Opinion
E083368
10-23-2024
In re I.G., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. v. I.G., Defendant and Appellant. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,
Robert V. Vallandigham, Jr., under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Robin Urbanski, and Laura Baggett, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. No. INJ2000026 Emily A. Benjamini, Judge. Affirmed.
Robert V. Vallandigham, Jr., under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Robin Urbanski, and Laura Baggett, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
CODRINGTON J.
I.
INTRODUCTION
Defendant and appellant, I.G. shot at three people during a drive-by shooting, killing one of them. Because he was 17 years old at the time, he was charged with murder and attempted murder in juvenile court, but the juvenile court ordered his case transferred to criminal court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (a) (section 707(a)). I.G. appeals that order, and we affirm.
II.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
J.M. told police that he, F.C., and F.L. were walking down the street when a white car approached, and the driver stated, "'Where the f-k you from?'" The driver and passengers got out of the car and began shooting in the direction of J.M., F.C., and F.L. F.C. was shot in the head and died a few hours later.
The driver, C.G., told police that I.G. was one of the passengers and he was armed. According to C.G., I.G. got out of the car and shot at the victims.
During an unrelated car pursuit the next day, defendant threw a handgun out of the vehicle. I.G.'s DNA retrieved from the handgun matched DNA found on ammunition found at the scene of the drive-by shooting.
In June 2022, I.G. was charged in juvenile court with murder (Pen. Code, § 187; count 1), for the benefit of a criminal street gang (Pen. Code, §§ 190.2, subd. (a)(22), 186.22, subd. (b)(5)), and the petition alleged that he personally and intentionally discharged a firearm that caused the death of another person who was not an accomplice (Pen. Code, § 12022.53, subds. (d), (e)). Defendant was charged with two counts of attempted murder for the benefit of a criminal street gang (Pen. Code, §§ 664/187, subd. (a), 186.22, subd. (b)(5)), and the petition alleged that he personally and intentionally discharged a firearm that caused great bodily injury to another person (Pen. Code, §§ 12022.53, subd. (c), 1192.7, subd. (c)(8).
Along with the petition, the prosecution filed a motion to transfer the case to criminal court under section 707(a) in order to charge I.G. as an adult. The juvenile court held a hearing on the motion over three days, heard the testimony of six witnesses, and considered over 400 pages of briefing and supporting evidence. The juvenile court granted the prosecution's motion, transferred the case to criminal court, and dismissed the juvenile petition. I.G. timely appealed.
III.
DISCUSSION
I.G. contends the juvenile court incorrectly applied section 707(a)'s five factors and, in so doing, erroneously found that he was unamenable to the juvenile court system and thus his case should be transferred to criminal court. We find no abuse of discretion. (See In re Miguel R. (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 152, 165 (Miguel R.)
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
"The Legislature amended section 707 in 2023 and 2024. Effective January 1, 2023, Assembly Bill [No.] 2361 amended section 707(a)(3) by adding the following italicized language: 'Following submission and consideration of the report, and of any other relevant evidence that the petitioner or the minor may wish to submit, the juvenile court shall decide whether the minor should be transferred to a court of criminal jurisdiction. In order to find that the minor should be transferred to a court of criminal jurisdiction, the court shall find by clear and convincing evidence that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. In making its decision, the court shall consider the criteria specified in subparagraphs (A) to (E), inclusive. If the court orders a transfer of jurisdiction, the court shall recite the basis for its decision in an order entered upon the minutes, which shall include the reasons supporting the court's finding that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.' (§ 707(a)(3), italics added.)" (Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 164.)
"The five statutory criteria listed in subparagraphs (A) through (E) of section 707(a)(3) were not amended by Assembly Bill [No.] 2361. Those criteria are (1) 'the degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by the minor' (§ 707(a)(3)(A)(i)), (2) '[w]hether the minor can be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile court's jurisdiction' (§ 707(a)(3)(B)(i)), (3) '[t]he minor's previous delinquent history' (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(C)(i)), (4) '[s]uccess of previous attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate the minor' (§ 707(a)(3)(D)(i)), and (5) '[t]he circumstances and gravity of the offense alleged in the petition to have been committed by the minor' (§ 707(a)(3)(E)(i)). The statute sets forth a nonexhaustive list of relevant factors for the court to consider with respect to each of the five criteria. (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(A)(ii), (B)(ii), (C)(ii), (D)(ii), (E)(ii).)" (Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 164.)
