Opinion
D069552
02-15-2017
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DAVID HUERTA, Defendant and Appellant.
Stephen M. Hinkle, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Peter Quon, Jr., and Randall D. Einhorn, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. SCD189649) APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Amalia L. Meza, Judge. Affirmed. Stephen M. Hinkle, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Peter Quon, Jr., and Randall D. Einhorn, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
During a gang-related brawl between David Huerta and his companions on the one hand, and the murder victim in this case—Javier H. (Javier)—and his companions on the other, Huerta repeatedly stabbed Javier, who died of his wounds. A jury found Huerta guilty of second degree murder (count 1: Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)) and assault with a deadly weapon (count 2: § 245, subd. (a)(1)). On November 6, 2015, the trial court sentenced Huerta to a determinate three-year middle prison term for his assault conviction, plus a consecutive indeterminate term of 15 years to life for his second degree murder conviction, for an aggregate prison term of three years plus 15 years to life.
Effective January 1, 2017, rule 8.90(b) of the California Rules of Court requires appellate courts to "consider referring to" certain individuals "by first name and last initial or, if the first name is unusual or other circumstances would defeat the objective of anonymity, by initials only" to protect those individuals' privacy. The list of people to whom this rule applies includes victims of crimes. (Rule 8.90(b)(4).) After consideration, we refer to the victim by his first name and last initial, and thereafter by his first name only, to provide some measure of anonymity.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
On appeal, Huerta contends his second degree murder conviction must be reversed because the court prejudicially erred by failing to instruct the jury sua sponte on (1) voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of murder based on the theory of imperfect self-defense, and (2) the defense of self-defense. We affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. The People's Case
On March 5, 2005, Yvonne Guerrero (Guerrero) hosted an evening party in her family's two-bedroom apartment in San Diego. Guerrero's friend, Paulina Via Cava (Cava); Guerrero's two sisters; and some friends of Guerrero's sisters were also in the apartment. At Guerrero's invitation, her friend, Jose "Urbn" Alarid (Jose), and four male companions (collectively Jose's group) came over to the apartment. Specifically, Jose's group of five males consisted of (1) Jose; (2) Jose's brother, Anthony "Teaser" Alarid (Anthony); (3) a friend named Jose "Frankie" or "Wacko" Perez (Perez); (4) Perez's brother, Arturo "Whore" Avina (Avina); and (5) Huerta, who introduced himself to Guerrero as "Carlos," and whom the other members of Jose's group called "Craft."
Later that night, sometime after midnight, the victim in this case, Javier, telephoned the apartment and asked to talk to Guerrero. Guerrero's friend Cava answered the phone for her. Because Guerrero knew that Javier did not know Jose and Jose's companions, and because she knew Javier was with two companions—gang members Arthur Torres (Torres) and Jesse Franklin (Franklin)—who were troublemakers, she did not tell Javier about the party, and she asked Cava to hang up because she (Guerrero) already had some people over. Guerrero was aware that Javier, Torres, and Franklin were known to spray mace in people's faces because they thought it was funny.
Later, when someone started banging on the front door of the apartment, Guerrero became very nervous, she made sure the doors were locked, and she told the people in the apartment not to open the front door. Despite her request, someone inside opened the door. Guerrero saw that Javier, Torres, and Franklin (collectively Javier's group) were standing outside the door. They never entered the apartment.
After the apartment door opened, Jose's group (Huerta, Jose, Anthony, Perez, and Avina) and Javier's group (Javier, Torres, and Franklin) began arguing confrontationally back and forth. Jose's group and Javier's group were from different areas of the city. Guerrero testified that she knew Javier's group "were pretty cocky about where they came from and making a name for themselves as bullies." Guerrero heard both groups saying, "Where you from?" and "What's up?", which she thought meant gang activity. Guerrero heard the two groups exchange challenges to fight with each other and the confrontation escalated to the point that Javier's group challenged Jose's group to come out of the apartment to fight.
