Opinion
C099826
08-12-2024
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ERIC MITCHELL HUDSONBROYER, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
(Super. Ct. No. 62186715)
BOULWARE EURIE, J.
Defendant Eric Mitchell HudsonBroyer appeals from the trial court's imposition of an agreed upon two-year local prison sentence, split between one year in custody and one year of mandatory supervision. He challenges one of his mandatory supervision terms as an overbroad delegation of judicial authority violating the separation of powers doctrine. Specifically, HudsonBroyer complains one of his conditions of mandatory supervision unconstitutionally delegates to the probation officer the authority to determine what kinds of rehabilitative programs he must undertake. We agree that the mandatory supervision condition, as written, improperly delegates judicial authority and will remand this matter with directions to strike the challenged condition or tailor it in accordance with this opinion.
BACKGROUND
On July 23, 2022, Rocklin Police Officer Adoni Stragalinos stopped HudsonBroyer for exhibition of speed and for crossing over the pedestrian crosswalk when awaiting a red light. HudsonBroyer had been driving with a suspended license. HudsonBroyer told Officer Stragalinos he was on searchable probation or parole for being a felon in possession of a concealed firearm and that she could search him for weapons. Officer Stragalinos found brass knuckles in HudsonBroyer's front pants pocket.
On July 14, 2023, HudsonBroyer resolved two cases pending against him by pleading no contest to possession of a deadly weapon (metal knuckles) (Pen. Code, § 21810) in exchange for a two-year middle term local prison sentence, split between one year in custody and one year on mandatory supervision. HudsonBroyer would also receive dismissal of his misdemeanor case "with a Harvey waiver just for drug terms" on the mandatory supervision. A presentence probation report was not prepared.
Thereafter, on October 25, 2023, the trial court sentenced HudsonBroyer to the agreed upon sentence and imposed various terms and conditions of mandatory supervision. Included among these, was mandatory supervision condition No. 4, from a standardized mandatory supervision check-the-box form, which stated: "After completion of his/her jail commitment, enter into and continue such education, psychological, psychiatric, drug, alcohol, or other rehabilitation program as prescribed by your probation officer, and shall not leave or terminate such programs without the permission of the probation officer." The final sentence of mandatory supervision condition No. 4 read, "Such program shall consist of: ." This portion of the form was left blank. None of the boxes for specialized terms, including those related to drug treatment or mental health, were selected. Nor was HudsonBroyer directed to generally abstain from the use of drugs or alcohol, nor to test for those substances. HudsonBroyer timely appealed in October 2023. His opening brief was filed in April 2024, and this case became fully briefed on May 17, 2024.
The trial court relayed this portion of the condition at the sentencing hearing.
DISCUSSION
HudsonBroyer challenges mandatory supervision condition No. 4 as an overbroad delegation of judicial authority violating the separation of powers doctrine. For the reasons we shall explain, we agree that, as written, the condition violates the doctrine.
A. Standard of Review
"A condition of mandatory supervision may be challenged on the same grounds as a condition of parole, which in turn, may be challenged based on the same standards as developed for challenging probation conditions." (People v. Brand (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 861, 866.) Under this standard, we review mandatory supervision conditions for abuse of discretion. (People v. Malago (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 1301, 1305.) We review constitutional challenges to mandatory supervision conditions de novo. (Brand, at p. 867.)
B. Condition No. 4 Improperly Delegates Judicial Authority
Article III, section 3 of the California Constitution states: "The powers of state government are legislative, executive, and judicial. Persons charged with the exercise of one power may not exercise either of the others except as permitted by this Constitution."
" 'The correct principle deducible from the better-reasoned cases dealing with the separation of powers seem to be that even the primary function of any of the three departments may be exercised by any other governmental department or agency so long as (1) the exercise thereof is incidental or subsidiary to a function or power otherwise properly exercised by such department or agency, and (2) the department to which the function so exercised is primary retains some sort of ultimate control over its exercise, as by court review in the case of the exercise of a power judicial in nature.'" (In re Danielle W. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1227, 1236.)
