Opinion
B331645
03-05-2024
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. RUBEN MANUEL INIGUEZ, Defendant and Appellant.
Edward H. Schulman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal; Ruben Manuel Iniguez, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant. No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, No. LA042497 Martin L. Herscovitz, Judge. Affirmed.
Edward H. Schulman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal; Ruben Manuel Iniguez, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
FEUER, J.
In 2005 Ruben Manuel Iniguez was found guilty following a jury trial of one count of second degree murder and one count of attempted willful, deliberate and premeditated murder. The jury found true that Iniguez personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing death and that the crimes were committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang. Iniguez was sentenced to 80 years to life on the murder count, plus a consecutive term of 70 years to life for the attempted murder. We affirmed Iniguez's convictions. (People v. Iniguez (May 29, 2007, B186450) [nonpub. opn.].)
On June 1, 2023 the superior court denied Iniguez's petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6 (former section 1170.95) without issuing an order to show cause, ruling Iniguez was ineligible for relief as a matter of law because the jury had not been instructed on felony murder or the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
Further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
No arguable issues have been identified following review of the record by Iniguez's appointed appellate counsel. We also have identified no arguable issues after our own independent review of the record and analysis of the contentions presented by Iniguez in his supplemental brief. We affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. Iniguez's Convictions for Second Degree Murder and Attempted Murder
On the night of February 1, 2003, Iniguez was attending a birthday party at a home in gang territory claimed by the Vineland Boys. Iniguez was a member of the Vineland Boys. While at the party, Iniguez was drawing attention to himself by loading a rifle and "showing it off," along with the gang tattoos on his body. Iniguez also asked various people which gang they were from, including Fernando Fulgar, who identified himself as a new member of the Vineland Boys.
We provide a recitation of the facts as set forth in People v. Iniguez, supra, B186450 as background. We deny Iniguez's request to take judicial notice of the file in B186450 as unnecessary.
Sergio Gutierrez and Shawn Stephens also attended the party, but at some point in the evening they left to pick up a friend. As they were walking back to the party through a field, they were approached by Iniguez and Alexander Chavez, another member of the Vineland Boys. Iniguez was carrying a rifle, and Chavez was carrying a handgun. Fulger joined them.
Stephens asked Iniguez and Chavez "What's up." Instead of responding, Iniguez and Chavez stopped walking, took off their shirts, and wrapped them around their arms. Chavez and Iniguez then started shooting. Stephens was hit in the arm, and Gutierrez was shot in the chest; Gutierrez later died. Fulger agreed to cooperate with the police and testified at trial against Iniguez. Following Fulger's testimony, Iniguez told another inmate that Fulger was a snitch and to "go ahead and take care of business."
The jury found Iniguez guilty of second degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a)) and attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664, subd. (a)). The jury also found true on both counts the gang allegations (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)) and that Iniguez personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing the death of Gutierrez. (§ 12022.53, subds. (b), (c), (d), &(e)(1)).
We affirmed Iniguez's convictions, rejecting his contentions that the trial court committed instructional error; the admission of Iniguez's statements to other inmates was prejudicial; and substantial evidence did not support the attempted murder charge. We also rejected Iniguez's contention that the trial court's imposition of consecutive indeterminate terms violated Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, and that his sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment. (People v. Iniguez, supra, B186450.)
B. Iniguez's Petition for Resentencing
On August 17, 2022 Iniguez, representing himself, filed a form petition for resentencing pursuant to former section 1170.95 and requested the appointment of counsel. The superior court appointed counsel for Iniguez, and the People filed an opposition, arguing Iniguez was not eligible for resentencing because the jury was not instructed on either the felony-murder theory or the natural and probable consequences doctrine, and the jury found true the special allegation that he personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury and death. Iniguez argued in his reply that he could have been found liable under a theory of implied malice because "there was no way to determine whose bullets may have struck the victim," and under the premeditated attempted murder instruction, the jury could have found someone other than Iniguez "personally intended to kill and premeditated and deliberated, without finding that petitioner personally harbored those mental states."