Guerrero testified that Jose's initial attitude was to try to "just work this out" to avoid a further escalation. However, the other males in Jose's group wanted to go out of the apartment to fight Javier's group. Eventually, those other members of Jose's group, including Huerta, prevailed and exited the apartment to confront Javier's group, and Jose followed. Javier's group went downstairs first, and then Huerta and the others in Jose's group followed Javier's group down to the bottom of the stairs.
Guerrero, who was at the top of the stairs during the incident, did not see who or what started the fight that followed, but she knew Javier's group had a history of pepper spraying people, and she saw "hand movement coming from [Torres]," who was in Javier's group, and she knew Jose was pepper sprayed. According to Guerrero, some lighting was provided by street lights and a light on the top corner of the apartment. Guerrero testified, "I saw [Torres] make some gestures which was hi[s] spraying [Jose]" at the beginning of the altercation. Guerrero also testified that Jose fell to the ground after Torres pepper sprayed him, Jose's group began fighting with Javier's group, and the altercation turned into a "brawl." Guerrero did not see anyone brandish a knife that night.
At trial Franklin and Torres recalled that when Javier knocked on the apartment door and the door opened, they exchanged verbal challenges with the males inside the apartment. After that exchange, Javier's group and Jose's group went down to the apartment parking lot and fought each other at the bottom of the stairs.
Franklin testified that while he was fighting someone near the stairs, another man stabbed him (Franklin) in the back. After he was stabbed, Franklin ran to his truck, which he had parked on the street, and then drove back to the apartment parking lot to find Javier and Torres. Franklin saw Javier on the ground surrounded by a group of people standing close to him. When Franklin honked the horn of his truck, the people near Javier ran away in different directions. Franklin got out of his truck and approached Javier, who was bleeding and breathing heavily.
Following the incident later that night, Torres told Detective Kenneth Brown at the scene that a person wearing a brown hat with lettering hit him from behind, pulled out a knife, and threatened him with it while he (Torres) was fighting another guy. Torres ran from the person holding the knife. During the interview, Detective Brown observed that the knife sheath on Torres's belt was empty. When Detective Brown asked about the empty knife sheath, Torres speculated that his knife fell out of the sheath when he got out of the car before the fighting began.
Torres testified that, before he started to run away, he saw Javier disappear behind a dumpster or a truck. Torres testified he "loop[ed] around" the apartments and, when he came back to where he had seen Javier disappear, he found Javier bleeding and still moving.
Denise Quarter, one of Guerrero's sisters in the apartment that night, stood at a window and saw someone pull Javier, who seemed to be walking away, behind a trash dumpster and out of her view.
When Guerrero and Cava exited the apartment and went downstairs, they found Javier lying on the ground and bleeding behind the dumpster. Javier was alone when Guerrero found him there; Franklin and Torres were with Javier when Cava arrived there. No one from Jose's group, including Huerta, was present.
Cava testified that a person who identified himself as "Carlos" had been bothering her at the party before Javier's group knocked on the apartment door. She also testified that she later told an officer that when "Carlos" left the apartment to fight Javier's group, he (Carlos) "pulled out" a "shiny" object and held it in his hand. She told the officer she thought the shiny object was a knife. She described Carlos to the officer as a Hispanic male who was about 20 years of age, five feet 10 inches tall, of medium build, and wearing a blue or black baseball hat with white "SD" letters on it. Cava told the officer she thought the hat was a San Diego Padres hat. Cava selected Huerta's picture from a photo lineup as the person she knew as Carlos.
Anna Rivera testified that, after the stabbing, she talked to Jeromey Gierat, who was acting "kind of nervous" and scared and told her that some guys he had been with had gotten into a fight. Gierat told Rivera that a group of people followed him to his apartment after the fight and wanted to use his telephone. Gierat also told her that one of the people who wanted to use his phone was a man he knew as "Craft" and that Craft had stabbed another person that night.
Other witnesses testified that "Craft" was one of Huerta's nicknames.
