Smith2d Dept.: 118 A.D.3d 1023, 987 N.Y.S.2d 460 (Westchester) Smith, J.Denied.
Disposition: Applications for Criminal Leave to appeal denied Decision Reported Below: 2d Dept: 118 AD3d 1023 (Westchester)
Although the defendant's contention that his plea of guilty was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent survives his valid appeal waiver (seePeople v. Ramos, 164 A.D.3d 922, 82 N.Y.S.3d 103 ), the record demonstrates that his plea was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered (seePeople v. Seeber, 4 N.Y.3d 780, 781, 793 N.Y.S.2d 826, 826 N.E.2d 797 ; People v. Fiumefreddo, 82 N.Y.2d 536, 543, 605 N.Y.S.2d 671, 626 N.E.2d 646 ).Contrary to the defendant's contention, he was not deprived of the effective assistance of counsel during the plea proceeding as his attorney provided meaningful representation (seePeople v. Ford, 86 N.Y.2d 397, 404, 633 N.Y.S.2d 270, 657 N.E.2d 265 ; People v. Ingvarsdottir, 118 A.D.3d 1023, 1024, 987 N.Y.S.2d 460 ). Further, the defendant failed to demonstrate the absence of a strategic or other legitimate explanation for counsel's challenged conduct in permitting the defendant to waive his right to appeal as part of the plea agreement (seePeople v. Miller, 161 A.D.3d 1579, 1580, 76 N.Y.S.3d 737 ; People v. Turck, 305 A.D.2d 1072, 1073, 758 N.Y.S.2d 895 ).
In any event, we conclude that defendant's contention is without merit. The delay in sentencing defendant is excusable because it was attributable to ongoing legal proceedings involving his codefendants, in which defendant was required to cooperate pursuant to the terms of the plea agreement (seePeople v. Ingvarsdottir, 118 A.D.3d 1023, 1024, 987 N.Y.S.2d 460 [2d Dept. 2014] ; People v. Arroyo, 22 A.D.3d 881, 882, 802 N.Y.S.2d 552 [3d Dept. 2005], lv denied 6 N.Y.3d 773, 811 N.Y.S.2d 340, 844 N.E.2d 795 [2006] ).
In any event, we conclude that defendant's contention is without merit. The delay in sentencing defendant is excusable because it was attributable to ongoing legal proceedings involving his codefendants, in which defendant was required to cooperate pursuant to the terms of the plea agreement (see People v Ingvarsdottir, 118 AD3d 1023, 1024 [2d Dept 2014]; People v Arroyo, 22 AD3d 881, 882 [3d Dept 2005], lv denied 6 NY3d 773 [2006]). Entered: June 15, 2018
"[O]nly unexcusable or unduly long delays violate the statutory directive" (People v. Dissottle, 68 A.D.3d 1542, 1543, 893 N.Y.S.2d 649 ; see Drake, 61 N.Y.2d at 366, 474 N.Y.S.2d 276, 462 N.E.2d 376 ) and, here, defendant was sentenced fewer than six months after he entered his guilty plea. The portion of that period attributable to defendant's grand jury testimony against a codefendant is excusable (see People v. Ingvarsdottir, 118 A.D.3d 1023, 1024, 987 N.Y.S.2d 460 ), and another portion of that period was attributable to at least two adjournments requested by defense counsel (see People v. Brooks, 118 A.D.3d 1123, 1124, 987 N.Y.S.2d 249, lv. denied 24 N.Y.3d 959, 996 N.Y.S.2d 218, 20 N.E.3d 998 ). We reject defendant's further contention that the sentence is unduly harsh and severe.
"[O]nly unexcusable or unduly long delays violate the statutory directive" (People v Dissottle, 68 AD3d 1542, 1543; see Drake, 61 NY2d at 366) and, here, defendant was sentenced fewer than six months after he entered his guilty plea. The portion of that period attributable to defendant's grand jury testimony against a codefendant is excusable (see People v Ingvarsdottir, 118 AD3d 1023, 1024), and another portion of that period was attributable to at least two adjournments requested by defense counsel (see People v Brooks, 118 AD3d 1123, 1124, lv denied 24 NY3d 959). We reject defendant's further contention that the sentence is unduly harsh and severe.