Opinion
C040477.
7-22-2003
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. RONALD EUGENE HUDSON, Defendant and Appellant.
A jury convicted defendant Ronald Eugene Hudson of the second degree murder of his brother, David Hudson, and the first degree murder of Davids spouse, Peggy Hudson (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a); further section references are to the Penal Code), and found that he personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)(1)) and personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury and death (& sect; 12022.53, subd. (d)). The jury found true the multiple murder special circumstance allegation (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)) and determined that defendant was legally sane at the time he committed the offenses.
Sentenced to state prison, defendant appeals. He contends his conviction for the second degree murder of his brother must be reversed because the trial court erred in denying defendants request for instructions on the law of imperfect self-defense. We disagree and shall affirm the judgment.
FACTS
Around 10:00 a.m. on August 13, 2000, David Hudson and his wife, Peggy Hudson, left their home to go to church. A neighbor heard several gunshots between 10:00 and 10:30 a.m. Later that day, the bodies of David and Peggy were found on the road near their home. David had gunshot wounds to his chest, thigh, hand, and head—the latter of which was fired at close range but not as close as the chest wound. Two .38 caliber bullets were removed from Davids body. Peggy had gunshot wounds to her face and her arm—the latter of which passed through her aorta. Two bullets recovered from Peggys body were smaller than the bullets recovered from Davids body. At the scene, officers found a .12 gauge shotgun shell, .38 special cartridges, and a magazine for a .25 caliber semiautomatic pistol.
For simplicity and to avoid confusion, we hereafter shall refer to David Hudson and Peggy Hudson by their first names.
On August 28, 2000, defendant went to a sheriffs office in Arizona and turned himself in, stating that he had been accused of having had inappropriate conduct with his niece, that he was angry about it, that he confronted his brother and shot him as well as defendants sister-in-law, that he knew he was wanted for shooting his brother, and that he wanted to show the police where the gun was located. After waiving his Miranda rights (Miranda v.Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602]), defendant gave a videotaped confession that was played for the jury.
The parties summaries of the facts are largely unhelpful. Defendants appellate counsel fails to comply with the rule requirement to provide record citations in support her recount of defendants statements (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 14(a)(1)(C)) and lumps together multiple "facts" without separate record citations as to each. The People cite to the record but not to defendants statements to the police; instead, the People rely on testimony of defense witness Dr. David McGee-Williams, who recounted defendants statements to him during an evaluation.
We shall summarize defendants statements to law enforcement based upon our review of the videotape and transcript of those statements.
During the statement given to Arizona authorities, defendant said the following:
Prior to the shooting, defendant had been living in a motor home in Texas. He believed that his brother, David, was spreading false rumors about defendant molesting Davids daughter many years ago, and that people were whispering about defendant. Thus, he went to Davids home to confront him. Defendant stopped in the driveway and got out of the car with two guns in his pockets, a .25 caliber and a .38 caliber special. David came driving down the driveway with his wife, Peggy, in the passenger seat. David stopped and asked, "Is anything wrong?" Defendant replied that David was in big trouble. David got out of his car, and defendant took the .38 caliber firearm out of his pocket. As defendant tried to pull the hammer back, David attempted to wrestle the gun away from defendant. The gun went off. Defendant then fired several more times. After David fell to the ground, defendant fired a shot into Davids head. During the shooting, Peggy was saying, "My God," over and over. Defendant approached her, and shot her in the head as she tried to bat the gun from her face. According to defendant, Peggy had been "trash mouthing" him.
Two detectives from Trinity County went to Arizona and spoke with defendant. His confession to them was videotaped and played for the jury. During that confession, he reiterated some of what he previously had stated to Arizona authorities. Defendant also claimed that he believed David had a bulletproof vest or full body armor. He admitted that, a few months before the killings, he called David and threatened those who were talking about defendant.
DISCUSSION
Defendant claims that he "presented sufficient evidence that his mental impairment caused him to believe, although unreasonably, that he needed to defend himself against his brother." Therefore, he contends, the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter based upon imperfect self-defense. (See CALJIC No. 5.17.) We disagree.
"The ordinary self-defense doctrine—applicable when a defendant reasonably believes that his safety is endangered—may not be invoked by a defendant who, through his own wrongful conduct (e.g., the initiation of a physical assault or the commission of a felony), has created circumstances under which his adversarys attack or pursuit is legally justified. [Citations.] It follows, a fortiori, that the imperfect self-defense doctrine cannot be invoked in such circumstances. For example, the imperfect self-defense doctrine would not permit a fleeing felon who shoots a pursuing police officer to escape a murder conviction even if the felon killed his pursuer with an actual belief in the need for self-defense." (In re Christian S. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 768, 773, fn. 1, 872 P.2d 574, orig. italics.)
Here, defendant drove from Texas to Trinity County heavily armed for a planned confrontation with his brother, David, over perceived persecution about defendants alleged molestation of his niece more than 20 years ago. Defendant intercepted his brother driving down the driveway of his home with his spouse in the car. When David stopped and asked if anything was wrong, defendant said David was the trouble. Defendant then got out of his car armed with two loaded weapons. As defendant started to pull the hammer back on one of the guns, David tried to wrestle the gun away from defendant. According to defendant, the gun fired accidentally, wounding Davis in the chest. Defendant then proceeded to shoot several more rounds into his brother, including into Davids head, killing him.
Because defendants own wrongful conduct of pulling a gun on his unarmed brother led to Davids attempt to wrestle the gun away, the trial court properly concluded imperfect self-defense was not available to negate malice aforethought. (In re Christian S., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 773.) As noted in the imperfect self-defense instruction, that principle of law "is not available, and malice aforethought is not negated, if the defendant by [his] . . . [wrongful] conduct created the circumstances which legally justified [his] . . . adversarys [use of force], [attack] [or] [pursuit]." (CALJIC No. 5.17.)
Accordingly, defendant could not escape a murder conviction even if he pulled the trigger in the actual, but unreasonable, belief in the need for self-defense.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: DAVIS, J., NICHOLSON, J.