However, flight is not a material element of proof, since it is at most an incriminating circumstance, and therefore it need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Hurley (2d Dist. 1968), 100 Ill. App.2d 167, 241 N.E.2d 318. The State's evidence showed that defendant fled the scene of the shooting and was arrested in Chicago some three months later.
In fact, this court long ago stated that the word "flight" was "commonly understood as connoting evasive action rather than a mere leaving of the scene." ( People v. Hurley (1968), 100 Ill. App.2d 167, 170.) The accused must be attempting to avoid arrest or detection, actions which imply a consciousness of guilt.
• 6 In addition, in the case before us, evidence of the flight was, "* * * at most an incriminating circumstance and not a material element of proof." ( People v. Hurley, 100 Ill. App.2d 167, 170, 241 N.E.2d 318 citing People v. Alexander, 77 Ill. App.2d 151, 157, 222 N.E.2d 172.) The remaining direct evidence of guilt was strong and convincing beyond reasonable doubt.
See, People v. Brown (1972), 3 Ill. App.3d 1022, 279 N.E.2d 765, 768; People v. Johnson (1966), 75 Ill. App.2d 231, 236-237. • 9 The prosecution emphasizes the fact that there was testimony that the defendant ran from the scene and cites, People v. Agnello (1961), 22 Ill.2d 352, 363; People v. Dukes (1957), 12 Ill.2d 334, 343; People v. Hurley (1968), 100 Ill. App.2d 167, 169-171. All of these cases are distinguishable on the basis that the defendants therein were running from pursuing police, indicating an attempt to evade arrest.