Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEALS from judgments of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. LA053051 Kathryne A. Stolz, Judge.
Rachel Lederman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Clinton Howes.
Jennifer A. Mannix, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Robert John Lattanzio.
Edmund G. Brown Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters and Roberta L. Davis, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
SUZUKAWA, J.
Defendants Clinton Howes and Robert John Lattanzio were convicted by a jury of first degree residential burglary and second degree burglary of a motor vehicle. (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 460, subds. (a), (b).) Defendants appeal, contending that there was insufficient evidence to support the first degree burglary conviction in that entry of a carport beneath inhabited condominiums does not constitute entry of an inhabited dwelling house within the meaning of section 460. Respondent disputes defendants’ contentions and requests additional court security fees pursuant to section 1465.8, subdivision (a)(1). We affirm the first degree burglary convictions and order that the abstracts of judgment be modified to reflect additional court security fees.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On July 28, 2006, Damian and Kelli Acevedo were at home in their third floor condominium. Their condominium building is located within a gated complex with approximately 72 condominium units. A remote control device is normally required to open the gate, but it is possible for one vehicle to follow another through the gate while it is open.
Mrs. Acevedo’s car was parked in the complex’s carport. The carport is located at ground level directly underneath the Acevedos’ condominium. The carport is walled on three sides and its ceiling is contiguous with the second floor of the condominium building.
At about 9 p.m., the car alarm from Mrs. Acevedo’s vehicle sounded and Mr. Acevedo ran to a balcony overlooking the gated driveway where cars enter the complex. He looked over the balcony and saw a white van pulling out of the parking space next to Mrs. Acevedo’s vehicle. As the van approached the gate, he saw a man jump into the passenger seat of the moving vehicle. Mr. Acevedo ran to a stairwell balcony in an attempt to identify the vehicle. He recorded the license plate number of the van as it exited the gate.
The Acevedos soon found that Mrs. Acevedo’s car door, which she had locked earlier, was unlocked, and that some of her belongings were strewn outside the car. Mr. Acevedo called police. Responding officers presently located a white van parked on a nearby street. Its license plate number matched the number recorded by Mr. Acevedo. Defendants emerged from a hedge near the parked van, whereupon they were detained by the officers. Mr. Acevedo identified defendants as the persons he had seen in the van. In the van, officers found defendant Howes’s wallet, as well as items worth $400 that Mrs. Acevedo said were taken from her locked car.
The information charged defendants with one count of first degree residential burglary for entering “an inhabited dwelling house and trailer coach and inhabited portion of a building” with the intent to commit larceny and one count of second degree burglary of a vehicle.
The jury received the following instruction regarding burglary of inhabited buildings: “An ‘inhabited dwelling house’ includes an inhabited apartment or condominium. [¶] A house is inhabited if someone uses it as a dwelling, whether or not someone is inside at the time of the alleged entry. [¶] A house includes any structure or garage that is attached to the house and functionally connected with it.” Defendants do not contend that the instruction was improper.
The jury found each defendant guilty on both counts of burglary. Defendants appeal the first degree burglary convictions.
Respondent claims that defendants owe additional court security fees pursuant to section 1465.8.
DISCUSSION
I. First Degree Burglary Convictions
Defendants contend that there was insufficient evidence at trial to support their convictions of first degree burglary. They claim that there is no substantial evidence that they entered an inhabited dwelling or portion thereof. We disagree.
To determine whether there is sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction, the court “must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578.) Reversal based on insufficiency of the evidence “is unwarranted unless it appears ‘that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support [the conviction].’ [Citation.]” (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331.)
A dwelling house is inhabited if it is “currently being used for dwelling purposes.” (§ 459.) A burglary of an inhabited dwelling house, “or the inhabited portion of any other building, is burglary of the first degree.” (§ 460, subd. (a).) “All other kinds of burglary are of the second degree.” (Id., subd. (b).) The Supreme Court has commented that “[t]he term ‘inhabited dwelling house’ for many years has been considered a broad, inclusive definition [citation], and has been analyzed in terms of whether the dwelling was being used as a residence.” (People v. Cruz (1996) 13 Cal.4th 764, 776 (Cruz).) For example, “[a]n apartment house is patently a dwelling house.” (People v. Zelaya (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 73, 75.)
