Opinion
2013-06430 Ind. No. 7278/11
11-21-2018
The PEOPLE, etc., Respondent, v. Johnny ILAGORRE, Appellant.
Martin Geoffrey Goldberg, Franklin Square, NY, for appellant. Eric Gonzalez, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove and Joyce Adolfsen of counsel; Masha Simonova on the brief), for respondent.
Martin Geoffrey Goldberg, Franklin Square, NY, for appellant.
Eric Gonzalez, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove and Joyce Adolfsen of counsel; Masha Simonova on the brief), for respondent.
WILLIAM F. MASTRO, J.P., SANDRA L. SGROI, COLLEEN D. DUFFY, HECTOR D. LASALLE, JJ.
DECISION & ORDER
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant's contention that the evidence was legally insufficient to support his conviction of robbery in the second degree is unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05[2] ; People v. Carncross, 14 N.Y.3d 319, 324–325, 901 N.Y.S.2d 112, 927 N.E.2d 532 ; People v. Seignious, 114 A.D.3d 883, 883–884, 980 N.Y.S.2d 561 ). In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 467 N.Y.S.2d 349, 454 N.E.2d 932 ), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt (see People v. Gordon, 23 N.Y.3d 643, 992 N.Y.S.2d 700, 16 N.E.3d 1178 ). Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15[5] ; People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1 ), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see People v. Mateo, 2 N.Y.3d 383, 410, 779 N.Y.S.2d 399, 811 N.E.2d 1053 ; People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672 ). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v. Romero, 7 N.Y.3d 633, 826 N.Y.S.2d 163, 859 N.E.2d 902 ).
We agree with the Supreme Court's denial of the defendant's request for a justification charge concerning his use of physical force during the altercation between the complainant and the codefendant (see Penal Law § 35.15[1] ). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant (see People v. McManus, 67 N.Y.2d 541, 549, 505 N.Y.S.2d 43, 496 N.E.2d 202 ), no reasonable view of the evidence supported a finding that the complainant, rather than the defendant and the codefendant, was the "initial aggressor" ( Penal Law § 35.15[1][b] ; see People v. Watts, 57 N.Y.2d 299, 301, 456 N.Y.S.2d 677, 442 N.E.2d 1188 ; People v. Giddens, 163 A.D.3d 990, 990–991, 81 N.Y.S.3d 515 ; People v. Cotsifas, 100 A.D.3d 1015, 954 N.Y.S.2d 219 ; People v. Williams, 112 A.D.2d 176, 177, 490 N.Y.S.2d 854 ).
MASTRO, J.P., SGROI, DUFFY and LASALLE, JJ., concur.