Attorney General argues that I.R. has forfeited any claim relating to this testimony by failing to object at the jurisdictional hearing. In order to forestall potential claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, we elect to consider I.R.'s due process claim on the merits and thus do not reach the question of forfeiture as to that issue. (See People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83,146.)
1. Additional background
During direct examination, when the prosecutor asked J.S. whether she had "ever been asked before ... whether [she] saw anything in his butt or not," J.S. replied, "[t]his morning, when we were all .. in the room. When we were talking about it." On crossexamination, defense counsel asked whether J.S. had ever told the police that she had seen something inserted in I.R.'s anus on April 29 and J.S. said that that she had not done so. J.S. also explained that she had spoken to K.C., T.V., and B.V. that morning about seeing something protruding from I.R.'s anus and the "other girls told [her] what they had seen." Defense counsel made no objection.
2. Applicable legal principles
"The Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution prohibits states from denying any person due process of law. This guarantee of due process affords criminal defendants the right to a fair trial, 'impos[ing] on States certain duties consistent with their sovereign obligation to ensure "that 'justice shall be done.'" '" (Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. Superior Court (2019) 8 Cal.5th 28, 39, quoting Cone v. Bell (2009) 556 U.S. 449, 451.)" 'Under well-established principles of due process, the prosecution cannot present evidence it knows is false and must correct any falsity of which it is aware in the evidence it presents, even if the false evidence was not intentionally submitted.' [Citations.]" (People v. Morrison (2004) 34 Cal.4th 698, 716.) 3. Analysis
I.R. does not directly accuse J.S. of offering false testimony, but rather implies that she along with K.C., T.V., and B.V. "acted in concealed togetherness, [and] jointly cooperated in comparing their testimonies." We do not find anything in the record to suggest that J.S.'s testimony that she had seen an object protruding from I.R.'s anus was based not on her personal observation on April 29 but rather was due to her out-of-court discussion with the other minor victims/witnesses. First, J.S.'s testimony established only that she did speak with K.C., T.V., and B.V. that morning about what they saw on April 20 and April 29, respectively. Second, I.R.'s due process rights were not violated because he had every opportunity to cross-examine J.S. about her out-of-court conversations with K.C., T.V., and B.V. and could have also recalled any of those witnesses to further explore exactly what they spoke about.
We also note that J.S.'s testimony about the object did not conform exactly to that offered by K.C., T.V., and B.V. Those girls testified that the object they saw was blue, whereas J.S. said that it was yellow.
K.C. and T.V. testified before J.S. and were excused subject to recall, as were J.S. and B.V.
As to I.R.'s generalized claim that his equal protection rights were violated by J.S.'s testimony, he offers no argument to explain this claim or case authority supporting it. Where a brief fails to contain reasoned argument and legal authority to support its contentions, we may (and hereby do) treat the claim as forfeited. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B); People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793.)
C. No error in admitting evidence of April 29 incident
I.R. next argues that the juvenile court should not have allowed evidence of the April 29 incident under Evidence Code section 352 as the evidence was more prejudicial than probative. We disagree.
The Attorney General again argues that I.R. has forfeited this claim because defense counsel failed to object below. As noted above, in footnote 11, we will utilize our discretion and proceed to consider the merits of I.R.'s argument.
1. Additional background
Prior to the jurisdictional hearing, I.R. moved to exclude all evidence regarding the April 29 incident, citing Evidence Code section 352. The district attorney responded that evidence of the April 20 and April 29 incidents should be admitted pursuant to Evidence Code sections 1101 and 1108.
At the hearing, I.R.'s counsel acknowledged that the court would need to first hear the evidence "with regard to April 29th to determine whether or not a criminal offense occurred on that date" and then rule on its admissibility. The juvenile court noted that, as the district attorney was also seeking to admit the April 29 evidence under Evidence Code section 1101 and 1108, "there has to be a balancing under Evidence Code section 352 where the Court looks at the probative value of that particular incident versus any prejudicial effect it could have on the trier of fact." The court then preliminarily ruled that it would "permit the evidence from the April 29th issue, finding that it would be relevant to .. the issues of identity or intent." However, it would "wait for the evidence to be presented to see how relevant it is and weigh the evidence in that respect." The court invited counsel for both parties to raise "any objections that they have as the evidence is presented and any future objections or requests to strike particular evidence."
2. Legal principles
"Character evidence, sometimes described as evidence of a propensity or disposition to engage in a type of conduct, is generally inadmissible to prove a person's conduct on a specified occasion." (People v. Villatoro (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1152, 1159; citing Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (a).) However, the Legislature has created certain exceptions to the prohibition against admitting propensity evidence in cases involving sexual offenses (Evid. Code, § 1108, subd. (a)). Evidence Code section 1108 is an exception to the general rule that "evidence of a person's character or a trait of his or her character . . . is inadmissible when offered to prove his or her conduct on a specified occasion." (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (a).) Evidence that a defendant committed a sexual offense is admissible character evidence in a "criminal action in which the defendant is accused of a sexual offense," as long as the evidence is not inadmissible under Evidence Code section 352. (Evid. Code, § 1108, subd. (a).)