Leticia Silvas also talked to an investigating officer about the stabbing, and her recorded (and transcribed) interview on March 6, 2005, was played for the jurors, who were given copies of the transcript. In that interview, Silvas told the officer that, after the stabbing occurred, she overheard "Carlos" (Huerta)—who she said was "wearing [an] SD hat"—and "Urbin" (Jose) brag to one another about how each of them stabbed a person. Silvas indicated that what began as "one on one" fighting became a brawl when one of the three men who arrived at the apartment (Javier's group) began spraying people with mace. Silvas said that she saw Craft (Huerta), Urbin (Jose), Teaser (Anthony), Arturo (Avina), and Wacko (Perez) attack a "short guy" (Javier) and repeatedly kick him. When that was happening, she did not see anyone stab the "short guy." Silvas also said that, a short time later, she saw the group of men run after Javier, who was saying, "fuck you, fuck you"; and she saw the group catch him, start hitting him, and what she described as "shank[ing]" (stabbing) him. Silvas then ran away.
Jose's group.
On March 8, 2005, Silvas was interviewed again and that interview was video-recorded and transcribed. The recording was played for the jury. Altering her prior statement to the officers, Silvas indicated that she did not see Huerta among the group of men who repeatedly kicked Javier and that she sensed Huerta felt bad about Javier being stabbed.
Jonathan Lucas, M.D., a forensic pathologist, testified that he performed an autopsy on Javier. He found that Javier suffered 29 stab or sharp-force wounds and punctures to his chest and abdomen that struck several internal organs. Javier had abrasions and contusions to his head and face. One of the stab wounds was between two-and-one-half and four inches deep, and another was between four and six inches deep. Dr. Lucas opined that the stab wounds to Javier's torso caused him to bleed to death.
San Diego Police Detective Michael Lambert was dispatched to the scene of the stabbing and was assigned the task of investigating the incident. He was told by potential witnesses that Huerta left the San Diego area and traveled into Mexico. An arrest warrant for Huerta was issued by a judge in the United States in April 2005. Huerta was taken into custody in 2014 by Mexican authorities and turned over to United States authorities.
B. Defense
Huerta did not testify and the defense did not present any witnesses.
DISCUSSION
I. INSTRUCTIONAL ERROR (IMPERFECT SELF-DEFENSE)
Huerta first contends his second degree murder conviction must be reversed because the court prejudicially erred by failing to instruct the jury sua sponte under CALCRIM No. 571 on voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of murder based on the theory of imperfect self-defense. In support of his claim of instructional error, Huerta asserts the court erred in "ma[king] a finding there was . . . insufficient evidence that [he] harbored the actual but unreasonable belief in the need for self defense." Relying principally on evidence of a statement that Silvas gave to the police after the incident, Huerta maintains that "the trial record contains sufficient evidence that [he] harbored the actual but unreasonable belief that he stabbed [Javier] while defending himself." Acknowledging that his trial counsel agreed during the jury instructions conference with the court's decision not to give an instruction on voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of murder based on the theory of imperfect self-defense, Huerta also contends his claim of instructional error is not barred under the doctrine of invited error.
Silvas indicated in her recorded and transcribed interview on March 6, 2005, that (among other things) she overheard "Urbin" (Jose) and "Carlos" (Huerta) talking after the incident, Urbin said he took a "shank" from a "guy" and both Urbin and Carlos bragged to one another about how each of them stabbed a person.
In response the Attorney General asserts two principal arguments: (1) the court did not err because, as Huerta's trial counsel recognized, insufficient evidence was presented to warrant the giving of an instruction under CALCRIM No. 571; and (2) "[a]ssuming any error, [Huerta's] claim is barred under the doctrine of invited error" because Huerta's counsel "deliberately did not ask the court to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter based on an imperfect self-defense theory," and Huerta's counsel "had a definite tactical, and pragmatic, reason for asking that the jury not be read CALCRIM No. 571."
Specifically, the Attorney General asserts that "[n]o substantial evidence was presented showing [Huerta] stabbed [Javier] as a reaction to his belief that he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily injury."
