The appellate court reversed and remanded for a new trial. 2013 IL App (1st) 110237, 378 Ill.Dec. 17, 3 N.E.3d 297. It also corrected defendant's mittimus, in the event he should be convicted again.

See People v. Hughes, 2015 IL 117242, ¶¶ 28, 46 ("The dissenting justice concluded the majority had, by reviewing the interrogation and confessions de novo, wandered into fact finding, 'a function incompatible with any recognized standard of review.'" (quoting People v. Hughes, 2013 IL App (1st) 110237, ¶ 97 (Mason, J., dissenting) and citing Hughes, 2013 IL App (1st) 110237, ¶ 117 (Mason, J., dissenting))). Accordingly, on remand, the trial court shall (1) vacate the order granting defendant's motion to suppress, (2) make findings regarding Officer Wortman's testimony and findings regarding the contents of the body camera recording, and (3) enter a new order consistent with those findings and the principles set forth herein.

(Emphasis in original.) In support of this argument defendant cites to People v. Hughes, 2013 IL App (1st) 110237, aff'd in part, rev'd in part 2015 IL 117242; People v. Shaw, 2015 IL App (1st) 123157; and People v. Dixon, 2015 IL App (1st) 133303. ¶ 54 However, while the court in Hughes applied a de novo standard to its review of video evidence, it did so in the context of determining whether a videotaped confession recorded therein was involuntary and should, therefore, be suppressed, a question which is ordinarily reviewed de novo. Hughes, 2013 IL App (1st) 110237, ¶¶ 51, 66. And, while the court in Shaw recognized that a trial court does not occupy a position superior to an appellate court in evaluating evidence that is not live testimony, it did not apply a de novo standard to the video evidence at issue in that case.

¶ 80 Pertinent to the closely-balanced-evidence prong, defendant proposes reasons why it was unrealistic to expect the jury to heed the court's directive to disregard the line of inquiry regarding Lucy's statements to Spayth. None of these is persuasive. First, defendant notes that one of the questions to Lucy was about her alleged statement to Spayth that defendant confessed the crime to her. Here defendant cites People v. Hughes, 2013 IL App (1st) 110237, ¶ 2, where the court noted the incomparable evidentiary force of a confession:"There is nothing more damning than a confession.

See, e.g., United States v. McNeal , 862 F.3d 1057, 1061–62 (10th Cir. 2017) ; United States v. Murphy , 703 F.3d 182, 188–89 (2d Cir. 2012) ; United States v. Prokupek , 632 F.3d 460, 462–63 (8th Cir. 2011) ; Muniz v. Rovira-Martino , 453 F.3d 10, 13 (1st Cir. 2006) ; United States v. Navarro-Camacho , 186 F.3d 701, 707–708 (6th Cir. 1999) ; Robinson v. State , 5 N.E.3d 362, 365–66 (Ind. 2014) ; State v. Williams , 334 S.W.3d 177, 180–82 (Mo. App. 2011) ; State v. Elders , 192 N.J. 224, 244–45, 927 A.2d 1250 (2007) ; Montanez v. State , 195 S.W.3d 101, 109 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). But see, e.g., People v. Hughes , 378 Ill.Dec. 17, 3 N.E.3d 297, 312–13 (Ill. App. 2013), rev'd in part on other grounds, 410 Ill.Dec. 246, 69 N.E.3d 791 (Ill. 2015) ; Commonwealth v. Novo , 442 Mass. 262, 266, 812 N.E.2d 1169 (2004) ; State v. Binette , 33 S.W.3d 215, 217 (Tenn. 2000). Turning to the substantive question of voluntariness, because the totality of the circumstances test "depend[s] [on] a weighing of the circumstances of pressure against the power of resistance of the person confessing"; (internal quotation marks omitted) Dickerson v. United States , 530 U.S. 428, 434, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 147 L. Ed. 2d 405 (2000) ; we begin by addressing the circumstances of the interrogation before turning to the defendant's personal characteristics and the extent to which they enabled him to resist the pressures imposed on him. Applying this method, and having carefully reviewed the video recording of the interrogation and transcript thereof, we conclude that the trial court correctly determined that the state met its burden of establishing the voluntariness of the defendan

Other state courts favor a de novo review. See, e.g., People v. Hughes, 3 N.E.3d 297, 313 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013) (stating that appellate court's "eyes are just as functional a[s] the trial court's" in reviewing video evidence evaluated in making suppression ruling), appeal denied, 5 N.E.3d 1126 (Ill. 2014); Commonwealth v. Novo, 812 N.E.2d 1169, 1173 (Mass. 2004) (reviewing video evidence de novo and stating that "lower court findings based on documentary evidence available to an appellate court are not entitled to deference"); State v. Binette, 33 S.W.3d 215, 217 (Tenn. 2000) ("[W]hen a court's findings of fact at a suppression hearing are based solely on evidence that does not involve issues of credibility, such as the videotape evidence in this case, the rationale underlying a more deferential standard of review is not implicated.").

Other state courts favor a de novo review. See, e.g., People v. Hughes, 378 Ill.Dec. 17, 3 N.E.3d 297, 313 (Ill.App.Ct.2013) (stating that appellate court's “eyes are just as functional a[s] the trial court's” in reviewing video evidence evaluated in making suppression ruling), appeal denied, 379 Ill.Dec. 17, 5 N.E.3d 1126 (2014); Commonwealth v. Novo, 442 Mass. 262, 812 N.E.2d 1169, 1173 (2004) (reviewing video evidence de novo and stating that “lower court findings based on documentary evidence available to an appellate court are not entitled to deference”); State v. Binette, 33 S.W.3d 215, 217 (Tenn.2000) (“[W]hen a court's findings of fact at a suppression hearing are based solely on evidence that does not involve issues of credibility, such as the videotape evidence in this case, the rationale underlying a more deferential standard of review is not implicated.”).

Other state courts favor a de novo review. See, e.g., People v. Hughes, 378 Ill.Dec. 17, 3 N.E. 3d 297, 313 (Ill.App.Ct.2013) (stating that appellate court's “eyes are just as functional a[s] the trial court's” in reviewing video evidence evaluated in making suppression ruling), appeal denied, 379 Ill.Dec. 17, 5 N.E. 3d 1126 (2014) ; Commonwealth v. Novo, 442 Mass. 262, 812 N.E. 2d 1169, 1173 (2004) (reviewing video evidence de novo and stating that “lower court findings based on documentary evidence available to an appellate court are not entitled to deference”); State v. Binette, 33 S.W. 3d 215, 217 (Tenn.2000) (“[W]hen a court's findings of fact at a suppression hearing are based solely on evidence that does not involve issues of credibility, such as the videotape evidence in this case, the rationale underlying a more deferential standard of review is not implicated.”).

People v. Cavinaugh HughesLower Court: 2013 IL App (1st) 110237, 378 Ill.Dec. 17, 3 N.E.3d 297 Disposition: Denied.

; instead, it is treated as a mechanical eavesdropper with an identity of its own, separate and apart from the voices recorded." People v. Griffin, 375 Ill. App. 3d 564, 570-71 (2007); People v. Theis, 2011 IL App (2d) 091080, ¶ 33 (same); People v. Hughes, 2013 IL App (1st) 110237, ¶ 65, aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 2015 IL 117242, ¶ 65 (same).