A court "must engage in a careful weighing process" when determining whether to admit evidence under Evidence Code section 1108. (People v. Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903, 913, 917 (Falsetta); People v. Baker (2021) 10 Cal.5th 1044, 1098.) "Rather than admit or exclude every sex offense a defendant commits, [] judges must consider such factors as its nature, relevance, and possible remoteness, the degree of certainty of its commission and the likelihood of confusing, misleading, or distracting the [finder of fact] from their main inquiry, its similarity to the charged offense, its likely prejudicial impact on the [finder of fact], the burden on the defendant in defending against the uncharged offense, and the availability of less prejudicial alternatives to its outright admission, such as admitting some but not all of the defendant's other sex offenses, or excluding irrelevant though inflammatory details surrounding the offense." (Falsetta, at p. 917.)
Evidence Code section 352 provides: "The court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury."" '[A] court need not expressly weigh prejudice against probative value or even expressly state that it has done so, if the record as a whole shows the court was aware of and performed its balancing functions under Evidence Code section 352. [Citation.]'" (People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 438 (Doolin).)
We review a court's rulings under Evidence Code sections 1108 and 352 for abuse of discretion. (People v. Dworak (2021) 11 Cal.5th 881, 899-900.)" 'To establish an abuse of discretion, defendant[] must demonstrate that the [] court's decision was so erroneous that it "falls outside the bounds of reason." [Citations.] A merely debatable ruling cannot be deemed an abuse of discretion. [Citations.] An abuse of discretion will be "established by 'a showing the [] court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.'"' [Citation.]" (People v. Miracle (2018) 6 Cal.5th 318, 346-347.)
The California Supreme Court has previously rejected the argument that Evidence Code section 1108 violates a defendant's right to due process in Falsetta, supra, 21 Cal.4th 903. Falsetta held that "the [] court's discretion to exclude propensity evidence under [Evidence Code] section 352 saves [Evidence Code] section 1108 from [a] due process challenge." (Id. at p. 917.)
Finally, where a court does not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence pursuant to Evidence Code section 1108, subdivision (b), that evidence cannot be inadmissible under Evidence Code section 1101. (People v. Daveggio and Michaud (2018) 4 Cal.5th 790, 827 (Daveggio); Evid. Code, § 1108, subd. (a) [evidence admissible under § 1108, subd. (a) "is not made inadmissible by Section 1101"].)
3. Analysis
In his brief, I.R. asserts that the April 29 incident was an "uncharged bad act." (Italics and underling omitted.) That is mistaken. As the Attorney General notes in its brief, the evidence of what occurred on April 29 was encompassed within the allegations set forth in the petition, specifically that I.R. annoyed or molested a child "[o]n or about and between April 20, 2022 and April 29, 2022." (Italics added.) Therefore, any evidence of what took place on April 29 was relevant to the charged offense, i.e., a violation of section 647.6, subdivision (a)(1)). The juvenile court need not have considered whether that evidence was admissible under Evidence Code sections 1101, subdivision (b) and 1108.
In any event, whether the evidence of what took place on April 29 constituted a charged or uncharged act does not change the result in this case since it is clear that the evidence was admissible under Evidence Code section 1108 to show I.R.'s propensity for committing a violation of section 647.6, subdivision (a)(1). The California Supreme Court has held that Evidence Code section 1108, subdivision (a)'s reference to "the defendant's commission of another sexual offense or offenses" permits the finder of fact to consider evidence of a defendant's charged sexual offenses, in addition to evidence of uncharged sexual offenses, to demonstrate his or her propensity to commit the other charged sexual offenses. In Villatoro, supra, 54 Cal.4th 1152, our Supreme Court held: "In short, we conclude nothing in the language of section 1108 restricts its application to uncharged offenses. Indeed, the clear purpose of section 1108 is to permit the [finder of fact]'s consideration of evidence of a defendant's propensity to commit sexual offenses. . . . In light of this clear purpose, we perceive no reason why the Legislature would exclude charged sexual offenses from section 1108's purview, and no indication that it did so in either the text of section 1108 or its legislative history. Whether an offense is charged or uncharged in the current prosecution does not affect in any way its relevance as propensity evidence." (Id. at p. 1164.)
