Opinion
B227480
11-04-2011
In re I.C., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. I.C., Defendant and Appellant.
Holly Jackson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Keith H. Borjon and Joseph P. Lee, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. KJ35341)
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Stephanie M. Bowick, Judge. Affirmed.
Holly Jackson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Keith H. Borjon and Joseph P. Lee, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
SUMMARY
I.C., a minor, appeals from the order of wardship (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) entered following a finding that he possessed live ammunition in violation of Penal Code section 12101, subdivision (b)(1), and resisted arrest, in violation of Penal Code section 148, subdivision (a)(1), both misdemeanors. (All subsequent statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted.) I.C. contends his motion to suppress evidence was improperly denied. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
At about 10 p.m. on June 25, 2010, police officer Joe Dolgovin was on patrol in Pomona, California, when he received a radio call referencing the Back Door, a bar located at 1250 East Mission Boulevard. The bar's owner reported her employees had observed a group of five male Hispanics who appeared to be gang members coming into the bar. The employees were concerned because the group kept their hands in their pockets, possibly indicating they possessed weapons. Dolgovin responded to the call. When he was about a block and a half away from the bar, he saw a group of about six male Hispanics dressed in oversized clothing running westbound in a high crime, commercial/residential area, in a direction away from the bar. At that time of night, only one business in the area, a donut shop, was open. Dolgovin attempted to detain the individuals by shining his vehicle's spotlight on them and sounding the vehicle's air horn, but the group continued running. Dolgovin pulled alongside the group, parked the car and got out, identified himself as a police officer, and told everyone to sit down on the curb. The group ran away. ~I.C. was in the group.
Pomona Police Officer, Vanessa Munoz, also responded to the radio call and to Dolgovin's radio report that he was in pursuit of several individuals. Munoz saw appellant hiding under a white Chevy Suburban approximately one block away from the Back Door bar. She ordered him out from beneath the car and told him not to get up. Appellant at first refused to comply. He "squirmed" out from under the car but then looked away from officers and twice attempted to get to his feet, causing the officers to believe he intended to flee. After forcing I.C. to lie flat, Munoz attempted to handcuff him. He resisted, clenching his arms beneath his chest. Appellant was eventually handcuffed and taken into custody.
At the police station, officer Munoz obtained I.C.'s permission to search his cell phone for his mother's phone number. Finding the number, she called his mother and obtained her consent to search I.C.'s room. The search produced a Winchester .22 caliber rifle and several live .22 caliber rounds.
The People filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 alleging that I.C. possessed live ammunition and resisted arrest. I.C. moved to suppress the evidence of ammunition found in his home on the ground that his detention was unreasonable, and any evidence obtained as a result was inadmissible. The trial court denied the motion, finding the detention was reasonable.
The juvenile court sustained the petition on the misdemeanor counts, dismissed the firearm possession count, declared I.C. a ward of the court, and imposed a three-month camp placement term. The court later modified the disposition order by terminating the camp placement order and granting I.C. home probation.
DISCUSSION
I.C. contends the trial court erred in denying his suppression motion because when police detained him they lacked reasonable suspicion to do so. We disagree.
When a trial judge rules on a motion to suppress evidence, he or she must (1) find the historical facts, (2) select the applicable rule of law, and (3) apply the latter to the former to determine whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts is or is not violated. (People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 182.) In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we review the trial court's explicit and implicit factual findings for substantial evidence, then exercise our independent judgment to determine, as a matter of law, whether the search or detention was constitutionally reasonable based upon the evidence supporting the factual findings. (See People v. Loewen (1983) 35 Cal.3d 117, 123; People v. Hester (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 376, 385.) In reviewing the factual findings for substantial evidence, we presume in support of the findings the existence of every fact the trier of fact reasonably could deduce from the evidence, and if the circumstances reasonably justify the findings, we must affirm even if the circumstances and evidence would also support a contrary finding. (See People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 11.) Where neither the facts nor the inferences that may be adduced from them are disputed, we independently determine as a matter of law whether the evidence should have been suppressed. (People v. Woods (1999) 21 Cal.4th 668, 673-674.) The same standard governs review of suppression hearings in juvenile court. (In re Lennies H. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1232, 1236.)
A search without a warrant is presumed to be unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment unless the prosecution can show by a preponderance of the evidence that the search is justified under one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement. (People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 673.) One exception is consent. (People v. Michael (1955) 45 Cal.2d 751, 753 [a search conducted pursuant to voluntary consent does not violate the Constitution].)
