"Nothing in the record of the plea allocution called into question the voluntary, knowing and intelligent nature of defendant's bargained-for plea" ( People v Seeber, 4 NY3d 780, 780 [citation omitted]). Nor was any hearing required based on hearsay or vague, ambiguous or conclusory statements contained in the affirmation of defendant's second attorney ( see People v Wyant, 47 AD3d 1068, 1069, lv denied 10 NY3d 873; People v Hudson, 237 AD2d 759, 760, lv denied 90 NY2d 1012; compare People v Hawkins, 271 AD2d 756, 758). Although counsel was granted an adjournment to prepare the motion to withdraw the plea, no affidavit by defendant was submitted to substantiate his claim of ineffective assistance or to cast doubt on his ability to comprehend the plea proceedings. "`In the context of a guilty plea, a defendant has been afforded meaningful representation when he or she receives an advantageous plea and nothing in the record casts doubt on the apparent effectiveness of counsel'" ( People v Singletary, 51 AD3d 1334, 1335, lv denied 11 NY3d 741, quoting People v Ford, 86 NY2d 397, 404). Defendant was 18 years old at the time of his plea, and the benefit of avoiding a potential life sentence is self-evident. During his plea, defendant expressly acknowledged his satisfaction with counsel and admitted discussing his rights and possible defenses with counsel, which counsel confirmed on the record.
The court further determined that he was not coerced into entering the plea and he had conferred with counsel as to, inter alia, his legal rights and possible defenses. Inasmuch as defendant admitted committing the crimes, never asserted his innocence during the plea proceeding and proffered no evidence of innocence at the hearing on his motion, the court's denial of defendant's motion on this basis was not an abuse of discretion (see People v. Davis, 250 A.D.2d 939, 940;People v. Hudson, 237 A.D.2d 759, 760, lv denied 90 N.Y.2d 1012). Defendant's challenge to the voluntariness of his plea is predicated on former counsel's alleged failure to investigate defendant's alibi defense.
Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion in summarily denying the pro se motion of defendant to withdraw his guilty plea ( see CPL 220.60; People v. Franco, 145 A.D.2d 837). "The record establishes that a favorable and voluntary plea was entered after a thorough allocution" ( People v. Rivera, 258 A.D.2d 426, 426, lv denied 93 N.Y.2d 1005; see People v. Frederick, 45 N.Y.2d 520, 524-526), and the court "personally observed defendant's participation in extensive plea negotiations, as well as defendant's demeanor and attitude, both at the time the plea was entered and thereafter" ( People v. Aquino, 237 A.D.2d 203, 204; see also People v. Hudson, 237 A.D.2d 759, 760, lv denied 90 N.Y.2d 1012). We further conclude that defense counsel's statements in response to the pro se motion of defendant to withdraw his guilty plea did not deny defendant effective assistance of counsel.
Other jurisdictions recognize in varying circumstances the existence of the crime of attempted perjury. (See State of La. ex rel. Gwin v. Dees (5th Cir. 1969) 410 F.2d 321, 324 [Louisiana]; Miscovsky v. State (Okla.App. 2001) 31 P.3d 1054, 1058 [Oklahoma]; Commonwealth v. D'Amour (Mass. 1999) 704 N.E.2d 1166, 1170 [Massachusetts]; State v. Cooks (Ohio App. 1997) 707 N.E.2d 1176, 1177 [Ohio]; People v. Hudson (N.Y.App. 1997) 655 N.Y.S.2d 142 [New York]; State v. Hyde (Or.App. 1977) 561 P.2d 659, 661 [Oregon].) Only one state, Florida, has refused to recognize that the crime of attempted perjury can be committed.
