Defendant correctly notes testimony by an informant who himself abuses unlawful substances and who participates in an undercover operation to minimize punishment for his own illegal activity should be closely scrutinized. ( People v. Perkins (1962), 26 Ill.2d 230, 234, 186 N.E.2d 330, 332; People v. Huffman (1988), 177 Ill. App.3d 713, 723, 532 N.E.2d 556, 562.) Brinks admitted using cocaine on a weekly basis and previously sought treatment for a daily addiction. He also testified he contacted law enforcement authorities to assist in an undercover operation so that he could obtain a dismissal of a pending traffic charge.
Furthermore, recent decisions have held that it is not error to refuse to give a tendered addict instruction. (See, e.g., People v. Huffman (1988), 177 Ill. App.3d 713, 727-28; People v. West (1987), 156 Ill. App.3d 608, 612; People v. Rollins (1982), 108 Ill. App.3d 480, 488.) "Jurors do not leave their common sense behind when they enter court, and even in the absence of cautionary instructions they will ordinarily be aware of the factors which make some witnesses unreliable."
Moreover, as Steidl pointed out, although a defendant is allowed to cross-examine witnesses regarding drug use, a trial court is not required to instruct the jury on the unreliability of a drug addict's testimony. People v. Armstrong, 183 Ill.2d 130, 146 (1998); People v. Huffman, 177 Ill.App.3d 713, 725-28 (1988). As the Steidl court observed," 'Jurors do not leave their common sense behind when they enter court, and even in the absence of cautionary instructions they will ordinarily be aware of the factors which make some witnesses unreliable.
"[T]he fact a witness is a *** narcotics addict has an important bearing on his credibility." People v. Huffman, 177 Ill. App. 3d 713, 723 (1988). The jury must assess the credibility and the weight of testimony.
1998) (addressing whether the district court erred in admitting an unavailable witness's sentencing hearing transcript into evidence under a hearsay exception); State v. Maldonado, 322 N.W.2d 349, 351 (Minn. 1982) (discussing, in the probable cause context, the difference between citizen informers and other types of informers). And, in an unpublished opinion, this court expressly declined to follow the out-of-state case law that Keezer claims Minnesota has joined.State v. Robinson, No. CX-02-662, 2003 WL 42175 (Minn. App. Jan. 7, 2003) (declining to follow People v. Huffman, 532 N.E.2d 556, 562 (Ill. Ct. App. 1988), and State v. Johnson, 627 N.W.2d 753, 763 (Neb. 2001)). As we noted above, the Minnesota Supreme Court has held that the weight and credibility of an individual witness is for the jury to determine.
"[T]he fact a witness is a * * * narcotics addict has an important bearing on his credibility." People v. Huffman , 177 Ill. App. 3d 713, 723, 126 Ill.Dec. 871, 532 N.E.2d 556 (1988). The jury must assess the credibility and the weight of testimony.
Id. ¶ 50 We note that no Illinois cases have specifically held that a circuit court has erred in failing to give a proposed instruction regarding the effect of a witness's drug addiction on his or her credibility. People v. Huffman, 177 Ill. App. 3d 713, 727 (1988). In fact, a court is not required to instruct the jury on the unreliability of testimony by drug addicts.
¶ 24 Defendant acknowledges that in Steidl, 142 Ill. 2d at 239, Armstrong, 183 Ill. 2d at 146, People v. Adams, 109 Ill. 2d 102, 123 (1985), People v. Iniguez, 361 Ill. App. 3d 807, 815 (2005), People v. Huffman, 177 Ill. App. 3d 713, 728 (1988), and People v. West, 156 Ill. App. 3d 608, 612 (1987), the reviewing court held that a trial court's refusal to tender an addict instruction to the jury is proper where evidence of the addiction is before the jury. However, he argues that in this case the defense's jury instruction concerning how drugs affected the drug-addicted witness's credibility was warranted because the case involved not one, but two witnesses who were under the influence of crack cocaine and the testimony of both were littered with inconsistencies.
In support of such a rule, appellant cites to caselaw and statutes from other jurisdictions. See People v. Huffman, 532 N.E.2d 556, 562 (Ill.App.Ct. 1988); State v. Johnson, 627 N.W.2d 753, 762-65 (Neb. 2001) (citing Nebraska statute requiring corroboration of "cooperative individual"). But Minnesota has adopted no such requirement with respect to informant testimony.
Plemmons' testimony that he finally came forward with the information because he believed that the defendant had lied to him about "what happened to his wife Beverly" could have raised a number of inferences, the least logical of which is that the defendant was somehow responsible for her death. Based on our finding that Plemmons' testimony did not create a natural inference that the defendant had killed his wife, there is no evidence of a collateral crime at issue. See People v. Huffman, 177 Ill.App.3d 713, 126 Ill.Dec. 871, 532 N.E.2d 556 (1988) We also reject the defendant's contention that "[i]t was entirely unnecessary for the State to elicit testimony regarding Beverly's death in explaining why Plemmons waited so long to tell his story." Defense counsel stated in his opening argument that Plemmons' motivation for testifying was to "get the deal that he wanted" from the government with respect to a pending fraud charge.