"Effective January 1, 2024, Senate Bill [No.] 545 amended section 707 to require that with respect to each of those five criteria the juvenile court 'shall give weight to any relevant factor,' including the specific factors listed as relevant to each criterion. (§ 707(a)(3)(A)(ii), (B)(ii), (C)(ii), (D)(ii), (E)(ii).) The previous version of the statute made consideration of those factors discretionary, not mandatory. (Former § 707, subd. (a)(3)(A)(ii), (B)(ii), (C)(ii), (D)(ii), (E)(ii).)" (Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at pp. 164-165.)
We review the juvenile court's ruling on a transfer motion for an abuse of discretion. (Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 165.) We review the juvenile court's findings as to section 707(a)'s five criteria for substantial evidence. (Miguel R., supra, at p. 165.) "Likewise, we review for substantial evidence the juvenile court's ultimate finding 'that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.' (§ 707(a)(3).) Because the juvenile court must make that finding by clear and convincing evidence, we 'determine whether the record, viewed as a whole, contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could have made the finding of high probability demanded by' the clear and convincing evidence standard." (Miguel R., supra, at p. 165.)
B. Analysis
Before ruling on the prosecution's transfer motion, the juvenile court reviewed over 400 pages of briefing and evidence and held a hearing on the prosecution's transfer motion over the course of three days during which six witnesses testified. In a detailed, 29-page order, the juvenile court thoroughly analyzed the section 707(a) factors under the appropriate clear-and-convincing standard of review while correctly noting that the focus should be on the ultimate determination of whether I.G. is amenable to rehabilitation in the juvenile court. After doing so, the court found that I.G. should be transferred to criminal court.
For the reasons outlined below, substantial evidence supports the court's core findings that section 707(a) factors favor transfer and I.G. is not amenable to rehabilitation in juvenile court, so the court's decision to transfer his case was not an abuse of discretion.
1. First Section 707(a) Factor: Degree of Criminal Sophistication
The undisputed evidence shows that I.G. has a gang-related history and that he remained involved in the gang while detained in juvenile hall for his current offenses. Before shooting at the victims, defendant or one of his cohorts asked, "'Where the f-k you from?'" which is a common way gang members determine if someone else is from a rival gang. The court thus reasonably found that the drive-by shooting, though apparently random, was nonetheless gang-related and that I.G. was "entrenched" in the gang, as evidenced by his continuing gang-related behavior in juvenile hall.
I.G. argues there is insufficient evidence that the shooting reflected criminal sophistication because it was random and uncomplicated. We disagree.
The juvenile petition filed in this case was I.G.'s fifth. All four previous petitions, filed between January 2020 and November 2021, concerned weapons-possession charges, and the fourth one (filed about seven months before the fifth one) also alleged that I.G. shot at an occupied house or vehicle.
As the probation officer in this case believed, I.G.'s criminal history and the increasing seriousness of his offenses reflect criminal sophistication. (See Kevin P. v. Superior Court (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 173, 192-193.) The fact that the shooting was gang-related also suggests criminal sophistication, as does the fact that I.G. took steps to avoid getting caught, including tossing the firearms used in the shooting. (See ibid.) On the other hand, the fact that the shooting was uncomplicated does not mean I.G. lacks criminal sophistication. (See People v. Superior Court (Jones) (1998) 18 Cal.4th 667, 683-684 [finding minor's offense reflected criminal sophistication even though robbery "was uncomplicated and ineptly executed"].) Substantial evidence thus supports the juvenile court's finding that the first factor supported a transfer.
One of I.G.'s principal arguments on appeal is that the juvenile court failed to properly consider his "hellacious and chaotic" childhood and the trauma that he suffered, as the court is required to do when assessing the first section 707(a) factor. (See § 707, subd. (a)(3)(A)(ii).) He notes that the juvenile court stated that it did consider these issues, but he "assert[s] those words are empty generalizations."
We reject that argument. We have no reason to doubt that the juvenile court was earnest in its repeated statements that it considered all of evidence of I.G.'s childhood trauma in the record, including the reports of two medical professionals who outlined, as the juvenile court put it, I.G.'s "extensive trauma-related history as a child," his "turbulent upbringing," and his "significant childhood trauma." The juvenile court's thorough order and statements throughout the hearing make clear that the court properly considered I.G.'s childhood trauma and history.
2. Second Factor: Whether I.G. Can Be Rehabilitated Prior to the Expiration of the Juvenile Court's Jurisdiction
The juvenile court found that the second factor weighed in favor of a transfer. Substantial evidence supports that finding.
