Opinion
G053016
01-23-2017
In re H.T., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. H.T., Defendant and Appellant.
Erica Gambale, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric Swenson and Barry Carlton, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. DL048397) OPINION Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County, Cheryl L. Leininger, Judge. Reversed and remanded. Erica Gambale, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric Swenson and Barry Carlton, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
* * *
In 2013 the court sustained a petition alleging defendant H.T. committed misdemeanor battery on school grounds (Pen. Code, § 243.2, subd. (a)(1)) and misdemeanor dissuading a witness (Pen. Code, § 136.1, subdivision (b)(1)). The court declared defendant a ward of the state, placed him on probation, and issued a restraining order.
In 2016 the court found defendant had successfully completed his probation and terminated jurisdiction. Despite defendant's concurrent request, however, the court refused to seal his record because the restraining order was still in effect. The court explained it would consider the motion after the restraining order had expired. The Attorney General agrees with defendant the failure to seal the record was error.
The restraining order was to expire in October 2016.
Welfare and Institutions Code section 786, subdivision (a) (all further statutory references are to this code, unless otherwise stated) states that once a ward "satisfactorily completes" probation, the court "shall order" records to be sealed. Section 786, subdivision (d) lists the only exception to sealing, i.e., if the underlying offense was included in section 707, subdivision (b). The minor's offenses did not fall within that statute.
The unambiguous language of section 786, subdivision (a) requires sealing. There is no exception for an outstanding restraining order. And section 786, subdivision (c)(1) prohibits a court form extending probation merely to delay or defer sealing of the minor's records. The statute plainly sets out the Legislature's intent. In construing a statute, we are only to determine what it means based on its language and "not to insert what has been omitted, or to omit what has been inserted." (Code Civ. Proc., § 1858.)
Defendant argues other provisions of section 786 also support a construction to require sealing and still allow for enforcement of the restraining order. For example, both the court and a victim may enforce a restitution order after the records have been sealed. (§ 786, subd. (g)(1), (2).) By analogy, then, the court would have authority to enforce a restraining order after a record has been sealed.
The Attorney General presents an alternative ground for requiring sealing based on section 786, subdivision (g)(2), that contains an exception to enforce a civil judgment, contending a restraining order is a civil judgment. We see no need to rely on this argument. --------
The order is reversed and the matter remanded for the court to seal the record.
THOMPSON, J. WE CONCUR: MOORE, ACTING P. J. ARONSON, J.