Opinion
C086583
10-03-2019
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. RICHARD LEE HRANAC, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 16FE024088)
Defendant Richard Lee Hranac was found guilty of multiple counts of lewd and lascivious conduct, oral copulation, and sexual intercourse or sodomy with M., his minor stepdaughter who was six to 10 years old during the time of the offenses. The court sentenced him to an indeterminate term of 125 years to life in state prison, plus a determinate term of 14 years.
Defendant contends on appeal that the trial court erred by: (1) permitting expert testimony on child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome, which he contends violated his constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial; and (2) admitting evidence that he furnished his minor stepson with methamphetamine, as the evidence was more prejudicial than probative under Evidence Code section 352.
We conclude the trial court properly admitted the child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome evidence and that any error in admitting the methamphetamine evidence was harmless. We affirm the judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
Defendant was charged with four counts of lewd and lascivious acts upon a child less than 14 years (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)—counts 1-4), five counts of oral copulation with a child of 10 years or less (§ 288.7, subd. (b)—counts 5-9), and two counts of sexual intercourse or sodomy with a child of 10 years or less (§ 288.7, subd. (a)—counts 10-11). The following evidence was adduced at trial.
Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Defendant was married to M.'s mother. M. lived with her mother, her brother Matthew, and defendant until shortly before she turned 11 years old. During that time, M.'s mother was very sick and suffered from significant heart-related health issues. She was frequently in the hospital and did not work. Defendant was her caretaker and worked only intermittently.
M. was born in January 2000, and she was 17 years old at the time of trial. Defendant was 36 years old during trial.
The family was poor and was evicted multiple times when M. was young. At one point they lived in a motel and later moved in with family members. Although M. and defendant were close, Matthew and defendant had a volatile relationship and would sometimes get in physical fights, which scared M.
The evidence at trial conflicted over M.'s living conditions while she resided with defendant and her mother. For example, M.'s maternal aunt testified that the duplex on Grady Street, where the family lived for a period of time, was disgusting and smelled vile, and a school principal who took M. and Matthew home one day described the house as "disgusting." Matthew admitted that his house was often dirty and that they cleaned it up before Child Protective Services (CPS) arrived. When CPS investigated the home in February 2008, they found it clean and appropriately furnished.
When M. was eight years old, her mother had a stroke and was admitted to the hospital. The next day, when the children returned from school, defendant sent Matthew to a store that was far away from the family's duplex on Grady Drive in Citrus Heights to purchase something defendant said he needed. After Matthew left, defendant and M. were alone in the house. Defendant asked M. if she wanted to make some money. She said yes.
According to M., defendant was lying on his bed with a blanket covering the lower half of his body. He had her sit on the bed next to him. When he removed the blanket, he was naked from the waist down. He asked M. to stroke his erect penis, showed her what to do, and she masturbated him until he told her to stop. When she left his bedroom, she saw him ejaculate on his stomach. Later that day, defendant gave M. $5 or $10, and told her not to tell anyone. Because she was so young, she did not realize that what defendant had her do was abnormal.
M. estimated that she masturbated defendant two to five times every one to two weeks, and at least 10 times, at the Grady Drive duplex. Defendant would have her do it when they were alone in the house. He told her she would make a good prostitute, although at the time she did not understand what he meant.
After M. had masturbated defendant on several occasions, defendant instructed her on how to perform oral sex by putting her mouth on his penis and stroking her hand. At the time, M. was eight or nine years old and did not know about oral sex. Thereafter, M. continued to perform oral sex on defendant several times a week at the Grady Drive duplex. In exchange for orally copulating him, defendant would offer M. money or buy her things she wanted. She estimated the oral copulation occurred at the same frequency as when defendant had her masturbate him.
When the family moved from the Grady Drive duplex to the Palm Garden Apartments, the sexual abuse continued. M. would masturbate and orally copulate defendant with the same frequency as when they lived at the Grady Drive duplex. Defendant continued to pay M. money or buy her candy or food. She estimated that she orally copulated defendant at the Palm Garden Apartments more than 10 times.
The family later moved from the Palm Garden Apartments to a motel. Although the frequency of the sexual abuse lessened while the family was living in a single motel room, defendant still had M. masturbate and orally copulate him on at least five occasions when they were alone in the room.
