Opinion
B153580.
7-30-2003
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. LARRY N. INGRAM, Defendant and Appellant.
David L. Polsky, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Robert F. Katz, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Roy C. Preminger, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant Larry N. Ingram appeals from the judgment entered after a jury convicted him of felony possession of cocaine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a)) and misdemeanor possession of a device used for smoking a controlled substance (id., § 11364) and he admitted two prior prison term allegations (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)). He contends the trial court erroneously denied his motion to suppress evidence. We find defendants contention to be meritorious and consequently reverse the judgment.
FACTS
We derive our statement of facts from the evidence adduced during the suppression hearing. (People v. Huntsman (1984) 152 Cal. App. 3d 1073, 1086, 200 Cal. Rptr. 89.)
On May 2, 2001 at approximately 1:15 a.m., Los Angeles Police Officer Juan Arenas was driving a patrol car in the vicinity of Main and 43rd Streets in Los Angeles when he saw defendants gray Chevrolet Beretta, bearing California license plate number 2LJN248. Officer Arenas and his partner were conducting random Department of Motor Vehicle (DMV) queries of various vehicles, using the mobile digital terminal in their patrol car. A query is a computer check through the DMV stolen vehicle system to determine if there are any "wants and warrants" on a vehicle.
When officers use their mobile computer to run a license plate for wants and warrants, the first readout on the computer comes from the DMV stolen vehicle system. If the system does not list the vehicle as stolen, the computer will read "no hits, no near misses." If the vehicle is stolen or if there is a wanted person associated with the vehicle, the computer will display "inquiry match" and will provide victim information. The computer then will provide information from the DMV pertaining to whether the car is registered, to whom it is registered and whether the registration is current.
When Officer Arenass partner ran defendants license plate, the first display on the computer revealed "an inquiry match on a pawned vehicle with victim information." This display was similar in all respects to the display officers would expect to see when a vehicle is stolen, except that it characterized the vehicle as "pawned" rather than stolen. The information generated by the computer did not report a violation of law involving the car or its owner but included victim information and stated that the San Diego Police Department was the agency to be contacted.
Officer Arenas did not know what the reference to a "pawned vehicle" meant. In his five years as a police officer, he had never before seen a reference to a "pawned vehicle" upon checking a license plate for wants and warrants. Although Officer Arenas was unsure if a violation of law had occurred, the reference to a victim led him to believe a crime had been committed. According to Officer Arenas, "When you have a crime, you have a victim." Based on the readout, the officers stopped the car, which pulled into a gas station at the intersection of Vernon and Broadway Avenues.
Officer Arenas approached defendant who was in the passenger seat of the car while his partner approached the driver. Officer Arenass partner spoke to the driver and arrested him because he was not licensed properly and stated he was on parole.
Officer Arenas asked defendant to get out of the car. Defendant complied. Officer Arenas then conducted a patdown search of defendant for officer safety reasons, among others. During the patdown search, Officer Arenas felt a cylindrical-shaped object in an outside pocket of defendants jacket. Believing the object to be a smoking device or pipe, Officer Arenas removed the object from defendants pocket. Sure enough, the object was a glass pipe that was burned on one end and was used to smoke crack cocaine. At that point, Officer Arenas believed defendant had violated Health and Safety Code section 11364. The officer then conducted a more thorough search of defendant but found no contraband or narcotics. The officer also determined, from speaking with defendant, that defendant was the owner of the car.
After searching defendant, Officer Arenas searched defendants car. On the floorboard behind the drivers seat, the officer found "a white case of chapstick." Inside the container, he found several "off-white solids resembling crack cocaine." In the center console of the car, Officer Arenas located some mesh or scouring pad, which narcotics users utilize to filter out narcotics when smoking crack cocaine through a pipe.
The officers subsequently conducted further investigation in an effort to ascertain if the car had been involved in criminal activity. They ultimately discovered that prior to stopping the Chevrolet, the car had not been involved in any violation of the law.
