Opinion
C082593
05-22-2017
In re I.G., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. I.G., Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. JV137738)
A petition filed December 30, 2015, pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, alleged that the minor I.G. possessed methamphetamine, a misdemeanor (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a); count one), and possessed hydrocodone (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a); count two). After the minor's motion to suppress the evidence (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 700.1) was denied, he entered a negotiated admission to count one and count two was dismissed in the interests of justice. The minor was placed on probation for six months subject to certain conditions including 21 days of community service with a maximum confinement term of one year.
The minor appeals. He contends the juvenile court erroneously denied his suppression motion, arguing that the officer who conducted the search exceeded the scope of the minor's consent to search. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 700.1, 800, subd. (a).) We disagree and affirm the order of the juvenile court.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
The facts are taken from the evidentiary hearing on the minor's suppression motion.
About 8:30 p.m. on September 5, 2015, while Sacramento Police Officer Lisa Carpenter and her training officer (Officer Lee) were on patrol in a marked patrol car, they saw two men, an adult and the minor, riding bicycles against traffic and without lights in violation of the Vehicle Code. The officers stopped the two bicyclists. The minor identified himself by name and gave his date of birth. Officer Carpenter was unable to locate a record of the minor in the computer system.
Sergeant Ethan Hanson arrived as a backup officer. He thought the minor looked older than 15. The sergeant watched the conversation between the officers and the minor for a short time and he then spoke to the minor. The sergeant asked the minor if he had "any sort of ID." The minor said that he did not. The sergeant asked the minor if he minded if he searched him. The minor asked the sergeant why he was stopped. The sergeant said that he had not made the stop but could think of several reasons and listed the bicycles going against traffic and the lack of a light. The sergeant asked, "Do you mind if I check?" The minor responded, "Nah." To clarify, the sergeant asked, "You don't mind, right?" The minor again said, "Nah." The sergeant and Officer Carpenter interpreted the minor's response as he did not mind being searched and was giving the officer consent to search.
The sergeant reached into the minor's right front pants pocket and found an identification card with the name of "Priscilla." In the minor's left front pants pocket, the sergeant found a small baggie about the size of a penny containing a crystal-like substance that appeared to be methamphetamine, as well as two yellow pills. The sergeant knew when he felt the baggie that it was a baggie but could not identify the contents until he saw it contained a crystal-like substance that appeared to be methamphetamine based on his prior experience. The sergeant did not find any identification for the minor in either pocket.
The patrol car's dashboard camera recorded the interaction between the officers and the minor and the video recording was played during the hearing. The minor did not testify.
The juvenile court ruled: "Appears to me that the resolution of this issue depends on three things. First of all, was the detention lawful? Second, was the consent free and voluntary? And third, did the search exceed the scope of the consent?
"First the detention. It doesn't appear there was much dispute that that was lawful. There were two Vehicle Code violations that were committed giving the officers the authority and ability to conduct a detention.
"And so then referring to the consent, the issue here is whether it was voluntary. And the defense has cited the Crowfoot case. And I think the important part of that case is at Page--I believe it's 722, and there is conversation between the officer and Crowfoot. And Crowfoot is set forth and--in summary, the officer said there were a lot of burglaries in that area where Crowfoot was coming from. And then in--this is a direct quote, 'I told him that he shouldn't have any objections to my looking in the backpack if he weren't doing anything. And I asked what his objection was to my looking in the backpack,' closed quote.
"This is different than the situation we have here. That was a much more confrontational statement and implied that if you don't consent, then you're obviously guilty. Here, Hanson was answering the minor's questions as to why he was stopped. And it was a much different situation.
"Defense pointed out this situation involving the number of officers, the vehicles, the lights, and so on could also be deemed coercive. And to the Court, it appears that the situation was unnerving because these situations are unnerving to anyone who is involved in them as a civilian, but we have to distinguish between what is uncomfortable and that which is coercive. It doesn't appear to the Court that this rose to the level of being coercive. The officers were definitely in charge--that's how they're supposed to behave--and were answering the questions that the minor asked and telling him quite clearly what it was that they wanted to do.
"So as far as the consent is concerned, there don't appear to be any verbal or physical indications that the minor did not consent to the search, nor do there appear to be any verbal or physical indications that he objected to it. It does not appear that it was coercive.
"Finally, then, there's the question of whether the search exceeded the scope of the consent. And the officer is checking in the pockets where an ID is likely to be found. When you feel something that could be contraband, you are justified in removing it. He removed the item from the pocket, and it doesn't appear that this exceeded the scope of the consent. The scope was, can you--in fact, the question was, can I search you? And the response was--well, the question was, would you mind if I search you, and the response was no. So it doesn't appear that the consent was limited to just an ID, that it was to a general search. It doesn't appear that the scope is a real issue.
"So it appears to the Court that the search was lawful and the evidence was properly seized, and so the motion will be denied."
DISCUSSION
The minor contends the juvenile court erroneously denied his suppression motion, arguing Sergeant Hanson exceeded the scope of the minor's consent to search for an identification card or a wallet. He also argues that the sergeant did not testify that he knew immediately by "plain feel" that the baggie was contraband and the baggie could not have felt like an identification card or a wallet. The minor does not challenge the juvenile court's finding that the detention was lawful.
In reviewing the juvenile court's ruling on the minor's suppression motion, we defer to the juvenile court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence and, based thereon, exercise our independent judgment to determine the lawfulness of the search. (People v. Miranda (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 917, 922.)
"The standard for measuring the scope of a suspect's consent under the Fourth Amendment is that of 'objective' reasonableness--what would the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect?" (Florida v. Jimeno (1991) 500 U.S. 248, 251 .) "A consensual search may not legally exceed the scope of the consent supporting it. [Citation.] Whether the search remained within the boundaries of the consent is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of [the] circumstances." (People v. Crenshaw (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1408.)
The juvenile court considered the totality of the circumstances and concluded that the scope of the minor's consent to search his person was not limited. The juvenile court's finding of fact is not "clearly erroneous." (People v. Crenshaw, supra, 9 Cal.App.4th at p. 1408.) The sergeant testified he asked the minor if he (the sergeant) could search the minor's person when the minor was unable to produce any sort of ID. The "typical reasonable person" would have understood that the sergeant wanted to search the minor's person generally and that the scope was not limited to a wallet or identification information.
Since the consent to search was not limited, the sergeant was not limited to looking for identification or a wallet. When he found the identification card for "Priscilla" in one pocket of the minor's pants, it was entirely reasonable for the officer to thoroughly search the other pocket. When the sergeant felt the penny-sized baggie in the other pocket, he pulled it out and discovered a crystal-like substance consistent with methamphetamine. (Ibid.)
The minor relies on Minnesota v. Dickerson (1993) 508 U.S. 366 , but that decision is distinguishable on its facts and the law. The officer was conducting a Terry frisk for weapons and felt a small lump that was obviously not a weapon. The officer manipulated the object and, believing the object was crack cocaine, removed it. Dickerson concluded that the search went beyond the scope of a Terry frisk for weapons because the officer's conduct went beyond touching the item that was not immediately apparent to be contraband. (Id. at pp. 378-379.)
Here, the sergeant was not conducting a Terry frisk for weapons. He was conducting a consent search of the minor's person that was not limited. The juvenile court did not err in denying the minor's suppression motion.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court's order is affirmed.
HULL, Acting P. J. We concur: ROBIE, J. DUARTE, J.