Opinion
May 20, 1991
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Queens County (Savarese, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant contends that he was denied his statutory right to a speedy trial. We disagree. The periods of delay directly resulting from the defendant's pretrial motion are not chargeable to the People (see, CPL 30.30 [a], [b]; People v Worley, 66 N.Y.2d 523, 527; People v Erts, 141 A.D.2d 665), nor are the delays to which the defendant failed to object, including the 41 days between the defendant's arraignment and his first scheduled court date which the trial court erroneously attributed to the People (see, People v Pappas, 128 A.D.2d 556; People v Gaggi, 104 A.D.2d 422). The total time properly chargeable to the People in this case was within the permitted six calendar months (see, e.g., People v Jones, 105 A.D.2d 179, 188, affd 66 N.Y.2d 529). Accordingly, the defendant's motion to dismiss pursuant to CPL 30.30 was properly denied.
Finally, we conclude that certain statements made by the prosecutor during his summation do not warrant reversal. The proof of the defendant's guilt on the reckless endangerment charge was overwhelming and, given his acquittal on the other two charges, there was no significant probability that the complained-of remarks affected the jury's verdict (see, People v Scott, 138 A.D.2d 421). Kunzeman, J.P., Balletta, Miller and O'Brien, JJ., concur.