In Cruz, the Supreme Court recognized that the legislative purpose underlying the residential burglary statute is “to protect the peaceful occupation of one’s residence.” (Cruz, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 775.) Further, “‘a person is more likely to react violently to burglary of his living quarters than to burglary of other places because in the former case persons close to him are more likely to be present, because the property threatened is more likely to belong to him, and because the home is usually regarded as a particularly private sanctuary, even as an extension of the person.’” (Ibid., quoting People v. Lewis (1969) 274 Cal.App.2d 912, 920.)
Defendants claim that the carport was not “attached and integral” to the inhabited building, invoking the language used by California courts in deciding whether burglarized structures are part of inhabited dwellings. Defendants note that the carport was open on one side, lacked an interior door leading to a condominium unit, and apparently shared no walls with any condominium unit. Defendants contend further that there was insufficient evidence that the carport was attached to the Acevedos’ particular unit.
“Case law has expanded the definition of ‘inhabited dwelling house’ to include areas not normally considered part of the ‘living space’ of a home.” (People v. Woods (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 345, 347-348 (Woods).) Courts have held that entry of a structure “attached and integral” to an inhabited dwelling house constitutes entry of the dwelling house within the meaning of section 460. (See People v. Cook (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 785, 795-796; People v. Moreno (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 109, 112-113 (Moreno); People v. Ingram (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1397, disapproved on another ground in People v. Dotson (1997) 16 Cal.4th 547, 559.)
In Woods, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at page 349, the court found no error in a finding that an apartment complex laundry room was “an integral part of the complex, and thus an inhabited dwelling,” even though the laundry room was not integral to an individual apartment unit. In In re Christopher J. (1980) 102 Cal.App.3d 76, the defendant was convicted of first degree burglary after he entered a carport that was presumed at trial to be attached to an inhabited dwelling house. The carport in question was “walled on 1 side and roofed, enclosed in the rear with a half wall and open on 2 sides.” (Id. at p. 77.) On appeal, the court held that entry of such a carport is sufficient entry to constitute first degree burglary if the carport is physically attached to a dwelling house. (Id. at p. 80.) In the present case, the evidence shows that the carport was attached to the inhabited condominium building.
Structures are attached and integral to a dwelling house for purposes of first degree burglary when they are physically contiguous and functionally interconnected with the dwelling house. In Moreno, the court reasoned that although there was no interior door between a residence and its connected garage, “given the fact that the garage was under the same roof, functionally interconnected with, and immediately contiguous to other portions of the house,” the garage was part of the dwelling house. (Moreno,supra,158 Cal.App.3d at p. 112.) Similarly, in Ingram, the court held that even though the attached garage could only be accessed from an external entrance, it was attached and integral to the dwelling house, “that is, functionally interconnected with and immediately contiguous to other portions of the house.” (Ingram, supra, 40 Cal.App.4th at p. 1404.)
Contrary to defendants’ contention, the absence of an interior door between the carport and a condominium unit does not defeat the prosecution’s theory that the carport was functionally interconnected with an inhabited dwelling house. Given that “[t]he close physical proximity of an attached structure is precisely what increases the potential for confrontation and threatens the safety of residents” (Ingram, supra, 40 Cal.App.4th at p. 1404), an attached structure may be an integral part of a dwelling even though, as here, it lacks an interior door connecting it with living quarters.
In People v. Rodriguez (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1101, 1108, the court found that a home and attached office were functionally interconnected despite the absence of an interior door connecting the two. The court noted that the home and office were related to one another and that the office contained property belonging to the homeowners. (Ibid.) Further, “[t]here was communication between the home and the office in the sense that the husband and wife freely traveled back and forth between the home and the office in order to maintain both their business and their household. . . . Thus, the home and the office were interrelated and the primary nature of the structure was residential, not commercial.” (Ibid.) Similarly, in this case the carport contains the property of the victims, in the form of their automobile and the personal possessions kept within. The victims travel freely between the carport and their condominium, and the primary nature of the building is residential, not commercial. The carport is, therefore, functionally interconnected with the victims’ condominium unit.
