Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County No. 07CF4073, M. Marc Kelly, Judge.
Michael Ian Garey for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Gil Gonzalez, Andrew Mestman and Lynne McGinnis, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
RYLAARSDAM, ACTING P. J.
After the denial of his motion to suppress evidence (Pen. Code, § 1538.5, defendant Nestor Hurtado-Diaz pleaded guilty to transporting methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a)) and possessing it for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378). The court placed him on three years’ probation.
Defendant appeals, contending the court erred at the suppression hearing by refusing to limit the prosecution’s cross-examination of him to the scope of direct examination and by restricting his cross-examination of the deputy who arrested him. He also argues the initial detention was unlawfully prolonged in time, scope, and intensity. We find no error and affirm the judgment.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
At the hearing on the motion to suppress evidence, Deputy Dennis Breckner testified that he conducted a traffic stop of a Jeep that he saw brake abruptly, cross a lane of traffic, and turn right without signaling, causing several cars behind it to apply their brakes and veer left. Breckner found defendant in the driver’s seat and Jorge Nava in the passenger seat. When Breckner explained why he had stopped the vehicle, Nava looked at defendant, said something in Spanish, and then stated he had forgotten about the turn until the last moment.
Defendant produced a Mexican photo identification but no driver’s license, although Nava had one. A records check confirmed defendant was the registered owner of the vehicle but was an unlicensed driver. Defendant and Nava otherwise checked out “clear.”
Upon the arrival of his partner “[s]hortly thereafter,” Breckner asked the two men to step out of the vehicle and sit on the curb. He spoke to them about where they had been that evening and where they were going and inquired if there was anything illegal in the vehicle, to which defendant said no. Breckner requested permission to search the vehicle and defendant responded “yeah, go ahead,” gesturing toward the vehicle. Under the backseat, Breckner found eight ounces of methamphetamine wrapped in individual baggies inside foil.
On cross-examination, Breckner testified that after the records check cleared, he waited about 10-12 minutes for his partner to arrive and the two men were asked to step outside the vehicle. Sometime within the next 10 minutes, he asked for and received permission to search the vehicle and while he was searching it a second backup officer arrived.
Breckner acknowledged he had been directed to defendant’s vehicle by another officer who requested that he “look for a Vehicle Code violation.” The court sustained a relevancy objection to defense counsel’s question whether Breckner understood that upon stopping the vehicle he was to find a basis to search it.
Following Breckner’s testimony, defense counsel sought to call defendant “to the stand, but in an extremely limited area.” Counsel indicated he wanted to ask defendant about the “30 second or 60 second snippet of time” related to “the supposed traffic violation” and requested “the cross-examination be severely limited to that specific issue....” The prosecutor responded that once defendant “testifies, his credibility is at issue, and [he was] entitled to ask him questions about the circumstances, the events.” Denying defendant’s request for a limited cross-examination, the court ruled defendant could testify “for a limited purpose, but it [would] open up... a wide range of cross-examination topics. I don’t think you can really limit that.... So it is [defendant’s] choice if he wants to testify or not....”
Thereafter, the court denied the suppression motion, noting that although Breckner had directions “to look for a traffic violation[,]... [h]e indicated that he did see a traffic violation, while he was looking at that car, and that appears to the court to be probative and credible, based on the fact that other cars needed to brake.” It also determined the detention was not “unnecessarily extended... given the fact [defendant] is not a licensed driver.” As to consent, the court found nothing that would vitiate defendant’s consent to search the vehicle.
DISCUSSION
1. Standard of Review
“‘When reviewing a ruling on an unsuccessful motion to exclude evidence, we defer to the trial court’s factual findings, upholding them if they are supported by substantial evidence, but we then independently review the court’s determination that the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 465.)
2. Evidentiary Rulings at Motion to Suppress
Defendant contends the court erred in restricting his cross-examination of Breckner and denying his request to limit the prosecution’s cross-examination of him. The contentions lack merit.
a. Limitation on Cross-Examination of Breckner
Defendant acknowledges that in Whren v. United States (1996) 517 U.S. 806, 809-811 [116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89], the United States Supreme Court “held that where an officer has a reasonable objective basis to conduct a traffic stop, the fact that he has an ulterior motive to conduct the stop will not render the stop illegal.” Nevertheless, he maintains “an examination into the ulterior motives of the detaining officer is essential in determining the credibility of the evidence upon which the purposed reasonable basis depends (such as the question of whether or not a claimed traffic violation occurred).” We are not persuaded.