Prior to trial, defendant, who elected to represent himself, filed a motion to suppress all evidence seized by the police (Pen. Code, § 1538.5). Defendant maintained that the stop of his vehicle, his ensuing detention, and the search of his person and car were illegal, necessitating suppression of the evidence.
The trial court denied defendants suppression motion, stating its reasons as follows: "Based on the officers information that the officer obtained through the mobile digital terminal indicating that the vehicle was a pawned vehicle with victim data information and that the information was entered . . . by San Diego Police Department, that gave the officer reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle, although[] the officers testimony was he didnt really know what that meant, but given the fact that there was victims information and that it was entered by a police department, he felt that it meant that theres something suspicious and that he needed to make further inquiry. [P] The court finds that that is a legal basis for the officer to stop the vehicle. However, even if that is not justified, the court finds that the officer was acting in good faith in his belief that in fact the information he received justified further inquiry."
The court further determined that even if the stop were unlawful, the initial stop was a seizure of the driver, not the passenger. In addition, the officer was justified in asking defendant to get out of the car and patting him down. Citing the plain feel doctrine, the trial court further found that the officer was justified in removing the smoking device. Finally, the court found the search of the car to be valid as a search incident to the arrest of defendant and the driver. A jury thereafter convicted defendant.
DISCUSSION
In reviewing the denial of a suppression motion, we view the record in the light most favorable to the trial courts ruling, deferring to the courts express or implied findings of fact if those findings are supported by substantial evidence. (People v. Glaser (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 362, 902 P.2d 729.) We then apply the relevant legal principles to the facts as found by the trial court to determine as a matter of law whether the Fourth Amendments proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures has been violated. (Ibid.)
Defendant first asserts that the trial court erred in concluding that he could not challenge the stop because he was a passenger in the car. He maintains that as the owner of the car, he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in it, thereby enabling him to challenge the constitutional validity of the stop even though he was not driving his car at the time police stopped it. The People agree, as do we.
In concluding that defendant could not challenge the stop, the trial court cited People v. Cartwright (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1362, in which the appellate court held that a passenger in a vehicle is not seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when police stop the vehicle (id. at pp. 1365-1366). Defendant disagrees with the holding of Cartwright, which states a minority view (ibid.), and asserts, in any event, that Cartwright is distinguishable on its facts. Inasmuch as the People concede and we agree that Cartwright is factually inapposite, we need not concern ourselves with whether Cartwright was decided incorrectly. (See, e.g., Colorado v. Bannister (1980) 449 U.S. 1, 4, fn. 3, 66 L. Ed. 2d 1, 101 S. Ct. 42 ["There can be no question that the stopping of a vehicle and the detention of its occupants constitute a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment."]; Delaware v. Prouse (1979) 440 U.S. 648, 653, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660, 99 S. Ct. 1391; People v. Bell (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 754, 760-762; People v. Grant (1990) 217 Cal. App. 3d 1451, 1457-1458, 266 Cal. Rptr. 587.)
As the owner of the car, defendant unquestionably had a legitimate expectation of privacy in it. (Rakas v. Illinois (1978) 439 U.S. 128, 143, fn. 12, 58 L. Ed. 2d 387, 99 S. Ct. 421; People v. Ayala (2000) 23 Cal.4th 225, 254, fn. 3; People v. Moreno (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 577, 582.) His property interest in the car conferred on him the right to exclude others from the car and legitimized his presence in it. Moreover, he had a subjective expectation that his car would be free from governmental intrusion, and there is no indication that he did not take normal precautions to maintain his privacy in his car. To be sure, defendant did not forfeit the legitimate expectation of privacy he had in his car simply by permitting another occupant to drive while he assumed a passengers role. Unlike the passenger in Cartwright, defendant was not simply an observer riding in someone elses car. We accordingly conclude that defendant properly asserted a violation of his own Fourth Amendment rights, which clearly were implicated when police stopped his car.