For reasons we shall explain, we conclude the invited error doctrine bars Huerta's claim of instructional error.
A. Background
During the jury instructions conference, the court discussed with the prosecutor and Huerta's counsel whether the court should instruct the jury under CALCRIM No. 570 on voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of murder based on the defense theory of heat of passion or sudden quarrel. The court indicated it would have a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury on the law of voluntary manslaughter if substantial evidence supported either of the two theories of voluntary manslaughter: (1) heat of passion or sudden quarrel (see CALCRIM No. 570), and (2) imperfect self-defense or imperfect defense of another (see CALCRIM No. 571).
Defense counsel responded that he was not requesting an instruction on voluntary manslaughter under either of those two theories, and that the court had no sua sponte duty to give such an instruction, because the evidence was not substantial "in any way concerning heat of passion or imperfect self-defense." Huerta's counsel expressed a tactical reason for not requesting a voluntary manslaughter instruction:
"Your Honor, there hasn't really been any evidence of any type of provocation such that would allow any reasonable argument for voluntary manslaughter. I know that . . . you could say there was a sudden quarrel, but . . . that's not really the theory that we're arguing, and I just think it would further confuse the jury so that's not something that we're proposing as an instruction." (Italics added.)
Shortly thereafter the court replied that it thought it "ha[d] a sua sponte duty to give [CALCRIM No. 570]." The court indicated it had such a duty if there was substantial evidence that Huerta killed the victim because of a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion. The court then stated that "the evidence is that the victim['s] group arrived at the apartment, words were exchanged, and there was a brawl, so I think I've got to give [CALCRIM No. 570]."
The prosecutor responded by indicating that the evidence supported the giving of a voluntary manslaughter instruction under CALCRIM No. 570 based on the theory of heat of passion or sudden quarrel, but that the court should not give CALCRIM No. 571 based on the theory of imperfect self-defense or imperfect defense of another because the evidence did not support that theory. The prosecutor also indicated that, under CALCRIM No. 571, proof of imperfect self-defense or imperfect defense of another required evidence showing the defendant actually believed he or someone else was in imminent danger of being killed or suffering great bodily injury. The prosecutor argued that, "under any . . . reading of the evidence," the evidence was insufficient to warrant the giving of CALCRIM No. 571 because no evidence had been presented to show Huerta harbored such belief.
The court then asked defense counsel, "What's your position with regard to imperfect self-defense?"
Defense counsel agreed with the prosecutor that the evidence supported the giving of a voluntary manslaughter instruction under CALCRIM No. 570 based on the theory of heat of passion or sudden quarrel, but argued that the court should not give a voluntary manslaughter instruction under CALCRIM No. 571 based on the theory of imperfect self-defense or imperfect defense of another. Specifically, defense counsel told the court:
"Well, I'm in agreement with the People. If the Court is going to instruct on voluntary manslaughter, I do believe it should be [under CALCRIM No.] 570 versus [CALCRIM No.] 571 just based on the evidence and the Court's discussion of the facts in terms of there being enough evidence of a sudden quarrel versus there being any evidence that [Huerta] acted in self-defense or defense of others."
In response the court stated, "Or was in imminent danger of being killed or suffering great bodily injury. I don't think there was evidence that [Huerta] ever was. Do both sides agree?" The prosecutor replied, "Yes." Defense counsel replied, "Yes, Your Honor."
1. Court's rulings
The court found the evidence was insufficient to warrant the giving of a voluntary manslaughter instruction under CALCRIM No. 571 based on the theory of imperfect self-defense or imperfect defense of another. However, the court also ruled it would instruct the jury under CALCRIM No. 570 based on the theory of heat of passion or sudden quarrel. The court later read CALCRIM No. 570 to the jury.
B. Analysis
"A court must generally instruct the jury on lesser included offenses whenever the evidence warrants the instructions, whether or not the parties want it to do so." (People v. Horning (2004) 34 Cal.4th 871, 904-905 (Horning).) "[W]hen a defendant is charged with murder the trial court's duty to instruct sua sponte, or on its own initiative, on unreasonable self-defense is the same as its duty to instruct on any other lesser included offense: this duty arises whenever the evidence is such that a jury could reasonably conclude that the defendant killed the victim in the unreasonable but good faith belief in having to act in self-defense." (People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 201 (Barton).)