Whren explained “the constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops” does not depend on “the actual motivations of the individual officers” (Whren v. United States, supra, 517 U.S. at p. 813) conducting a stop because “[a]s a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred. [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 810; see also People v. Woods (1999) 21 Cal.4th 668, 679-680 [extending Whren’s holding].) In short, “considering pretextual police-citizen encounters in the context of criminal law violations,” “pretext is clearly permissible,” and “‘[s]ubjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Valenzuela (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1202, 1207.)
Here, whether Breckner had another motive and the traffic violation was a pretext for pulling over defendant is immaterial under Whren given Breckner’s testimony that he actually observed the traffic violation and the fact no evidence contradicted this testimony. Accordingly, we must defer to the trial court’s factual finding that there was probable cause for a traffic stop and reject defendant’s contention the initial detention was unlawful.
People v. Rodriguez (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1137, cited by defendant, is inapposite. Rodriguez reversed and remanded for a further evidentiary hearing to determine whether the alleged basis for the stop in that case—a nonfunctioning taillight—was entirely fabricated. (Id. at pp. 1141, 1148-1149.) The evidence in this case does not show wholesale fabrication of probable cause.
b. Denial of Request to Limit Cross-Examination of Defendant
Defendant argues the court’s refusal to limit the prosecution’s cross-examination of him deprived him of his statutory right to “fully litigate” his motion to suppress evidence. We disagree.
“[N]o witness, even a defendant in a criminal case, will be permitted to testify concerning a matter while refusing cross-examination as to the same matter. In such situations the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination as to the subject matter of his direct examination is deemed waived. [Citations.]... ‘[One] cannot reasonably claim that the Fifth Amendment gives him not only this choice [of testifying to his own version of the facts] but, if he elects to testify, an immunity from cross-examination on the matters he has himself put in dispute....’” (People v. Williams (1973) 30 Cal.App.3d 502, 510.) “When a defendant voluntarily testifies in his own defense the People may ‘fully amplify his testimony by inquiring into the facts and circumstances surrounding his assertions, or by introducing evidence through cross-examination which explains or refutes his statements or the inferences which may necessarily be drawn from them.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Harris (1981) 28 Cal.3d 935, 953.)
Defendant has cited no authority for his claim this rule does not apply in suppression hearings. The court thus properly applied the law and advised defense counsel that defendant could testify but that he would be subject to broad cross-examination.
3. Length and Scope of Detention
Defendant asserts “the detention was unlawfully prolonged in time, scope, and intensity.” (Capitalization and bold omitted.) We conclude otherwise.
Although a police officer may stop a motorist for a traffic violation, the detention cannot be prolonged beyond the time period necessary to address the violation. (People v. McGaughran (1979) 25 Cal.3d 577, 584.) There is no set time limit beyond which a detention is automatically deemed unduly prolonged; rather, it depends on the circumstances of each case. (Williams v. Superior Court (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 349, 358.)
Where a vehicle is properly detained, “an officer may ask for and examine the license of the driver and the registration for the vehicle, and may remove the driver from the car in order to do these things. [Citations.] If the driver cannot produce his or her license, or satisfactory proof of identity, or the registration, then the officer may expand the scope of the detention, depending on the circumstances. [Citations.]” (People v. Valencia (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 906, 918.)
Here, defendant produced a Mexican photo identification, but not a driver’s license. A records check confirmed defendant was the registered owner of the vehicle but that he was driving without a license. As the trial court found, defendant’s unlicensed status justified expanding the length and scope of the detention. Breckner testified that after the records check, he waited 10-12 minutes for his partner to arrive and that defendant consented to a search of the car within the next 10 minutes. Under these facts, defendant’s detention was not unduly prolonged in length or scope. Because neither the stop nor detention was unlawful, we reject defendant’s final contention that an unlawful stop and detention vitiates his consent to search the car.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: O’LEARY, J., FYBEL, J.