The court noted that I.G., then 20 years old, could remain in the juvenile court system for at most five more years. The court found that I.G. was not amenable to rehabilitation within that timeframe because of his continued gang entrenchment and gang activity while in juvenile hall despite multiple rehabilitation programs, including a deferred entry of judgment for firearms offenses in 2020, and completion of the Youth Treatment and Education Center (YTEC) program. In the months before the transfer hearing, I.G. still refused to renounce his gang, continued to influence younger gang members in juvenile hall, and continued to "engag[e] in gang rival stuff with peers." In the court's view, I.G.'s continued gang involvement was an "affirmative impediment" to his growth and maturity.
The juvenile court properly relied on this gang-related evidence as proof that I.G. is not amenable to rehabilitation in the juvenile court system. (See Kevin P. v. Superior Court, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 200, fn. 13; D.C. v. Superior Court (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 441, 457.) Substantial evidence thus supports the juvenile court's finding that the second factor weighed in favor of a transfer.
3. Third Factor: I.G.'s Previous Delinquent History
The third section 707(a) factor directs the juvenile court to consider the "minor's previous delinquent history" and, when doing so, to "give weight to any relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the seriousness of the minor's previous delinquent history and the effect of the minor's family and community environment and childhood trauma on the minor's previous delinquent behavior." The juvenile court properly did so.
The juvenile court noted that I.G. had four prior petitions filed against him within two years for gun-related offenses before his current offenses, and the fourth one involved a shooting in a residential area. Thus, in the court's view, I.G.'s delinquent conduct was "escalating." The court once again considered I.G.'s "significant childhood trauma" as well as his "family and community environment" when finding that the third factor weighed in favor of a transfer. Substantial evidence supports that finding.
4. Fourth Factor: Success of Previous Attempts by the Juvenile Court to Rehabilitate I.G.
The juvenile court found that the fourth factor, the "[s]uccess of previous attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate [the minor]," weighed in favor of a transfer. The juvenile court reasoned that I.G. remained gang-entrenched after multiple rehabilitative efforts after each of four petitions, including a deferred judgment, placement in the YTEC program, home supervision, and placement in juvenile hall. Despite these efforts, I.G. continued to reoffend, his offenses escalated in severity, and he consistently refused to renounce his gang. Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's finding on this factor.
5. Fifth Factor: The Circumstances and Gravity of the Offense
The fifth factor the juvenile court considered was the circumstances and gravity of the alleged offenses. (§ 707(a)(3)(E)(i).) When evaluating this criterion, the court was permitted to give weight to any relevant factor, including I.G.'s actual behavior, his mental state, his degree of involvement in the crimes, the level of harm he actually caused, and his "mental and emotional development." (§ 707(a)(3)(E)(ii).)
The juvenile court properly considered everything under this factor. I.G.'s offenses-murder and attempted murder-are grave and caused serious harm to the victims, one of whom died. The decedent's mother is "emotionally devastated" and his two sisters suffered (and likely continue to suffer) serious emotional distress. I.G. was fully involved in all aspects of the offenses, which the court properly described as "a senseless, gang-oriented, 'drive-by' shooting" of three victims who were "taking a walk at night when they were riddled with gunfire." The court once again considered I.G.'s "mental and emotional development" in the context of his "traumatic upbringing," and again considered I.G.'s psychological reports and evaluations in the record, but still found that his background did not "mitigate the circumstances [or] gravity of the offense[s] in this case." Substantial evidence thus supports the juvenile court's finding that the fifth factor weighed in favor of a transfer.
6. Ultimate Finding
The juvenile court appropriately recognized that its "ultimate finding" as to whether I.G. is amenable to rehabilitation cannot be based solely on "a simple balancing or counting of the various criteria," but instead must be based on "an evaluation of all of the criteria and factors and based on the totality of the circumstances as presented" with a "focus on [I.G.'s] amenability to rehabilitation." (See Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at pp. 165-166.) Applying these standards to the extensive evidence, the juvenile court found that clear and convincing evidence showed that I.G. is not amenable to rehabilitation. Substantial evidence supports that finding.
In our view, the juvenile court did exactly what it was supposed to do. It applied the right standards to the evidence and thoroughly outlined its ruling in a thoughtful, detailed order. As a result, we conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in granting the prosecution's motion to transfer I.G. to criminal court.
IV.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court's order transferring I.G. to criminal court is affirmed.
We concur: McKINSTER Acting P. J. FIELDS J.