At a hearing held on June 1, 2023, the trial court stated it had read the petition and briefs, as well as "the court file that consists of the minute orders, the record of conviction, as well as the actual jury instructions that I gave during this trial, as well as the unpublished opinion of the conviction." The court denied the petition, explaining it "never instructed the jury on the felony-murder rule. The court never instructed the jury on the natural and probable consequence[s] theory. [¶] The court did instruct on aiding and abetting but told the jury . . . the aider and abettor would have to have the same intent as the actual perpetrator even if they didn't convict the defendant as an aider and abettor. [¶] So since it's impossible for the defendant to have been convicted under the felony-murder rule . . . or on natural and probable consequence[s] theory on either counts one or two, he is not entitled to relief and there's been no prima facie case made for relief."
Iniguez filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
We appointed counsel to represent Iniguez on appeal from the denial of his postjudgment petition. After reviewing the record, appointed counsel informed us that he did not identify any arguable issues. Appointed counsel advised Iniguez on January 5, 2024 that he was filing a brief stating he was unable to find arguable issues, and further, Iniguez could personally submit any contentions he believed the court should consider. On January 10, 2024 counsel sent Iniguez a copy of the brief and record on appeal.
On January 22, 2024 we received a 34-page handwritten supplemental brief from Iniguez challenging his original sentence. Among the claims made in the supplemental brief, Iniguez argues that someone impersonating Fulger testified at his trial; the trial court dismissed the gang allegations; Iniguez was denied a mistrial despite the jury having only seven remaining jurors; Iniguez's prior strikes were expunged; and the jury only found him guilty of manslaughter and battery, but the "judge managed to change my sentence." Iniguez also asserts that a judge in Kern County, with the assistance of two federal judges standing behind her during court proceedings, reneged on a plea agreement that he negotiated with the court.
Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437) eliminated the natural and probable consequences doctrine as a basis for finding a defendant guilty of murder and significantly limited the scope of the felony-murder rule. (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707-708; People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957; People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842843, 847-848; see People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 984.) Under section 1172.6 a defendant convicted of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine can challenge his murder conviction if he or she "makes a 'prima facie showing' of entitlement to relief.... This, in turn, requires a showing that, among other things, he 'could not presently be convicted of murder' under the amendments to the murder statutes that became effective on January 1, 2019." (People v. Arreguin (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 58, 62; see People v. Strong at p. 708.)
Section 1172.6, however, does not allow a petitioner to raise new arguments not based on changes made by Senate Bill 1437. (See People v. Burns (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 862, 865 ["Section 1172.6 does not create a right to a second appeal."].) Thus, "[t]he mere filing of a section [1172.6] petition does not afford the petitioner a new opportunity to raise claims of trial error or attack the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury's findings." (People v. Farfan (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 942, 947.) Accordingly, to the extent Iniguez's supplemental brief challenges the verdict at trial, these arguments are not properly raised in this appeal.
Moreover, as the trial court found, Iniguez was not convicted on a theory of felony murder or the natural and probable consequences doctrine. While the trial court instructed the jury on aiding and abetting, "Senate Bill No. 1437 did not change the law to prohibit direct aider and abettor liability on an imputed malice theory." (People v. Berry-Vierwinden (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 921, 936.) Further, none of the issues raised by Iniguez in his supplemental brief shows he "could not presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder because of changes to Section 188 or 189" made by Senate Bill 1437. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3).)
Finally, to the extent Iniguez challenges the alleged violation of his plea agreement with the Kern County Superior Court, we lack jurisdiction to decide this issue because the notice of appeal must be filed in the superior court where the judgment occurred. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.304(a)(1).) Kern County is within the jurisdiction of the Fifth Appellate District.
Because no cognizable legal issues have been raised by Iniguez's appellate counsel or by Iniguez or identified in our independent review of the record, the order denying his petition for resentencing is affirmed. (See People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 231-232; see generally People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 118-119; People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441-442.)
DISPOSITION
The postjudgment order denying Iniguez's petition for resentencing is affirmed.
We concur: SEGAL, Acting P. J., MARTINEZ, J.