An original proceeding in contempt against one who had not been admitted to practice in which part of the acts cited were representations "by signs on his office building, and by the designation after his name in the telephone directory as `attorney.'" The Colorado Supreme Court, in People v. Humbert, 86 Colo. 426, 282 P. 263 (1929), found a disbarred attorney who had allowed his name to continue in print in local legal and telephone directories with the designation "lawyer" or "attorney" in contempt and sentenced him to 30 days in jail. Although there was a statute, governing the activities of disbarred attorneys, the court was doubtful that this added anything to prior law. It was said that "[i]n the absence of statute, it would seem clear that one who falsely represents himself as an officer of this court thereby committed a contempt of the court."
In addition, Boyer presented medical evidence tending to mitigate the seriousness of his offense. Under these circumstances, we agree with the PDJ that a period of imprisonment is not warranted. But see People ex rel. Colorado Bar Ass'n v. Humbert, 86 Colo. 426, 427-28, 282 P. 263, 263-64 (1929) (finding that lawyer who allowed his name to continue to appear as an attorney in the city and state directories and the city telephone directory after he was disbarred was in contempt of the supreme court and sentencing him to thirty days in the county jail). The PDJ concluded that a fine was appropriate.
3. Consulting with parties to a lawsuit. See also, State ex rel. Patton, Atty. Gen v. Marron, 22 N.M. 632, 167 P. 9 (1917); In re Phillips, 64 Mont. 492, 210 P. 89 (Mont. 1922); People v. Humbert, 86 Colo. 426, 282 P. 263 (Colo. 1929); State ex rel. Nebraska State Bar v. Butterfield 172 Neb. 645, 111 N.W.2d 543 (1961); In re Hawkins, 81 Wn.2d 504, 503 P.2d 95 (1972). With reference to our category 4 in paragraph preceding, particularly in reference to engaging in much more than clerical work while working for other licensed attorneys, see, Crawford v. State Bar of Calif., 54 Cal.2d 659, 7 Cal.Rptr. 746, 355 P.2d 490 (1960); In re Bodkin, 21 Ill.2d 458, 173 N.E.2d 440 (1961).
The statute makes clear that holding oneself out as entitled to practice law constitutes contempt of an order of suspension. See also People ex rel. Colorado Bar Ass'n v. Humbert, 86 Colo. 426, 282 P. 263 (1929) and State ex rel. Patton v. Marron, 22 N.M. 632, 167 P. 9 (1917), and cases cited therein. [1] The respondent takes the position that no harm resulted from this particular incident, since he rendered no services and charged no fee.
"It is uniformly held that for one to hold himself out as a practicing attorney after he has been disbarred is a contempt of the court which disbarred him." Bowles v. United States, 4 Cir., 50 F.2d 848, 851, certiorari denied 284 U.S. 648, 52 S. Ct. 29, 76 L.Ed. 550. See also: Bowles v. Laws, 59 App.D.C. 399, 45 F.2d 669; In re Lizotte, 32 R.I. 386, 79 A. 960, 35 L.R.A., N.S., 794; In re Duncan, 83 S.C. 186, 65 S.E. 210, 24 L.R.A., N.S., 750; State ex rel. Patton, Atty. Gen. v. Marron, 22 N.M. 632, 167 P. 9, L.R.A. 1918B, 217; People ex rel. Colorado Bar Ass'n v. Humbert, 86 Colo. 426, 282 P. 263; 7 C.J.S., Attorney and Client, § 40, page 814; 5 Am.Jur., Attorneys at Law, § 299, p. 442. The question is thus narrowed to whether the acts and conduct of Page as shown by the evidence amounted to holding himself out as a practicing attorney.