The family next moved in with defendant's sister, her husband, and their children in an apartment near Sunrise Mall (the Sunrise Mall apartment). M. was around 10 years old. M. estimated that she masturbated and orally copulated defendant between five and 10 times when they lived at the Sunrise Mall apartment.
Defendant's niece, who lived with defendant at the Sunrise Mall apartment for a short time, testified on behalf of defendant that he never touched her in a sexually inappropriate manner.
M. also testified that she and defendant would sometimes walk to a nearby wooded area that was secluded; there was a chair in the wooded area that defendant sat on while M. masturbated and orally copulated him at least 10 times. One time in the wooded area, defendant told M. he would give her $100 if she had sex with him. She pulled her pants down and defendant pulled his pants down and sat on the chair. M. sat down sideways on his lap, and defendant tried to insert his penis into her vagina. Instead, his penis went into her rectum for a few seconds. M. became scared because she thought she heard someone coming, so she got off defendant's lap and pulled up her pants. Defendant later paid M. some money, but not the $100 he promised.
A few weeks later, defendant came into M.'s room at the Sunrise Mall apartment and told her to take her pants off. She complied. Defendant removed his own pants and applied lubricant to his penis. Defendant inserted his penis into M.'s vagina, but she told him to stop because it hurt. Following this incident, defendant did not try to have vaginal intercourse with M. again.
While M. lived with her mother and defendant, the family was reported to CPS numerous times. Because M. did not want to be taken from her mother, who she considered her best friend, and she did not want defendant to be taken away from her mother, since he was her caregiver, M. would clean the house before CPS visited and tell them everything was fine. She did not disclose the sexual abuse to the social workers.
One anonymous report to CPS was made in June 2009 from Carol, who lived in a neighboring duplex on Grady Drive. She testified that she talked with M. and Matthew at a party for another neighborhood child named Elizabeth. Matthew was very hyper and told Carol that defendant had given him methamphetamine. According to Carol, M. told her she was being sexually abused and forced to perform oral sex on defendant. At trial, M. did not remember telling Elizabeth or Carol about the sexual abuse.
Before trial, defense counsel moved to exclude evidence that defendant had given Matthew drugs. The court denied the motion.
Carol told other adults at the party what M. and Matthew had said, and a group later confronted defendant. Carol stood at a distance and watched; she was scared the confrontation would turn violent. During the heated confrontation, she heard someone say, " 'You're molesting your children, you're giving them methamphetamine, you're a piece of shit.' " Defendant replied, " 'I'll do whatever I want. These are my children. It is none of your business.' "
In response to Carol's anonymous report about possible child molestation and drug use, CPS visited the family at the Grady Drive duplex in June 2009. The social worker spoke with M. and Matthew at the same time. Both children denied that defendant used drugs and said the neighbors did not like him. They admitted they gave defendant backrubs, but said they liked it and the backrubs were not " 'nasty.' " M. denied that defendant had ever touched her inappropriately or asked her to touch him, and Matthew denied that defendant had given him methamphetamine. Although CPS later received a report that M. said she orally copulated defendant, the agency did not follow up on the report.
Five days before M.'s eleventh birthday, in January 2011, her mother unsuccessfully attempted suicide. Afterwards, M. and Matthew went to live with their biological father, although Matthew later returned to live with their mother. M. did not disclose the sexual abuse to her father at that time because her brother was still living with their mother and she did not want him to be taken away from her. She also feared that her father would become enraged and try to harm defendant if he found out.
During trial, Matthew admitted that he made a false report to CPS about his father so that he could return to his mother. He did not believe she would live that long, given her severe health issues.
M.'s mother passed away in August 2013. After her passing, M. kept the sexual abuse a secret because she was afraid her father would try to kill defendant. M. contacted defendant several times on social media following her mother's death, asking him how he was doing, wishing him happy birthday, asking about her mother's ashes, and talking about being in a relationship with a boy. She admitted at trial that she still cared about defendant.
Defendant's mother testified that after M.'s mother died, a dispute arose between her and M.'s father over M.'s mother's cremated ashes.