Because I.C. consented to the search of his cell phone and his mother consented to the search of his room, both searches were reasonable. (See People v. Munoz (1972) 24 Cal.App.3d 900, 907 [a head of the household may give consent to search a room occupied by another].)
I.C. argues that his initial detention was unlawful, and any subsequent statement or admission by him should be excluded as the fruit of "the" unreasonable seizure. The initial detention was reasonable.
"The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits seizures of persons, including brief investigative stops, when they are 'unreasonable.' [Citations.] Our state Constitution has a similar provision. [Citation.] A seizure occurs whenever a police officer 'by means of physical force or show of authority' restrains the liberty of a person to walk away. [Citation.]" (People v. Souza (1994) 9 Cal.4th 224, 229.) "When are facts known to a police officer constitutionally sufficient to justify a forcible stop? . . . [¶] . . . [¶] A detention is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when the detaining officer can point to specific articulable facts that, considered in light of the totality of the circumstances, provide some objective manifestation that the person detained may be involved in criminal activity." (Id. at pp. 230-231.) Time of night, the crime rate in the area, and flight from approaching police are proper factors to consider in deciding whether in a particular case the officers have sufficient cause to detain, but none of those factors alone, without other facts suggesting criminal conduct, is sufficient. (Id. at pp. 235, 239, 240-242 [holding that officer had reasonable suspicion to detain where, at 3:00 a.m. in an area he knew had a high incidence of burglaries and drug transactions, he saw defendant standing near a parked car apparently talking to someone inside, and when the officer shined his spotlight into the car's interior, two people inside the car ducked out of sight and defendant ran away].)
"[T]he lawfulness of a temporary detention depends not on any one circumstance viewed in isolation, but upon the totality of the circumstances known to the detaining officer[.]" (People v. Souza, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 227.) "The reasonableness of official suspicion is measured by what the officers knew before they acted." (People v. Hester, supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at p. 386.) This particularized suspicion is based on the inferences and deductions a trained police officer, not a lay person, would make regarding the totality of the circumstances based upon probabilities, not hard certainties. (Id. at p. 387, quoting United States v. Cortez (1981) 449 U.S. 411, 418.)
The record provides substantial evidence of specific articulable facts that, considering the totality of the circumstances, gave rise to a reasonable, particularized suspicion that I.C. may have been involved in criminal activity when he was detained. Munoz testified she had been notified that (1) a group of male Hispanics who looked like gang members had entered a bar in a high crime area at night, keeping their hands in their pockets (suggesting they had weapons), and (2) Officer Dolgovin was pursuing a group of male Hispanics who ran in a direction leading away from the bar. Munoz testified she saw appellant hiding under a car parked on the street in a high crime area at night, where few if any businesses were open.
It is not a crime to keep one's hands in one's pockets or to run through a high-crime, semi-deserted commercial-residential district at night, near a location where suspicious activity had been reported, in a direction away from that location, and then to flee from police and hide under a car. There could be an innocent explanation for such behavior. But '"[t]he possibility of an innocent explanation does not deprive the officer of the capacity to entertain a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct.'" (People v. Souza, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 233, quoting In re Tony C. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 888, 894.) "Rather, when circumstances are '"consistent with criminal activity," they permit—even demand—an investigation[.]'" (Ibid.)
Here it appeared to Munoz that I.C. was a member of a group that had surveilled a business, possibly for the purpose of committing an armed robbery, had subsequently run from police, and now hid under a car. Absent evidence to the contrary, we think Munoz was readily able to discern whether I.C.'s behavior was "more indicative of innocent behavior or consciousness of guilt." (In re H.M. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 136, 145.) Munoz justifiably stopped appellant to investigate her reasonable suspicions.
The authorities I.C. cites do not compel a different conclusion. In each, unlike this case, the police detained the appellants after receiving anonymous tips that criminal activity had occurred. (See Florida v. J. L. (2000) 529 U.S. 266; People v. Dolly (2007) 40 Cal.4th 458; In re Richard G. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1252.) The United States Supreme Court in Florida v. J. L. concluded the anonymous tip in that case did not justify the appellant's detention, while the courts in People v. Dolly and In re Richard G. concluded the anonymous reports in those cases did support detention. But the cases are distinguishable because, as I.C. concedes, the phone call to police received here was from a known business owner, not an anonymous tipster. The business owner told police a group of several Hispanic males had entered her bar and acted suspiciously. Officers Munoz and Dolgovin would have been remiss in the performance of their duty had they not investigated a similar group running away from the bar.
The detention was lawful. The court therefore properly denied I.C.'s motion to suppress.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court's order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
CHANEY, J. We concur:
MALLANO, P. J.
ROTHSCHILD, J.