Defendant next argues that the stop violated the Fourth Amendment, in that it was based on erroneous information supplied by law enforcement, and that exclusion of the evidence is required. We agree.
At the time Officer Arenas stopped defendants car, he could not point to "specific and articulable facts" indicating that the occupants of the car had violated the law. Officer Arenass sole justification for stopping defendants car was the information that had been inputted into the stolen vehicle system by the San Diego Police Department. Inasmuch as this information turned out to be false, the stop made in objective reliance upon it violates the Fourth Amendment. (United States v. Hensley (1985) 469 U.S. 221, 229, 232, 83 L. Ed. 2d 604, 105 S. Ct. 675.)
In denying defendants suppression motion, however, the trial court relied upon the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. It determined that even if the officers were not justified in stopping defendants car, the evidence subsequently discovered did not have to be excluded, in that the officers stopped the car in good faith reliance on information they had received via their mobile computer. As defendant maintains and the People concede, however, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule is not applicable when the police make an arrest or seize evidence during a search undertaken in reliance on erroneous information furnished by law enforcement. (People v. Willis (2002) 28 Cal.4th 22, 29-51; People v. Ramirez (1983) 34 Cal.3d 541, 543-552, 194 Cal. Rptr. 454, 668 P.2d 761.)
In People v. Willis, supra, 28 Cal.4th 22, police discovered evidence during a warrantless search conducted in good faith reliance on information supplied by law enforcement that the defendant was on parole and subject to a warrantless parole search condition. Unbeknownst to the officers conducting the search, however, this information was incorrect. The Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment required suppression of the evidence. (At pp. 29-51.)
In People v. Ramirez, supra, 34 Cal.3d 541, a warrant check through the police computer system revealed that the defendant had an outstanding bench warrant for drug possession. Based on this information, which was erroneous, the police arrested defendant. The Supreme Court held that the evidence found on defendants person following his arrest should have been suppressed. Inasmuch as the arrest warrant had been recalled six months earlier, the high court held that the arrest was invalid and without probable cause. (At pp. 543-552.)
In this case, Officer Arenas stopped defendants car in reliance on the information generated by his mobile computer. The trial court determined that this information had been inputted into the DMV stolen vehicle system erroneously by the San Diego Police Department. Although the systems description of defendants car as "pawned" rather than stolen was a novelty to Officer Arenas, the reference to a victim led him to believe that a crime had been committed. He consequently stopped the car to investigate. It was during the subsequent patdown search of defendant and the search of his car that the evidence forming the basis of the charges for which he was convicted was discovered.
Subsequent investigation revealed that the "victim information" the police had received on their computer screen after inputting defendants license plate number was erroneous. At the time Officer Arenas stopped defendants car, it had not been involved in any criminal activity. The DMV stolen vehicle system therefore should have indicated "no hits, no near misses" to indicate that the vehicle was not stolen.
That Officer Arenas relied in good faith on the information inputted by the San Diego Police Department and generated by the DMV stolen vehicle system is not enough to preclude application of the exclusionary rule. Police simply may not rely upon erroneous information provided through official law enforcement channels when law enforcement personnel enter such information into the system. (People v. Willis, supra, 28 Cal.4th at pp. 29-51; People v. Ramirez, supra, 34 Cal.3d 541 at pp. 543-552.)
For these reasons, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule does not apply. Inasmuch as the initial stop was illegal, the smoking device seized from defendants person and the cocaine seized from defendants car were the fruit of the unlawful stop and consequently should have been suppressed. Without such evidence, defendants conviction cannot stand.
In light of our decision to reverse the judgment, we need not and do not address defendants further contentions that the trial court violated his constitutional rights by instructing the jury with CALJIC No. 17.41.1, that the true finding on the prior prison term enhancement allegation premised on his 1993 conviction must be set aside, and that the probation condition, requiring him to stay away from places where drug users and sellers congregate, is constitutionally overbroad.
The judgment is reversed.
We concur: ORTEGA, J., MALLANO, J.