Here, we need not decide whether the evidence warranted an instruction under CALCRIM No. 571 on voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of murder based on based on the theory of imperfect (unreasonable) self-defense or defense of another because, even if we were to assume the court erred in finding the evidence was insufficient to warrant such an instruction, the defense invited any error and the doctrine of invited error bars Huerta's claim of instructional error.
See Horning, supra, 34 Cal.4th at page 905 ["[w]e need not decide whether the evidence warranted an instruction on second degree murder in this case because we find any error . . . invited"]; see also People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 827 (Cooper) [no need to decide whether the trial court had a sua sponte duty to instruct on a lesser included offense "because even if there was error, defendant is barred from asserting it under the invited error doctrine"].)
In Barton, supra, 12 Cal.4th at page 198, the California Supreme Court explained that "a defendant may not invoke a trial court's failure to instruct on a lesser included offense as a basis on which to reverse a conviction when, for tactical reasons, the defendant persuades a trial court not to instruct on a lesser included offense supported by the evidence. [Citations.] In that situation, the doctrine of invited error bars the defendant from challenging on appeal the trial court's failure to give the instruction."
In Cooper, supra, 53 Cal.3d at page 831, the Supreme Court explained that for the invited error doctrine to apply, "the record must show only that counsel made a conscious, deliberate tactical choice between having the instruction and not having it. If counsel was ignorant of the choice, or mistakenly believed the court was not giving it to counsel, invited error will not be found. If, however, the record shows this conscious choice, it need not additionally show counsel correctly understood all the legal implications of the tactical choice. Error is invited if counsel made a conscious tactical choice. A claim that the tactical choice was uninformed or otherwise incompetent must, like any such claim, be treated as one of ineffective assistance of counsel." (Italics added.)
Here, assuming without deciding or suggesting that the evidence warranted the giving of CALCRIM No. 571, we conclude the doctrine of invited error bars Huerta's claim on appeal that his conviction of second degree murder should be reversed on the ground the court prejudicially erred by failing to give that instruction on its own initiative. The doctrine of invited error applies because the record shows Huerta's trial counsel made a conscious and deliberate tactical choice to join the prosecutor in asking that the court not give a voluntary manslaughter instruction under CALCRIM No. 571. (See Cooper, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 831 ["the record must show only that counsel made a conscious, deliberate tactical choice between having the instruction and not having it"].) Given the substantial discussion between the court and both counsel during the jury instructions conference about whether the court should give CALCRIM No. 571, Huerta's counsel was fully aware of the choice "between having the instruction and not having it" (Cooper, at p. 831). The record also establishes that defense counsel deliberately made this conscious choice not to request a voluntary manslaughter instruction for a tactical reason. Huerta's counsel opposed the giving of CALCRIM No. 570, as the court later acknowledged during the conference when it said, "I understand the defense does not want it." As noted, Huerta's counsel told the court during the jury instructions conference that he was not requesting a voluntary manslaughter instruction because the evidence did not support it, the defense was not "arguing" a voluntary manslaughter theory, and such an instruction "would further confuse the jury." The record further demonstrates that Huerta's principal defense at trial was that there was no evidence he murdered Javier by stabbing him. This is shown by that fact that, during his closing argument, defense counsel told the jury that "there just has not been any solid proof of who [stabbed Javier to death]" and "there just wasn't any credible evidence in terms of who did what." Huerta's counsel also told the jury that "the [prosecutor's] theories are not evidence" and "[t]here was practically zero evidence connecting Mr. Huerta to the murder in this case."