When she was about 14 years old, M. eventually told two of her friends that she gave defendant oral sex for money, but asked that they keep it a secret. She later told her friend, Jacob, that she was molested when she was younger and asked that he keep it a secret. According to Jacob, M. did not provide details surrounding the molestation. M. also confided in her cousin that defendant would bribe her with candy and money to give him oral sex. Her cousin said M. later confided that defendant tried to have sex with her, but she said it hurt and he stopped. At her cousin's urging, M. reluctantly told her aunt.
Several years after M. disclosed the abuse to Jacob, he was interviewed by police and told them that he could not recall if M. identified the person who molested her, but that he thought she had been molested by an uncle or her dad's friend because "the guy who molested her helped pay [her mother's] medical bills."
Her aunt told M.'s father, and M.'s father called police. Sheriff's Deputy Michael Beggs responded to the call, and briefly interviewed M. while her stepmother was present. During the interview, M. talked about masturbating defendant and orally copulating him, and also about two acts of penetration that had occurred. The deputy took notes after she finished speaking, but did not show her his notes before he left. He later wrote a report based on his notes. According to M., who was shown the officer's written report shortly before trial, the officer got some of the details regarding the sexual acts wrong, such as the order of the anal and vaginal sex and where each act took place.
Deputy Beggs initially tried to make an audio recording of the interview, but his equipment failed.
M. later participated in a forensic interview with someone trained to interview alleged child sexual abuse victims. During that interview, M. described acts of masturbation, oral copulation, and penetration, both vaginal and anal. She said the anal penetration occurred before the vaginal penetration, and she specifically remembered one incident when defendant ejaculated, which was the very first time he had her masturbate him at the Grady Drive duplex.
Over defense counsel's pretrial objection, the prosecution called psychologist Dr. Blake Carmichael, an expert on sexual abuse of children, to testify about child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome. He did not know M. and was not familiar with the facts of the case.
Dr. Carmichael testified that children delay reporting sexual abuse for a variety of reasons, including that the child relies on the abuser for care, that the child still values the relationship and is reluctant to see it end, that the child often feels powerless and helpless because the abuser is an older, more dominant person, and that the child fears retribution, especially if the abuser acts violently towards other family members. In some instances, the child goes along with a sexual encounter so that the abuse will be completed sooner. Dr. Carmichael also testified that sexually abused children will sometimes directly deny abuse if asked.
During cross-examination, Dr. Carmichael stated that it was not his role as a psychologist to determine whether an accusation of abuse was true. That determination was for a jury to make in a criminal trial, and he expressed no opinion on whether defendant had sexually abused M.
Defendant testified on his own behalf. He denied the sexual abuse allegations and denied ever giving Matthew methamphetamine. He said he was not around a lot because he could not deal with the stress of his wife's illness, and that as she got sicker, he struggled with a methamphetamine addiction.
Defendant's description of the confrontation with the neighbors conflicted with Carol's version. He claimed that several people jumped him and that someone said something about giving his kids drugs, although they did not specify methamphetamine. He told them to mind their own "F'ing business and walked home . . . ." He denied ever hearing them accuse him of sexually molesting his children.
The officer who later interviewed defendant about the sexual abuse allegations testified that defendant was "taken aback" or shocked upon hearing the allegations.
Defendant also testified that the wooded area near the Sunrise Mall apartment was not secluded, but was visible from several nearby businesses. He said he sometimes walked his dog there alone, but M. and Matthew occasionally would accompany him.
A jury convicted defendant as charged. The court sentenced defendant to an indeterminate term of 125 years to life in prison, plus a determinate 14-year term. The court imposed 15 years to life on counts 5 through 9, 25 years to life on counts 10 and 11, eight years on count 1, and two-year terms on counts 2, 3, and 4. Defendant timely appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome Evidence
Defendant contends the trial court violated his federal and state rights to due process and a fair trial when it allowed Dr. Carmichael to testify as an expert on child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome. We disagree.
Before considering the merits of defendant's contentions, however, we address the People's argument that defendant forfeited his appellate challenge by failing to object when Dr. Carmichael testified. Given the record before us, we conclude no such objection was necessary.