Penal Code section 1203.1 "gives trial courts broad discretion to determine whether to grant an eligible defendant probation, and if so, what terms of probation will promote rehabilitation and protect public safety." (People v. Hall (2017) 2 Cal.5th 494, 498.) The broad discretion conferred on trial courts to formulate terms and conditions of probation "is not boundless; the authority is wholly statutory, and the statute furnishes and limits the measure of authority which the court may exercise." (People v. Cervantes (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 353, 356, superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in People v. DiMora (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1545, 1549.) "[N]o statutory provision sanction[s] a delegation of unlimited discretion to a probation officer" to implement or interpret probationary terms. (Cervantes, at p. 358.) "[T]hese determinations are essentially judicial functions." (Ibid.)
Nonetheless, Government Code section 27771 vests a probation officer with "perform[ing] the duties and discharg[ing] the obligations imposed on the office by law or by order of the superior court, including ....[¶] . . . [¶] (5) Community supervision of individuals subject to mandatory supervision pursuant to subparagraph (B) of paragraph (5) of subdivision (h) of Section 1170 of the Penal Code." (Gov. Code, § 27771, subd. (a)(5).) Thus, part of a probation officer's charge is supervising the terms and conditions of mandatory supervision imposed by the trial court.
As part of these duties as explained in People v. O'Neil (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1351, "probation officers may be given 'wide discretion to enforce court-ordered conditions'" but cannot "create conditions not expressly authorized by the court" (id. at p. 1358). "There are many understandable considerations of efficiency and practicality that make it reasonable to leave to the probation department the amplification and refinement of a [probation condition]. The court may leave to the discretion of the probation officer the specification of the many details that invariably are necessary to implement the terms of probation. However, the court's order cannot be entirely open-ended. It is for the court to determine the nature of the prohibition placed on a defendant as a condition of probation." (Id. at pp. 1358-1359.)
Where a trial court unequivocally imposes a requirement to attend a specific kind of program but leaves the selection of which program to a probation officer, such delegations are permissible. (See People v. Penoli (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 298, 307-309 [not improper to delegate to probation selection of the specific residential drug rehabilitation program for the defendant and determine whether he successfully completed it].) "The trial court is poorly equipped to micromanage selection of a program, both because it lacks the ability to remain apprised of currently available programs and, more fundamentally, because entry into a particular program may depend on mercurial questions of timing and availability." (Id. at p. 308.) However, a court may not "completely delegate the setting of [an adult probation] condition to the probation department." (In re D.N. (2022) 14 Cal.5th 202, 209, fn. 4.)
Thus, it is clear that a "probation officer may properly specify the details necessary to effectuate the court's probation conditions, [but] it is the court's duty to determine the nature of the requirements imposed on the probationer." (People v. Smith (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 897, 902.)
Here, the trial court ordered HudsonBroyer to "enter into and continue such education, psychological, psychiatric, drug, alcohol, or other rehabilitation program as prescribed by the probation officer." (Italics added.) On its face, this provision appears to give the probation officer untethered discretion to determine whether HudsonBroyer will participate in "education, psychological, psychiatric, drug, alcohol, or other rehabilitation programs." However, it only does so because the trial court failed to complete the last sentence of the condition that read, "Such program shall consist of: ." Had the court directed the types of programs for completion, this condition would not run afoul of the separation of powers doctrine. (People v. Penoli, supra, 46 Cal.App.4th at pp. 307-309.) Nor is there any other information in the record tethering the probation department's exercise of discretion in mandatory supervision condition No. 4. Rather, there was no probation report, and no other conditions of mandatory supervision can be said to inform the probation officer's exercise of this discretion, even though the inclusion of drug conditions was contemplated by HudsonBroyer's plea agreement.
This is an unconstitutional delegation of power. (People v. Smith, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 902; In re D.N., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 210 [conceding a probation condition allowing a probation officer to find a violation of probation and impose a sanction would invoke separation of powers problems].)
DISPOSITION
The authorization for the probation officer to determine whether to prescribe "education, psychological, psychiatric, drug, alcohol, or other rehabilitation program" is reversed. The matter is remanded with directions for the trial court to either strike mandatory supervision condition No. 4 or to revise that condition in conformity with the guidance provided in the opinion. The judgment is otherwise affirmed.
We concur: HULL, Acting P. J., DUARTE, J.