Opinion
C085131
10-02-2018
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CEDRIC DASHUN HUNT, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 17FE005380)
Defendant Cedric Dashun Hunt and a cohort were arrested after being found in a stolen vehicle with a set of shaved keys for various makes and models of cars and drug paraphernalia. Defendant pleaded no contest to unlawful receipt of a stolen vehicle (Pen. Code, § 496d, subd. (a); statutory section references that follow are to the Penal Code unless otherwise set forth) and admitted a prior conviction for the same offense (§ 666.5, subd. (a)) in exchange for a stipulated three-year split local prison sentence and dismissal of the remaining counts and allegations. The court sentenced defendant to one year in county jail and two years on mandatory supervision.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in ordering him to pay a $40 court security fee (§ 1465.8) and a $30 court facilities assessment (Gov. Code, § 70373) as conditions of his mandatory supervision. He does not challenge the court's authority to impose the fees, but instead claims that the payments are conditions of his mandatory supervision so that the failure to pay could result in revocation of his supervision. We shall modify the judgment to clarify that the court security fee and the court facilities assessment are not conditions of mandatory supervision, but are separate orders of the court. As so modified, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
The following facts are taken from Officer Clayton Whitcomb's testimony at the preliminary hearing.
On the evening of March 21, 2017, Sacramento Police Officer Clayton Whitcomb noticed a stolen black Saturn automobile with nonmatching license plates parked on the street. Codefendant Nancy Elizabeth Valencia was the driver, and defendant was her passenger. At the time, both were on searchable probation. A search of the vehicle revealed a key ring with shaved keys on the driver's seat, a methamphetamine pipe in the glove box, and another methamphetamine pipe in between the passenger's seat and the center console.
Defendant was charged with vehicle theft (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a), count one), unlawful receipt of a stolen vehicle (§ 496d, subd. (a), count two), possession of burglary tools (§ 466, count three), and possession of drug paraphernalia (Health & Saf. Code, § 11364, count four). For counts one and two, it was alleged that defendant had previously been convicted of violating section 496d, subdivision (a) (§ 666.5, subd. (a)).
In July 2017, defendant pleaded no contest to receiving a stolen motor vehicle (§ 496d, subd. (a)), and admitted a prior section 496d conviction (§ 666.5, subd. (a)) in exchange for a split three-year local prison sentence and dismissal of the remaining charges and allegations. Pursuant to the parties' agreement, the court sentenced defendant to three years county jail with one year in custody and two years on mandatory supervision. Defendant appeals.
DISCUSSION
Defendant's sole contention on appeal is that the trial court erred in ordering him to pay a $40 court security fee (§ 1465.8) and a $30 court facilities assessment (Gov. Code, § 70373) as conditions of his mandatory supervision. Respondent contends the trial court did not make the security fee and the facilities assessment conditions of defendant's mandatory supervision. The parties cite dueling portions of the record to support their respective positions. After examining the record, we conclude that it is not clear whether the trial court separately imposed the court security fee and the court facilities assessment or whether it made them a condition of mandatory supervision. We shall therefore modify the judgment to show that the court security fee and the court facilities assessment are not conditions of mandatory supervision.
Section 1465.8 mandates that a trial court impose a fee for every conviction "[t]o assist in funding court operations." (§ 1465.8, subd. (a).) Government Code section 70373 requires a trial court to impose an assessment on every felony conviction "[t]o ensure and maintain funding for court facilities." (Gov. Code, § 70373, subd. (a)(1).) A court may not make either the payment of the court security fee or the court facilities assessment a condition of probation. (People v. Kim (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 836, 842-843.) This is because such fees and assessments, like the cost of probation supervision, are " 'collateral' " to defendant's crime and punishment. (Id. at p. 842.) They are "not oriented toward a defendant's rehabilitation but toward raising revenue for court operations." (Ibid.)
It is well settled that "a defendant may be imprisoned for violating a probation condition, but not for violating an order to pay costs and fees." (People v. Pacheco (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1392, 1403, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Trujillo (2015) 60 Cal.4th 850, 858, fn. 5; People v. Soto (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1219, 1237.) Because mandatory supervision has been characterized as "akin to probation" (People v. Griffis (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 956, 963, fn. 2), payment of the court security fee and the court facilities assessment cannot be made conditions of mandatory supervision.
In this case, the record is unclear as to whether the court properly imposed the fee and assessment as a separate order. A minute order dated July 3, 2017--the date defendant was sentenced-- states that "the first 1 yr(s) 0 mos. shall be served in the CJ [county jail], consecutive; the concluding term of 2 yr(s), 0 mos. shall be on Mandatory Supervision of the Probation Dept. under the terms and conds. listed in the Prob. Rpt. on pgs. 1 to 8 as mod." While the full probation report is not included in the record, it appears a portion of the report, specifically pages one through eight, with the court's handwritten modifications is included. The fees and fines, including the court security fee under section 1465.8 and the court facilities assessment under Government Code section 70373 are listed on page seven. Although the court did not specifically reference the fee and assessment during the sentencing hearing, the court did refer to pages one through seven of the probation report, and imposed, modified, or struck various terms and conditions contained therein.
Considering these two documents together with the court's comments during the sentencing hearing, it is possible that the security fee and the facilities assessment may have been improperly imposed as a condition of mandatory supervision. As such, we shall order that the judgment be modified to clarify that the $40 criminal security fee and the $30 court facilities assessment are separate orders and not conditions of mandatory supervision. (Pacheco, supra, 187 Cal.App.4th at p. 1404.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is modified to clarify that the $40 criminal security fee under Penal Code section 1465.8 and the $30 court facilities assessment under Government Code section 70373 are imposed as a separate order and are not imposed as conditions of mandatory supervision. The clerk of the superior court is directed to correct the minutes accordingly. The judgment as modified is affirmed.
HULL, Acting P. J. We concur: ROBIE, J. HOCH, J.