Prior to trial, defense counsel moved in limine to prohibit any evidence regarding child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome and specifically referenced anticipated testimony from Dr. Carmichael. After considering the parties' extensive briefs on the issue and hearing oral argument, the court denied defendant's motion. Because defendant's pretrial in limine objection was specific, was directed to an identifiable body of evidence, and was advanced at a time when the trial judge could give fair consideration to the admissibility of the evidence, the issue was properly preserved for appeal. (Evid. Code, § 353; People v. Morris (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152, 187-190, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Stansbury (1995) 9 Cal.4th 824, 830, fn. 1.) Defendant did not need to renew the objection during Dr. Carmichael's testimony. Having rejected the People's forfeiture argument, we turn now to defendant's evidentiary challenge.
Citing cases from other states, defendant argues that child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome evidence should be held inadmissible in California for all purposes because the jury will invariably use the evidence improperly against a defendant and because the average person no longer harbors misconceptions about child sexual abuse victims. While he acknowledges that the California Supreme Court has "nodded approvingly" to admitting child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome evidence, he nevertheless argues the approval was dictum and should not be followed here. We are not persuaded.
See, e.g., Newkirk v. Commonwealth (Ky. 1996) 937 S.W.2d 690, 691-694; Haddon v. State (Fla. 1997) 690 So.2d 573; State v. Bolin (Tenn. 1996) 922 S.W.2d 870, 872-874.
In California, "it has long been held that in a judicial proceeding presenting the question whether a child has been sexually molested, [child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome] is admissible evidence for the limited purpose of disabusing the fact finder of common misconceptions it might have about how child victims react to sexual abuse." (In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 418; see People v. Mateo (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1063, 1069; People v. Patino (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1737, 1744; People v. Housley (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 947, 955-956; People v. Bowker (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 385, 393-394.) Although expert testimony about how child sexual abuse victims commonly react is not admissible to show a child has in fact been sexually abused, it is admissible to show the alleged victim's conduct was not inconsistent with the conduct of someone who has been molested, and also to evaluate the believability of the alleged victim's testimony. (CALCRIM No. 1193.)
In People v. McAlpin (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1289 (McAlpin) and People v. Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 892 (Brown), our Supreme Court discussed with approval admitting child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome evidence to " 'disabuse jurors of commonly held misconceptions about child sexual abuse, and to explain the emotional antecedents of abused children's seemingly self-impeaching behavior.' " (McAlpin, at p. 1301; Brown, at p. 906.) McAlpin explained the admissibility of evidence about the behavior of child sexual abuse victims to support its conclusion that the trial court properly admitted expert testimony on why a parent might delay reporting sexual abuse of his or her child. (McAlpin, at pp. 1300-1301.) Brown analogized to child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome evidence in holding the trial court properly admitted expert testimony on battered women's syndrome even though there was no proof the defendant abused the victim on more than one occasion. (Brown, at pp. 895-896, 906-907.)
While it may be true, as defendant argues, that neither McAlpin nor Brown involved a child that failed to report sexual abuse or otherwise denied or recanted sexual abuse accusations (Consumers Lobby Against Monopolies v. Public Utilities Com. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 891, 902, disapproved on other grounds in Kowis v. Howard (1992) 3 Cal.4th 888, 896-897 [an observation unnecessary to a court decision does not constitute binding precedent]), we consider the discussions by our Supreme Court on the admissibility of child abuse accommodation syndrome evidence in each case persuasive authority which supports the trial court's ruling permitting such evidence here. (United Steelworkers of America v. Board of Education (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 823, 835, abrogated by statute on other grounds ["Even if properly characterized as dictum, statements of the Supreme Court should be considered persuasive"]; San Joaquin etc. Irr. Co. v. County of Stanislaus (1908) 155 Cal. 21, 28 ["it does not follow that the dictum of a court is always and at all times to be discarded. A correct principle of law may be announced in a given case, although it may not be necessary to there apply it"].) That other jurisdictions have resolved the issue differently does not compel a contrary result. (People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 195 [case from a sister state is not controlling]; In re Walton (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 934, 946 [same].)