The record thus demonstrates that defense counsel made a conscious and deliberate tactical choice not to request a voluntary manslaughter instruction under CALCRIM No. 571 because (1) the theory of the defense was that Huerta did not stab and kill Javier; (2) such an instruction would be inconsistent with his defense that he did not kill Javier, and it would confuse the jury; and (3) the court already had indicated it was going to give the jury a voluntary manslaughter instruction under CALCRIM No. 570 based on the theory of heat of passion or sudden quarrel, which (like CALCRIM No. 571) was inconsistent with the defense theory that Huerta did not stab Javier to death.
Furthermore, "[a] claim that the tactical choice was uninformed or otherwise incompetent must, like any such claim, be treated as one of ineffective assistance of counsel." (Cooper, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 831.) Here, Huerta was not without a possible remedy if his counsel acted incompetently because Huerta could have claimed he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Huerta, however, does not claim on appeal that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance.
For all of the foregoing reasons, we conclude Huerta's claim of instructional error is barred by the doctrine of invited error.
II. INSTRUCTIONAL ERROR (SELF-DEFENSE)
Huerta also contends his second degree murder conviction must be reversed because the court prejudicially erred by failing to instruct the jury sua sponte on the defense of self-defense. Specifically, he contends the court erred by failing to instruct the jury on its own initiative on the defense of self-defense under both CALCRIM No. 505 ("Justifiable Homicide; Self-Defense or Defense of Another") and CALCRIM No. 3471 ("Right to Self-Defense: Mutual Combat or Initial Aggressor"). In support of this contention, Huerta maintains the evidence supports "[a] reasonable inference . . . that [the victim (Javier)] was armed with a knife, and that the fistfight escalated into a battle with knives, where [he (Huerta)] was trying to defend himself." Suggesting his trial counsel may have provided ineffective assistance by "mistaken[ly]" choosing not to request a self-defense instruction, Huerta also maintains this claim of instructional error is not barred by the doctrine of invited error because "there was no possible tactical reason" for not requesting such an instruction.
Although Huerta suggests his trial counsel may have provided ineffective assistance, he does not claim his second degree murder conviction should be reversed on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel. --------
We conclude Huerta's claim of instructional error is unavailing. A trial court is "obligated to instruct the jury on all general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence, whether or not the defendant makes a formal request." (People v. Blair (2005) 36 Cal.4th 686, 744.) In People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412 (Boyer), the California Supreme Court explained that, "as a corollary of its duty to instruct on all principles closely and openly connected with the facts of the case, and which are necessary for the jury's understanding of the case [citations], the court must instruct on an affirmative defense, . . . even in the absence of a request, 'if it appears the defendant is relying on such a defense, or if there is substantial evidence supportive of such a defense and the defense is not inconsistent with the defendant's theory of the case.'" (Id. at pp. 468-469, italics added.) Thus, if the defendant does not rely on a particular defense, the trial court has no sua sponte duty to instruct on that defense if the defense is inconsistent with the defendant's theory of the case. (Ibid.)
Here, it is undisputed that Huerta did not rely on the defense of self-defense. Rather, as discussed, ante, his defense at trial was that there was no evidence he murdered Javier by stabbing him. Thus, given that Huerta did not rely on the defense of self-defense, the court had a duty to instruct the jury on its own initiative on the defense of self-defense under CALCRIM Nos. 505 and 3471 only if (1) there was substantial evidence supportive of such a defense, and (2) the defense of self-defense was not inconsistent with the defendant's theory of the case. (Boyer, supra, 38 Cal.4th at pp. 468-469.)
The record establishes that the defense of self-defense as set forth in CALCRIM Nos. 505 and 3471 was inconsistent with Huerta's defense theory of the case because his defense was that he did not kill Javier, whereas a defense of self-defense would have been premised on the claim he was justified in killing Javier. Because the defense of self-defense was inconsistent with Huerta's defense theory of the case, we conclude the court had no duty to instruct the jury on its own initiative on the defense of self-defense under CALCRIM Nos. 505 and 3471. Accordingly, we reject Huerta's claim of instructional error and affirm the judgment.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NARES, J. WE CONCUR: BENKE, Acting P. J. IRION, J.