Defendants argue that the carport in this case is not attached to the inhabited condominium, and that entry of the carport is analogous to the entry of a detached garage in People v. Picaroni (1955) 131 Cal.App.2d 612. In Picaroni, a cement walkway separated an uninhabited garage from an inhabited residence. (Id. at p. 617.) The court held that “entry of an uninhabited garage would be burglary of the second degree. Accordingly, the entry of the garage alone would not necessarily be an entry of the inhabited dwelling.” (Id. at p. 618.)
The difference between the present case and Picaroni is that the carport in this case was physically contiguous with the inhabited condominium building, while the garage in Picaroni was separated from the residence by a walkway. In this case, the three walls and ceiling of the burglarized carport were physically attached to the condominium building. Mr. Acevedo testified that the carport was “directly underneath” and “connected with” his condominium, a point never mentioned in defendants’ briefs.
Defendants assert that because the carport did not share a common wall or roof with the condominium building, it was not contiguous with an inhabited dwelling. They point out that the garage in Moreno was attached to a residence by a common wall (Moreno, supra, 158 Cal.App.3d at p. 112), and that in In re Edwardo V. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 591, a burglarized garage shared a common wall and roof with an inhabited duplex. However, common walls and roofs are merely examples of contiguity between inhabited dwellings. In this case, the carport’s ceiling was, essentially, the base of the building’s second floor. Its walls were part of the building. The carport was therefore contiguous with the inhabited condominium building.
Defendant Lattanzio contends that there was no evidence that the carport was immediately contiguous with the victims’ third floor condominium unit, and therefore the carport was not attached and integral to an inhabited dwelling house. It is true that the record is unclear on this point. Mr. Acevedo testified that his residence is located on the third floor. Indeed, the record does not specifically disclose whether another inhabited condominium unit is situated between the Acevedos’ unit and the ground-level carport. Defendant Lattanzio suggests that “[i]t is equally reasonable to infer from the testimony that there was a condo between the Acevedos’ condo and the covered carport.”
However, Mr. Acevedo testified that the carport is “directly underneath” and “connected with [his] condominium.” We believe that a reasonable jury could have inferred from this testimony that the carport was immediately contiguous with an inhabited dwelling house.
Further, it was not strictly necessary for the prosecution to prove that the carport was immediately contiguous with a specific unit. In People v. Coutu (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 192, 193, the court held that “burglary of a storeroom connected to an inhabited dwelling by a breezeway constitutes first degree burglary.” In Coutu, the roof of the dwelling also covered the breezeway and the storeroom. (Ibid.) The court found that “the connecting breezeway structure rendered the storeroom ‘functionally interconnected with’ and ‘an integral part of’ the main house.” (Ibid.) In this case, even if the evidence leaves some possibility that there is a vacant unit between the ground-level carport and the victim’s third floor unit, the vacant unit would be strongly analogous to the breezeway in Coutu. We see no reason why a condominium unit, even an unoccupied one, situated between the carport and the Acevedos’ unit should be treated differently than the breezeway separating the storeroom and the residence in Coutu. Because the carport in this case is contiguous with the inhabited condominium building and in close proximity to inhabited units, it is attached and integral to an inhabited dwelling house.
II. Additional Court Security Fees
The Attorney General contends that the judgments should be modified to reflect an additional $20 court security fee for each defendant under section 1465.8. We agree.
Defendants were ordered to pay one $20 court security fee pursuant to section 1465.8. Section 1465.8, subdivision (a)(1) provides in part that “a fee of twenty dollars ($20) shall be imposed on every conviction for a criminal offense.” Defendants were convicted of two offenses. The plain language of section 1465.8 “requires a fee to be imposed for each of defendant[s’] convictions.” (People v. Schoeb (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 861, 865-866.) The abstracts of judgment should be modified to impose two $20 court security fees on each defendant under section 1465.8.
DISPOSITION
The judgments are modified to impose an additional $20 court security fee on each defendant under section 1465.8. As modified, the judgments are affirmed. The trial court is directed to amend the abstracts of judgment accordingly and to send a certified copy of the amended abstracts to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
We concur: EPSTEIN P. J., WILLHITE J.