The April 29 incident was relevant to the question of whether I.R. committed the acts in question and, since it was only nine days after the April 20 incident, remoteness in time did not weigh in favor of excluding it. As this was a court trial, there was little likelihood that the judge would be confused, misled, or distracted from the main inquiry or that he would be unduly prejudiced by hearing it. The events of April 29 were substantially similar to the events of April 20 and defending against the offense described as taking place on April 29 did not impose an additional burden on I.R. In sum, the probative value of this evidence was high, and I.R. does not identify what specific prejudice is associated with it. It is well-settled that," '[i]n applying [Evidence Code] section 352, "prejudicial" is not synonymous with "damaging."' [Citation.]" (People v. Karis (1988) 46 Cal.3d 612, 638.)
Further, to the extent that I.R. contends the juvenile court erred by failing to make an express ruling that the evidence was more probative than prejudicial under Evidence Code section 352, we reject that claim as well. As we noted above," 'a court need not expressly weigh prejudice against probative value or even expressly state that it has done so, if the record as a whole shows the court was aware of and performed its balancing functions under Evidence Code section 352.' [Citation.]" (Doolin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 438.) The record here makes clear that the court considered and properly weighed the evidence of the April 29 incident and, acting within its discretion, declined to exclude it. Because we conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence pursuant to Evidence Code section 1108, subdivision (b), that evidence cannot be inadmissible under Evidence Code section 1101. (Daveggio, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 827.)
D. No showing of ineffective assistance of trial counsel
Appellate counsel makes generalized remarks asserting that I.R.'s counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance. The assertions are not supported with analysis or citation to authority and we could deem them forfeited. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B); People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793.) However, to the extent that these claims are founded on counsel's purported failure to (successfully) object to the April 29 testimony, we have already considered and rejected those matters on their merits. Accordingly, there is no basis for relying on them for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. "Failure to raise a meritless objection is not ineffective assistance of counsel. [Citation.]" (People v. Bradley (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 64, 90.)
E. Substantial evidence supports the jurisdictional findings
Finally, I.R. asserts, again without analysis or citation to authority, that the evidence below was not sufficient to support the court's findings that the allegations in the petition were true. We are not persuaded.
When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we "review 'the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment' and decide 'whether it discloses substantial evidence . . . such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.' [Citation.]" (People v. Hatch (2000) 22 Cal.4th 260, 272.) "Section 647.6, subdivision (a)(1) makes it a misdemeanor to annoy or molest a child under the age of 18 years. As used in that provision, the words 'annoy' and 'molest' 'are synonymous and generally refer to conduct designed to disturb, irritate, offend, injure, or at least tend to injure, another person.' [Citation.] Section 647.6, subdivision (a) is violated by conduct that (1) a normal person unhesitatingly would be irritated by, and (2) is motivated by an unnatural or abnormal sexual interest in the victim. [Citation.]" (Ruelas v. Superior Court (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 374, 379.) In addition, "there must be evidence that the perpetrator 'directed' the conduct toward a child. [Citations.] The intent to be observed while engaging in the offensive conduct is subsumed in the element that the offender 'directs' his conduct toward a child." (People v. Phillips (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1383, 1394 (Phillips); see also People v. Thompson (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 459, 466-467 [finding sufficient evidence to support conviction under former section 647a, now section 647.6, where defendant repeatedly drove slowly alongside and past minor victim, "stared at her, ... made hand and facial gestures in her direction[] .. stopped his vehicle along her route of travel, causing her to pass by the stopped vehicle if she was to continue along the same route."].)
In Phillips, a 15-year-old student was leaving school for the day when she saw the defendant masturbating in his car, which was parked in front of the school. (Phillips, supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 1386.) On appeal from his conviction under section 647.6, subdivision (a)(1), Phillips argued that there was insufficient evidence to prove "that he focused his conduct toward a specific child victim." (Phillips, at p. 1388.) The court rejected that argument, stating "there is nothing in the statute or any case law directly on point that requires the defendant to have singled out any particular child (or group of children) in advance for his actions." (Id. at pp. 1395-1396.) "[T]he requisite intent is proved from the circumstantial evidence surrounding [the defendant]'s conduct, such as . where he parked in relation to the children, the time of day-the degree to which his actions rise to the reasonable inference that he intended to be observed." (Id. at p. 1395, fn. omitted.)
The testimony below was that, on April 20 and again on April 29, I.R. walked onto a middle school campus in the afternoon, a place where children were likely to be present even after school was dismissed. While positioned in front of female minors, I.R. deliberately exposed his buttocks, as well as an object that was inserted into his anus. This conduct would, unquestionably and immediately, disturb or irritate a normal person. The evidence thus showed that I.R. was motivated by an unnatural or abnormal sexual interest in children, given where and when the acts took place, the display of his buttocks and the inserted object, the fact that he turned to look at the victims, and that he committed the same act again within a few days. On this record, there was substantial evidence presented to support the juvenile court's jurisdictional findings.
III. Disposition
The dispositional order is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: BAMATTRE-MANOUKIAN, ACTING P. J., DANNER, J.