Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, John Conley, Judge. Super. Ct. No. 04SFI383
Martha L. McGill, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Gil Gonzalez and Andrew Mestman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
RYLAARSDAM, ACTING P. J.
A jury found defendant Canis Hunt guilty of attempted premeditated murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 664; all further statutory references are to this code unless otherwise specified; count 1) and first degree residential burglary (§§ 459, 460, subd. (a); count 2). It also found true defendant personally used a knife when committing the two crimes (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)) and that a nonaccomplice was present during commission of the burglary (§ 667.5, subd. (c)(21)). The jury found the allegation he personally inflicted great bodily harm not true. Defendant was sentenced to life in prison with the possibility of parole on count 1 and a concurrent one-year term for use of the knife. The sentence on count 2 was stayed pursuant to section 654.
Defendant raises two issues on appeal: (1) erroneous exclusion of evidence of the victim’s trait of violence deprived him of his right to fully present the defense of self-defense; and (2) the police question as to the location of the knife should have been excluded because he had not been given his Miranda (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694]) warning. We affirm.
FACTS
In 2000 defendant became friends with Rushy Moore, after being introduced to him by Rushy’s then wife, Capazin Moore. At some point in the next few years Rushy lived with defendant for awhile and then resumed living with his wife. In the summer of 2004 Rushy and defendant stopped speaking to each other because, according to Rushy, defendant was having marital and financial problems.
In late December 2004, defendant went to Rushy’s house and accused him of having come into his home and underlining portions of his bible. After Rushy denied it and as defendant was leaving, he told Rushy, “Tell your wife sooner or later she’s going to have to bury you, because I’m coming after you.”
At about the same time, just a few days before Christmas, defendant called Rushy seeking to collect $300 Capazin had borrowed, saying he was broke. Rushy paid him $100 that day and promised to pay $100 the next week. A few days later, defendant went to the Moores’ home to collect the rest of the money. Although Rushy had a $100 bill, he only agreed to give defendant $40. The two went to a grocery store to break the bill, where they did some shopping. Defendant became angry at Rushy when he refused to pay for a few items for him and they had an argument.
The next day defendant returned to the Moore’s home. After Rushy let him into the house, defendant began swearing and again accusing Rushy of coming into his home. Defendant then punched Rushy in the stomach or chest and stabbed him in the chest. When Rushy saw defendant holding a small machete with a foot-long blade, he tried to block it. The knife almost sliced off one finger and cut the tip off another. Rushy attempted to defend himself and get the knife. During the struggle Rushy was again stabbed in his chest.
Capazin heard defendant arrive at their home. Within minutes she heard a “bang” and Rushy said, “Hey, man, what are you doing?” When she heard “scuffling” she looked into the living room and saw defendant holding a knife “jabbing toward” Rushy, who was backing away. She screamed, “what are you doing” and ran into the room. Defendant did not answer but left the house with the knife. As he was leaving he said, “yeah, mother fucker, come to my house.”
After defendant was arrested, he was questioned by police, who videotaped the interview. The tape was played for the jury. Defendant said Rushy “took advantage of [his] friendship” and was part of a plan to steal his identity. He confirmed what happened at the market when Rushy refused to pay for his few items.
He said that when he went to Rushy’s house the day of the incident, when Rushy answered the door, defendant asked, “Where’s money (sic) ?” He also said, “What the shit you do to my house, man? You come—you know, disrespect me, man. You just walk away, leave my house [inaudible]. Just take all my shit and go and make money out of it.”
Defendant said Rushy then began trying to push the front door closed. “So, that’s when I had the knife in my pocket. I take the knife. Fuck, I don’t -- I didn’t – [inaudible] really look forward to hurt Rushy. Rushy’s a huge man . . . . [¶] . . . So, when he’s pushing back I had already take[n] the knife out of my pocket. . . . So, when he pushed . . . - - I pressed the knife, press[ed] the knife right there [inaudible] his chest.” Defendant said Rushy got cut because Rushy pushed forward into the knife. He also said he did not intend to hurt Rushy.
Defendant told police Rushy was 7’2” or 7’3” and weighed 300 pounds. At trial Rushy testified he was 6’7” and weighed 225 pounds. Defendant was about 5’10”. At the time of the attack, Rushy was in his early 50’s; defendant was in his mid-40’s
DISCUSSION
1. Evidence of Rushy’s Character Trait of Violence
a. Procedural Background
Defendant sought to introduce testimony of Rushy’s past violence under Evidence Code section 1103, subdivision (a) to show he acted in self-defense in support of his claim Rushy was the aggressor. Specifically, he wanted to show prior convictions in 1983 and 1991 for distribution of marijuana and possession of a gun. He also wanted to put in evidence Rushy had “assaulted his wife on numerous occasions”; those led to a police report but no charges were filed.
At an Evidence Code section 402 hearing to determine admissibility, Capazin testified she and Rushy had marital problems. In 2000 he had grabbed her by the neck, choked her, and pushed her. She called the police and filed a report and also obtained a restraining order. She did not remember if she had ever told defendant about Rushy’s violence but may have. She was sure she had told him that Rushy had been arrested for whipping or spanking his 16-year-old child. She also had told him about Rushy’s irritability during 2003-2004.
Rushy testified he had told defendant about his arrest and trial for child abuse, where he had been found not guilty, and his prior gun and marijuana convictions. But he denied physically abusing Capazin or telling defendant he had hurt her.