, People v. Munck, 278 A.D.2d 662, 663). Finally, the fact that defense counsel advised defendant to accept the plea offer to avoid the possibility of a harsher sentence after trial does not constitute undue pressure or coercion (see, People v. Dashnaw, 260 A.D.2d 658, 659, lv denied 93 N.Y.2d 968). Despite being afforded an ample opportunity to substantiate his request to withdraw the plea, defendant offered claims which were insufficient on their face and, therefore, we find no error in County Court's failure to appoint another counsel or to conduct an evidentiary hearing (see, e.g.,People v. Davis, 246 A.D.2d 931, 932, lv denied 91 N.Y.2d 1006; People v. Hudson, 237 A.D.2d 759, 760, lv denied 90 N.Y.2d 1012). Mercure, J.P., Spain, Carpinello and Mugglin, JJ., concur.
He also acknowledged that he had not been forced, threatened or coerced into pleading guilty. Finally, he freely admitted that he had engaged in the specific conduct that constituted the crime of burglary in the second degree. In these circumstances, there is no basis to disturb County Court's denial of defendant's request to withdraw the plea based on conclusory claims of duress, innocence and ineffective assistance of counsel that have no support in the record (see, People v. Anderson, 270 A.D.2d 509, lvs denied 95 N.Y.2d 792, 793;People v. Hudson, 237 A.D.2d 759, lv denied 90 N.Y.2d 1012). The record on this direct appeal discloses that defense counsel provided meaningful representation and negotiated a favorable plea bargain and that defendant knowingly and voluntarily entered his plea after having an ample opportunity to discuss and consider the plea bargain.
This is not one of those rare cases in which the statements of defendant cast significant doubt on his guilt or otherwise call into question the voluntariness of the plea ( see, People v. Toxey, supra, at 726; People v. Lopez, supra, at 666). Defendant received meaningful representation ( see, People v. Ford, 86 N.Y.2d 397, 404; People v Hudson, 237 A.D.2d 759, 760, lv denied 90 N.Y.2d 1012), and the sentence is neither unduly harsh nor severe.
Defendant's acknowledgment of the facts underlying the charge of misdemeanor driving while intoxicated was sufficient to support the plea of guilty to that charge ( see, Vehicle and Traffic Law ยง 1192). Finally, we conclude that defendant received meaningful representation ( see, People v. Ford, 86 N.Y.2d 397, 404; People v. Hudson, 237 A.D.2d 759, 760, lv denied 90 N.Y.2d 1012).
With regard to defendant's motion to withdraw the plea, the record discloses that prior to accepting the plea, County Court advised defendant of the rights he would be waiving and defendant acknowledged that he understood those rights and was acting voluntarily with no coercion. Defendant freely admitted his guilt of the two crimes and, as a result of the plea bargain, was assured of concurrent sentences that were considerably less than the harshest possible consecutive sentences that could have been imposed. In these circumstances, defendant's conclusory claims of innocence, coercion and/or ineffective assistance of counsel, which remained unsubstantiated despite the ample opportunity afforded by County Court to defendant and his attorney on the motion, provided no basis to vacate the plea (see, People v. Feliciano, 242 A.D.2d 787; People v. Hudson, 237 A.D.2d 759, lv denied 90 N.Y.2d 1012). Crew III, Peters, Carpinello and Mugglin, JJ., concur.
The prosecutor is free to set forth the terms under which a plea offer may be accepted (see, People v. Eaddy, 200 A.D.2d 896, 897, lv denied 83 N.Y.2d 852) "and there is nothing coercive in leaving with the defendant the option to accept or reject a bargain if one is offered" (People v. Seaberg, 74 N.Y.2d 1, 8-9). Furthermore, the transcript of the plea proceeding reveals that defendant's plea was knowing, voluntary and intelligent and there is nothing in this record which casts doubt on counsel's effectiveness. Given defendant's conclusory allegations of innocence, coercion and ineffective assistance of counsel (see,People v. Feliciano, 242 A.D.2d 787; People v. Hudson, 237 A.D.2d 759, 760, lv denied 90 N.Y.2d 1012), we find no error in County Court's denial of the withdrawal motion. Defendant's contention that the sentence should be reduced to an eight-year prison term is similarly unavailing.