In this case, Dr. Carmichael's testimony was relevant to help explain why M. did not report the abuse for several years, and why she denied that defendant sexually abused her when directly questioned by CPS. He explained that people often mistakenly believe that children will fight off their abusers or immediately report the abuse to stop it. But it was actually common for a child to delay reporting sexual abuse if the child relies on the abuser for care like M. did here. M.'s mother was very sick, and M. relied on defendant to take care of her and her mother, whom she adored.
Dr. Carmichael's testimony that a child may still value the relationship with his or her abuser, as the sexual abuse is only one aspect of the relationship, helped explain M.'s testimony that she and defendant were close and that she still cared for him, and dispelled the misconception that abusers must force a child not to disclose the abuse. Dr. Carmichael's testimony that a child might be reluctant to disclose abuse if the child has witnessed his or her abuser harm other members of the family helped put in context M.'s testimony that she saw defendant physically harm her brother during violent confrontations that scared her.
The fact that the public might be more aware that sexual abuse occurs does not mean there are no longer misconceptions about child sexual molestation. Dr. Carmichael's testimony was relevant to explain these faulty assumptions concerning how and when a victim of sexual abuse may come forward about the abuse, and that the failure to immediately report abuse or later deny that such abuse occurred is not inconsistent with someone who suffered sexual abuse.
The court, moreover, properly instructed the jury that Dr. Carmichael's testimony was not evidence that defendant committed any of the charged crimes, and that it could only consider his testimony when deciding whether M.'s conduct was not inconsistent with the conduct of someone who has been molested and in evaluating the believability of her testimony. Dr. Carmichael testified that he did not know M. and knew nothing about the case. He also made clear during cross-examination that it was not his role as a psychologist to determine whether the accusations against defendant were true, and he expressed no opinion on whether defendant sexually abused M. The jury was not compelled to accept Dr. Carmichael's testimony or conclude that the delays in reporting here were due to child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome rather than fabrication. His testimony, then, did not unfairly tip a "close case" against defendant. B. Methamphetamine Evidence
Defendant contends the court abused its discretion in admitting evidence that he gave his minor stepson methamphetamine. Even if we assume without deciding that the methamphetamine evidence was inadmissible, we conclude any error in admitting the evidence was harmless.
"Absent fundamental unfairness, state law error in admitting evidence is subject to the traditional Watson test: The reviewing court must ask whether it is reasonably probable the verdict would have been more favorable to the defendant absent the error." (People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 439; see People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836-837.) Although, in general, prior bad acts evidence involves the risk of prejudice (e.g., People v. Thompson (1980) 27 Cal.3d 303, 318), the nature of M.'s testimony recounting defendant's sexual misconduct is not the type which could have been affected by the disputed evidence that defendant gave Matthew methamphetamine on one occasion. (Cf. People v. Bergschneider (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 144, 163, disapproved on another ground in People v. Griffin (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1015, 1028 [in case involving charged sexual offenses, erroneous admission of propensity evidence that the defendant (the victim's stepfather) and her mother previously furnished the victim with drugs not prejudicial].)
M. testified in great detail that defendant had her repeatedly masturbate him between the ages of eight and 10, that he instructed her on how to perform oral sex when she had no idea about the sexual act, that she orally copulated defendant multiple times, and that defendant penetrated her both vaginally and anally when she was 10 years old. At the time, defendant was nearly 20 years older than M. and was married to her mother. Evidence about methamphetamine, which defendant denied, was not nearly as inflammatory as the sexual abuse evidence.
Defense counsel also objected to Carol's testimony that Matthew disclosed to her that defendant had given him methamphetamine. The court overruled the hearsay objection because the evidence was offered for the limited purpose to show what Carol did after the disclosure and not for its truth. At defense counsel's request, the court instructed the jury that the evidence was "not being offered for the truth of the matter," but was instead "being offered to show what [the] witness did subsequent to learning and being told this information."
Under the circumstances and in light of the court's instruction, which we presume the jury followed (People v. Sanchez (2001) 26 Cal.4th 834, 852 ["Jurors are presumed able to understand and correlate instructions and are further presumed to have followed the court's instructions"]), we conclude it is not reasonably probable that a more favorable result would have occurred had the methamphetamine evidence been excluded.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/S/_________
RENNER, J. We concur: /S/_________
BLEASE, Acting P. J. /S/_________
MAURO, J.