The court ruled the two prior convictions could be admitted as impeachment. It denied admission of the domestic violence evidence under Evidence Code section 352 stating it was too indefinite. The court wanted to avoid a mini trial on a “collateral credibility issue[],” and the probative value of the evidence did not outweigh potential confusion, prejudice, or undue time consumption. It also denied admission under Evidence Code section 1103. At trial Rushy testified to his prior convictions.
b. Evidence Properly Excluded
Defendant asserts that because one of his theories was self-defense, evidence of Rushy’s violent nature was admissible to prove his aggressive behavior at the time of the incident under Evidence Code section 1103, subdivision (a).
That section provides that evidence of a crime victim’s character trait as shown by specific acts may be admitted if defendant offers it “to prove conduct of the victim in conformity with the character or trait of character.” (Evid. Code, § 1103, subd. (a)(1). “‘[W]here self-defense is raised in a homicide case, evidence of the aggressive and violent character of the victim is admissible.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Wright (1985) 39 Cal.3d 576, 587.) In addition, “‘A person claiming self-defense is required to “prove his own frame of mind,” and in so doing is “entitled to corroborate his testimony that he was in fear for his life by proving the reasonableness of such fear.” [Citation.]’” (People v. Minifie (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1055, 1065.)
Even when evidence is admissible under Evidence Code section 1103, it is still subject to the test of Evidence Code section 352, the ground on which the court excluded defendant’s proffer here. (People v. Shoemaker (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 442, 444, 448.) Exclusion under this section is reviewed for abuse of the court’s broad discretion, and “its exercise of that discretion ‘must not be disturbed on appeal except on a showing that the court exercised it[ ] in an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1124-1125.)
Here there was no such abuse of discretion. The evidence about Rushy’s alleged domestic violence was contested and therefore speculative. Had Capazin testified to it, the prosecution would have called Rushy to dispute it. No charges were filed against him, although Capazin testified police “gave her a temporary restraining order . . . .” And even though there was a police report, it noted lack of visible injuries to Capazin. Introduction of this evidence would have resulted in the mini trial on a collateral matter lacking little or any relevance, i.e., whether Rushy abused his wife, that the court anticipated and sought to avoid. (See People v. Geier (2007) 41 Cal.4th 555, 582.) Defendant acknowledges the tangential nature of the evidence and potential for confusion and undue expenditure of time when he argues the jury should have evaluated the conflicting evidence and the credibility of Capazin and Rushy.
In addition, the transcript confirms the court’s fears it would have been time consuming. Rushy’s testimony about the events of the crime itself was protracted because he refused at times to answer questions based on his religious beliefs, even when faced with contempt.
And, in denying admission of the evidence, the court considered that defendant could introduce evidence of Rushy’s violent character with his prior convictions. Further, the transcript of defendant’s police interview was admitted. In that he explained his version of the events, which included a claim Rushy had once threatened him - “while I was driving with him” he told me he was “going to knock me out. Oh yeah, I kick your ass for you . . . .” In the interview defendant also stated he had not intended to harm Rushy, but that defendant had taken out the knife only when Rushy had tried to push the door closed and leaned into the knife.
Additionally, the jury was instructed about the elements of self-defense and the evaluation of the credibility of a witness, including one who has been convicted of a crime.
Moreover, there was sufficient evidence defendant was not acting in self-defense. His explanations about what happened were weak and improbable. In addition to evidence about the stabbing itself from Rushy and Capazin, there was also testimony of defendant’s recent threat to kill Rushy. Finally there was evidence part of the license plate on defendant’s car had been obliterated, raising an inference he had planned to try to hide his identity when leaving Rushy’s home. Thus, even had the evidence been admitted, there is no showing defendant would have achieved a more favorable result. (People v. Hill (1992) 3 Cal.4th 959, 988.)
We also reject defendant’s claim exclusion violated his constitutional right to put on a defense. Although due process requires that a criminal defendant have “‘a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense[]’ [citations]” (Crane v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 683, 690 [106 S.Ct. 2142, 90 L.Ed.2d 636]), this right is not absolute. Courts have “long observed that, ‘[a]s a general matter, the ordinary rules of evidence do not impermissibly infringe on the accused’s [state or federal constitutional] right to present a defense.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Robinson (2005) 37 Cal.4th 592, 626-627, fn. omitted.) The United States Supreme Court has also recognized, “we have never questioned the power of States to exclude evidence through the application of evidentiary rules that themselves serve the interests of fairness and reliability—even if the defendant would prefer to see that evidence admitted. [Citation.]” (Crane v. Kentucky, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 690; accord People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 141-142.)
2. Miranda
Shortly after defendant drove away from Rushy’s house after the crimes, he was stopped by a sheriff who was responding to a bulletin about an assault with a knife. The car defendant was driving matched the one described in the radio broadcast. According to the police report, defendant was “taken into custody” and put into the backseat of the police car. The deputy then asked, “Where’s the knife?” Defendant replied, “The one I stuck him with?” When the deputy said “yes,” defendant told him the knife was in the driver’s side door pocket. There was blood on both the knife and its brown leather sheath they found. Dried blood was also found on the car’s center console.
Defendant made a pretrial motion to suppress his question, “The one I stuck him with?” because he had not been given his Miranda warning. The court denied the motion on the ground the police’s question fell within the public safety exception to Miranda. Defendant claims the exception did not apply under the facts of the case.
Without discussing the public safety exception, it is clear that even if the statement was erroneously admitted, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 [87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705].) The case did not turn on whether defendant had stabbed Rushy; defendant was relying on self-defense. And defendant admitted stabbing Rushy in the police interrogation. Thus, the cumulative evidence of his admission was inconsequential. Even without the statement, there was sufficient other evidence of the crime.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: O’LEARY, J. FYBEL, J.